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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE 
CAUVERY WATER CONFLICT 
1.1 Evolution of a water conflict 
Since ages human existence depends on the relationship that societies have with 
water resources. It can be seen that most of the ancient civilisations were built 
around rivers. In the current era, water influences almost all facets of economic 
development like agriculture, industries, employment, housing, health and several 
other sectors. But the present development of water resources are taking place in a 
context of limited resources, rivalling priorities, increasing demands and 
institutional limitations (Uitto and Duda, 2002). This is especially true for 
developing countries, though it is a common pattern all over the world. In 
addition, global climate change, causing shifts in spatial and temporal rainfall 
patterns, has added to the existing woes (Ansink and Ruijs, 2008). The escalating 
scarcity of water is exacerbating conflicts over transboundary water resources. 
Their management poses a number of challenges to politicians, planners, 
administrators and scientists. Another interesting point is that economic and 
population growth in developing countries like in India and China is exerting 
further pressure on already stretched resources; and water may become more and 
more a limiting factor in these countries if development of appropriate 
institutional structures and investments on relevant technologies are not taking 
place. In this scenario, an interstate water conflict by the federal states in India 
sharing the Cauvery River is discussed. It is to be noted that the disagreement 
among these Indian states is over the quantitative allocation of available water in 
the river, like in many transboundary rivers of the Middle East, Africa and 
America and not on the water quality issues as predominant in Europe. It will be 
interesting for the reader if we traverse through the historical development of this 
water dispute, explain current political dilemmas in this introductory chapter. 
1.2 Historical background  
Examining the historical train of events that led to the conflict under study can 
furnish meaningful insights over current political stand points and may throw 
some light on possible management measures. The Cauvery river dispute is 
virtually tied up to the history of south India over 800 years even though the last 
100 years are the most significant. The construction of embankments and canal 
irrigation in south India can be traced back to the Gupta era (300-500 A.D), 
evident from the Fa Hsien’s (Buddhist Pilgrim of fifth Century from China) 
travelogue. Even in a time before Guptas, a stone masonry structure across the 
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Cauvery River (Cauvery Anicut) was constructed by an early Chola King, 
Karikala Cholan (200 A.D) to regulate the flood waters.  The irrigation heritage of 
Pallavas (600 A.D.) was flourished during the time of a later Chola dynasty (985-
1205 A.D) when a quite advanced irrigation system including anicuts (a dam 
made in the course of a stream for the purpose of regulating the flow of a system 
of irrigation) and tanks were constructed. The Cauvery anicut, mentioned earlier, 
was strengthened during the British Regime in 18th century. All these irrigation 
facilities were primarily targeted to enhance the cultivation of rice in the Cauvery 
delta region. (Bosu, 1995 and Choudhary, 2000).  
Turbulent times in water sharing in Cauvery basin date back to early 1800 when 
there was a correspondence between the Madras state which was under the British 
rule and the Mysore, which was a princely state (Wodeyar Kings), notably on the 
latter’s use of waters from Cauvery river against the interests of the former (1807 
AD). The delta region of Cauvery was under Madras state of British Empire while 
the upstream area belonged to the princely state of Mysore at that time period. 
From 1831 to 1881, the two states were under British rule and irrigation projects 
continued during early years, but abandoned in 1877 due to a severe famine in 
that year. The irrigation projects were recommenced after the transfer of Mysore 
to Maharaja’s administration in 1881 (Anand, 2004).  
The irrigation developments in Mysore state again raised the concerns of Madras 
state and an official discussion between the two states was organised during 1890 
which resulted in “Irrigation Works in Mysore State - The Madras - Mysore 
Agreement” in 1892. This agreement restricted the Mysore government in 
constructing new reservoirs or anicuts (water diversion structures) in the area 
under her command with out the prior consent of Madras presidency. While the 
Madras state was not allowed to refuse the consent unless the proposal to 
construct new reservoirs violates its already acquired or the actually existing 
prescriptive rights on water. (Bosu, 1995 and Anand, 2004). After a while, both 
governments were of the opinion that the 1892 agreement is against their interests 
as the Mysore observed that her irrigation development is throttled by the 
undefined prescriptive rights of Madras. Meanwhile Madras state was concerned 
of getting completely deprived of any share of available water surpluses.  
Under the auspices of the 1892 agreement, both Madras and Mysore states started 
developing new irrigation projects during the 1900s and 1910s, where the Mysore 
came up with the Kannambadi dam project while Madras was considering the 
Cauvery Mettur project. The Kannambadi dam which is now known as Krishna 
Raja Sagar (KRS) was proposed in two stages where the initial one would create a 
water storage capacity of 11 billion cubic feet (0.31 billion cubic meters) while 
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the second stage would result in additional 30 billion cubic feet storage (0.84 
billion cubic meters). In accordance with the agreement, both riparian states were 
exchanging details of the proposals and the Madras state gave consent to the first 
phase. But it had strong reservations against the construction of second phase.  
Following the discussions during 1910 and 1924, a new agreement was signed by 
the riparian states. Even though the new agreement allowed Mysore to construct 
the second phase of KRS dam, it insisted on limiting the irrigated area to 110, 000 
acres (44,000 ha) and in turn the Madras state agreed to limit the new irrigation 
area of the Mettur dam to 301,000 acres (120,400 ha). Mysore Govt. had to ensure 
the flows to Madras according to the annexure of the agreement, but was allowed 
to expand the effective storage capacity to 45 billion cubic feet (1.27 billion cubic 
meters) in the Cauvery basin. This agreement had an expiry time of 50 years 
(Anand, 2004).  
After the Indian independence from British rule in 1947 and division of the 
country into linguistic-based federal states in 1956, the Mysore princely state fell 
in the state of Karnataka while most of the areas under Madras state of British 
India belonged to the state of Tamil Nadu. Development of irrigation 
infrastructure started soon after its formation in Karnataka and the land area under 
irrigation grew around four times compared to the stipulated area in 1924 
agreement by 1970. This affected the interests of the farmers in the Tamil Nadu 
state where the irrigated agriculture was already well developed and hence the 
Tamil Nadu (TN) Govt approached Government of India to refer the dispute to a 
tribunal under the Inter State Water Disputes Act (ISWD Act, 1956). By this act, 
the Govt. of India can delegate the issue to adjudication by the tribunal only if the 
negotiation between the two riparian states failed to settle the issue. There had 
been 21 rounds of discussion between the states since 1971 without any outcome 
and hence the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal constituted in 1990 following 
ISWD act by the request of TN in 1986. TN wanted Karnataka to restrict her new 
irrigation projects and ensure a timely and adequate water releases. By the early 
80s itself, the scenario of Cauvery water sharing was different in many ways. 
Now the Kerala state claimed 100 billion cubic feet (2.83 million cubic meters) of 
Cauvery water, Karnataka state demanded 465 billion cubic feet (13.16 billion 
cubic meters) and the union territory of Pondichery claimed 10 billion cubic feet 
(0.283 billion cubic metes) and Tamil Nadu was of the opinion that 1897 and 
1924 agreements must be followed (Anand, 2004). 
Soon after the constitution of the tribunal, Tamil Nadu approached the tribunal for 
an interim award for water releases from Karnataka, and the tribunal gave an 
interim award in 1991 according to the Indian Supreme Court directive. This 
entitled 205 billion cubic feet (5.8 billion cubic meters) of annual release of water 
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from Karnataka to Tamil Nadu. The award also included a monthly and weekly 
schedule of water to be released to Tamil Nadu along with a stipulation of barring 
expansion of irrigated area in Karnataka. In turn, Karnataka passed an ordinance 
to make the tribunal award void. The Supreme Court of India intervened and the 
order of the tribunal was upheld making the ordinance invalid. These 
developments caused widespread violence and damages in Karnataka.  In 1995, 
when the monsoon rain failed in Karnataka, the states did not follow the interim 
order of the tribunal and subsequently the state of Tamil Nadu approached the 
tribunal for the immediate release of 30 billion cubic feet of water. The tribunal 
examined the case and ordered Karnataka to release 11 BCF of water. Karnataka 
informed the tribunal that it is not in a position to release 11 BCF water to Tamil 
Nadu and hence Tamil Nadu approached the Supreme Court. The Court in turn 
asked the prime minister to make a political decision and all parties agreed on 
releasing 6 BCF water to Tamil Nadu.                                                                                                   
In 1997, two new bodies viz., the Cauvery River Authority (CRA) and Cauvery 
Monitoring Committee (CMC), were formed by the Government of India. The 
CRA included the prime minister of India and chief ministers of Kerala, 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry; while the CMC was a body of 
engineers, technocrats and other experts for surveillance of ground situation in 
Cauvery and it had to report to CRA. In 2002, the monsoon failed once again in 
Cauvery basin and the Indian Supreme Court, in response to Tamil Nadu’s plea, 
ordered (October, 2002) a release of 1.25 billion cubic feet of water per day 
unless CRA revised it. Subsequently the CRA revised the requirement to 0.8 
billion cubic feet of water per day. But in response to widespread protests in 
Cauvery basin districts in Karnataka against release of Cauvery water, Karnataka 
stalled the release of any water to Tamil Nadu defying the CRA order. 
Subsequently the Supreme Court ordered Karnataka to comply with the CRA 
order which the Karnataka state government refused. In the following legal 
action, Karnataka resumed the release of water to Tamil Nadu in the month of 
November (Wikipedia, 2007). It seems to be a never ending story. 
The development of irrigated areas in both states during the described period is 
quite important. Before 1924, the irrigated area in Cauvery basin (under Madras 
presidency then Tamil Nadu) was around 1.52 million acres. According to the 
Cauvery tribunal, the area developed by Madras/Tamil Nadu state under the 
clauses of 1924 agreement was 0.62 million acres which together constituted an 
area of 2.14 million acres. Further, an area of  0.206 million hectares developed 
by Tamil Nadu outside the provisions of 1924 agreement was held under merit by 
the tribunal along with 125 thousand acres under the minor irrigation category. So 
the total area under irrigation considered under merit by tribunal is 2.471 million 
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acres (1 million hectares). In case of Karnataka, the area before 1924 is only 
0.344 million acres. The area developed under the clauses of the 1924 agreement 
is 0.724 million acres which together constitutes 1.068 million acres (according to 
Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal). An area of 0.691 million acres of irrigated area 
which is now developed by Karnataka outside the provisions of 1924 agreement 
and 0.126 million hectare under minor irrigation are also considered under merit 
by Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT-VOL V, 2007). The total irrigated 
area considered in Karnataka is 1.885 million acres (0.76 million hectares).  Bosu, 
1995 reports that the irrigated area in Karnataka was 2.14 million acres (0.85 
million ha) in 1990 while irrigated area under Tamil Nadu stood at 2.58 million 
acres (1.03 million ha). In summary, it can be seen that the historical development 
of irrigation in Cauvery basin caused the development of irrigated area and 
pattern that the River can not sustain under present technical and institutional 
conditions.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Cauvery River basin showing its main tributaries and reservoirs                                                                
Source: Bosu (1995) 
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1.3 Research questions  
With this historical sequence of irrigation development of the study region in the 
background, the study poses the following research questions  
1) How can one explain the political non-cooperation in Cauvery water sharing 
between the states? 
2)  What are the environmental and economic impacts? 
3) Can we design institutional measures to alleviate them?  
1.4 Objectives 
1. Providing a theoretical explanation of  the non-cooperative strategy of Cauvery 
basin states in water sharing 
2. Assessing the environmental costs of the water sharing dispute in the 
agricultural sector  
3. Designing water rights trade as an institutional arrangement and analysing its 
potential in alleviating the economic and environmental cost of mutual 
noncooperation between the basin states.  
1.5 Organisation of the study  
Chapter 1 presented the evolution of the Cauvery river water conflict from a 
historical perspective and introduced the research questions and objectives of the 
research work. Subsequently, Chapter 2 introduces the research setting by giving 
an overview of geographical and climatic characteristics as well as the surface and 
the ground water supply and demand conditions of the river basin. This chapter 
also describes the primary data collection exercise and presents the farm and 
farmer characteristics to make the reader aware of the agricultural setting in the 
research work. Chapter 3 explores various instruments that can be used for 
transboundary water allocation decisions. The pros and cons of legal, economic 
and geographic approaches in transboundary water sharing are discussed here. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the features of large irrigation systems in 
developing countries in general and the Indian context in particular and lays the 
background for further discussion. It also gives an overview on various 
environmental externalities of inefficient water allocation.  Chapter 4 builds upon 
the historical perspective presented in the chapter 1 and discusses why there is a 
need to decouple water allocation and the net benefits that the water represents, 
for a politically acceptable solution of the water sharing issue. This chapter 
unravels the economic motives behind the political stand points of farmers and 
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presents the prisoners dilemma that is faced by parties facing electoral 
competition in constituencies in Cauvery River basin area. Subsequently, the 
chapter 5 discusses the possibility of using the economic instrument of initial 
water allocation and trading of water rights to decouple water rights from actual 
water use.  A concept of interstate water trade among water user associations is 
developed to reduce the transaction costs. In order to coordinate the responses of 
farmers in a water user association to water right prices a revenue sharing contract 
mechanism is designed. The coordination mechanism ensures that farmers take 
effort to generate water surplus that can be traded to other water user association 
facing water deficit. The final water allocation is decided by the water market and 
it can lead to Pareto optimal increase in benefits compared to the status quo 
allocation in the river basin, only if the cost of purchasing the additional water 
rights is lower than cost of the using the alternative source of water by the WUAs 
of the demand side i.e. groundwater. Hence the Chapter 6 estimates the cost of 
ground water extraction including the externality costs. The investment cost of 
setting up bore wells and pumping machinery is amortized and added with the 
externality costs of over- extraction to calculate the demand price of water rights. 
The externality is calculated using spatial hedonic regression of the depths of 
water table on farmland prices.  The econometric estimation of the spatial hedonic 
regression is carried out in a Bayesian framework. In order to examine whether 
the supply prices are the demand prices estimated in Chapter 6, a numerical 
simulation of the revenue sharing contract is conducted in the chapter 7 to 
estimate supply prices. Various parameters of the contract are estimated using 
secondary and primary data. The estimated demand and supply prices of water is 
used to examine whether the water market can generate Pareto optimal benefit for 
both the states.    Finally the Chapter 8 compiles the results and reveals the road 
map to an equitable, efficient and sustainable water allocation among the basins 
states by establishing initial water rights and an interstate water right market 
where water user communities are allowed to trade water rights.   
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
2.1 Description of study area 
The Cauvery River is a major river in peninsular India (see Rao, 1975), flowing 
from Western- Ghat mountain ranges to the Bay of Bengal through the Mysore 
plateau and the Cauvery delta crossing Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu states and 
the union territory of Pondicherry. The 800 kilometers long river has a catchment 
area of 81155 Km2 in which 34273 Km2 lies in Karnataka, 44016 Km2 in Tamil 
Nadu and 2886 Km2 in Kerala. The river flows around 400 kilometers in 
Karnataka state, 60 kilometers along the Karnataka -Tamil Nadu border and 
around 230 kilometers in Tamil Nadu. Cauvery River has 21 principal tributaries 
in which 9 are located in Karnataka and 12 in Tamil Nadu. Important tributaries 
that join Cauvery in Karnataka are the Harangi, the Hemavathi, the Shimsha, the 
Arkavathi, the Lakshmithirtha, the Kabini and the Suvarnvathi.  After entering 
into Tamil Nadu, Cauvery meets the Mettur reservoir. Below Mettur, principal 
tributaries in Tamil Nadu viz. the Bhavani, the Noyyal and the Amaravathi joins 
Cauvery. Then the river continues its flow until upper anicut where the Cauvery 
bifurcates to a southern branch which retains the name Cauvery and a northern 
branch called Coleroon and both joins again at grand anicut. From the grand 
anicut, the Coleroon continues its flow in north east direction and joins Bay of 
Bengal while the Cauvery divides further into Cauvery and Vennar and then 
subdivides into a number of branches and finally reaches the Bay of Bengal 
(CWDT-VOL I, 2007 and Rao, 1975). A flow diagram of Cauvery River up to 
lower anicut is given in figure 2.1.  
  
Figure 2.1 : Flow digram of Cauvery River 
Source:  Rao, 1975 
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It is to be stated that this study confines to the major riparian states i.e. Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu; though Kerala and Union territory of Pondicherry will be 
occasionally mentioned. 
2.1.1 Rainfall and weather conditions  
The climate of the Cauvery basin can be categorized into four distinct seasons i.e. 
colder weather period (January to February), hot weather period (March to May), 
south-west monsoon period (June to September), and north-east monsoon period 
(October to December) (CWDT-VOL III, 2007). During the colder weather 
period, mean daily minimum temperature ranges from 8.6oC in mountainous areas 
to 22.8oC in plains of the basin while the mean daily maximum temperature 
ranges between 20.4 oC to 35.5 oC during hot weather period. The Western side of 
the catchment receives mainly south-west monsoon while the eastern part receives 
rain mostly from north east monsoon. The rainfall pattern is very diverse along 
the river basin ranging from 574 to 5411 mm per annum. Coorg district of 
Karnataka receives 2400 mm rainfall annually while the Mysore and Mandya 
districts receive 691 mm and 762 mm, respectively. In the case of Tamil Nadu, 
south-west and north-east monsoon contributes almost equally up to the 
confluence of Cauvery with Amaravathy River (around 390 mm each) while from 
the confluence with Amaravathy to confluence it with Bay of Bengal, the north-
east monsoon contributes a mean rainfall of 527mm while south-west monsoon 
contributes 299 mm on an average. (CWDT-VOL III, 2007 and India water 
portal, 2007).  So it can be seen that the Cauvery basin up to Mettur reservoir is 
under the influence of south-west monsoon while the area downstream to Mettur 
reservoir is under the influence of north-east monsoon. This pattern is evident in 
the average rainfall patterns provided below. It has major implications for 
seasonal water availability and requests.  
Figure 2.2 shows that Mandya and Mysore districts are benefited from south-west 
monsoon (peaking of rainfall in June to September) while figure 2.3 shows the 
predominance of north-east monsoon (peaking of rainfall in October to 
December) in the selected taluks (local administrative unit) of Trichy, 
Pudukkottai and Tanjavore districts of Tamil Nadu downstream to Mettur dam.   
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Figure 2.2 Average rainfall (mm) per month in selected taluks of Mandya and Mysore 
districts of Karanataka for the time period 1901-2002.  
Source ; India water portal (2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Average rainfall (mm) per month in selected taluks of Trichy, Pudukkottai and 
Tanjavore districts of Tamil Nadu (mm) for the time period 1901-2002.  
Source ; India water portal (2007) 
2.1.2 Surface water availability in Cauvery basin 
The estimated average annual water potential of Cauvery River is 21.36 billion 
cubic meters (BCM) while the estimated utilizable surface flow is 19 BCM per 
annum. The live storage capacity of completed river water projects in the basin is 
8.60 BCM and development of additional 0.27 BCM storage capacity is 
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progressing (Central Water Commission, 2005). The Cauvery water disputes 
tribunal (CWDT-VOL III, 2007) reports slightly different figures, i.e. the gross 
storage capacity of all reservoirs in Cauvery basin is 9.34 BCM (330 TMC) while 
the live storage capacity is 8.78 BCM (310 TMC). In this 5.8 BCM gross storage 
capacity (5.57 BCM live storage) is built before 1972. 
2.1.2.1 Storage structures 
The irrigation infrastructure in the Cauvery basin is well developed in both, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu by major, medium and minor irrigation projects as 
well as diversion structures. It should be noted that the local irrigation systems are 
classified into three groups in India according to their command area viz. Major 
(more than 10,000 hectares), Medium (2000 to 10000 hectares) and Minor (less 
than 2000 hectares). The major and medium projects are handled by state 
government agencies (like irrigation department), while the minor irrigation 
projects are handled by local bodies like village panchayats. Before the existence 
of reservoir systems, a number of anicut schemes (water diversion structures) 
existed in Karnataka. Currently there are 25 anicut schemes of which 15 are 
located above the Krishna Rajasagar reservoir (see Figure 2.1) and 10 are located 
downstream to the reservoir. Together, these anicut schemes irrigate 80,000 
hectares.  The major irrigation projects in Karnataka are Kabini, Harangi, 
Hemavathi and Krishna Rajasagar reservoirs while medium sized projects are 
Kanva, Suvarnavathy, Arkavathy, Yagachi, Marconahally, Votehole, 
Manchanabele, Taraka, Gundal, Nugu and Uduthorehalla. The major reservoirs 
(viz. Kabini, Harangi, Hemavathi reservoirs) are located in the tributaries of 
Cauvery River with the same name, while the Krishna Rajasagar reservoir (KRS) 
is located in the main Cauvery river. In case of medium sized projects, Kanva and 
Marconahally projects are located in Shimsha tributary, Manchanabele and 
Arkavathy are located in Arkavathy tributary, Taraka is standing at Taraka 
tributary of Kabini, Nugu is located at Nugu River in Kabini sub basin, 
Uduthorehalla is constructed at Palar tributary, Votehole is located at Votehole 
tributary of Hemavathi and Yagachi is located at Yagachi tributary of Hemavathi. 
Major irrigation projects viz. Kabini, Harangi, Hemavathi and Krishna Rajasagar 
(KRS) reservoirs mentioned above have live storage capacities 0.45, 0.23, 1.01, 
1.27 billion cubic meters (BCM) and the irrigation potentials of 41225, 43141, 
194768, 138173 hectares respectively (as of March/2005). The KRS dam was 
constructed during 1911 and 1931 while construction of Kabini started in 1959, 
Harangi in 1964, Hemavathi in 1968 and all were completed during the 10th five 
year plan period (2002-2007). The current irrigation potential of the medium 
irrigation projects mentioned ranges from 1245 hectares (Manchanabele) to 21448 
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hectares (Yagachi). All of these dams were completed by 1989. In addition, the 
construction of Krishna Rajasagar Right Bank Canal or Devraj Urs canal was 
started in 1979 and now it irrigates 32375 hectares (CADA, 2005, CWDT- VOL 
IV, 2007). 
The major irrigation reservoirs in Tamil Nadu are Mettur, Lower Bhavani, 
Amaravathy and Palar-Porandalar, all located in Cauvery and its tributaries of 
Bhavani and Amaravathy. The live storage capacities of these dams are 2.65, 
0.91, 0.11 and 0.04 BCM respectively. These projects were completed by 1970. 
The Cauvery River in Tamil Nadu forms an extensive delta area of 0.35 million 
hectares which is directly fed from the Mettur irrigation project. The other 
irrigation systems fed by Mettur project are the lower Coleroon Anicut system, 
the Salem-Trichy channels, the Kattalai scheme, the Cauvery Mettur project 
(Grand anicut canal), the Mettur Canal, the new Kattalai high level canal and the 
Pullambadi canal. Gross irrigated areas by these canal systems are 0.065, 0.045, 
0.034, 0.13, 0.018, 0.008, 0.0088 million hectares, respectively. Above Mettur 
reservoir, the Thoppaiar reservoir scheme serves 2120 hectares. In the Bhavani 
sub basin of Cauvery basin, the Kodivery anicut system, the Kalingrayan anicut 
system, the lower Bhavani reservoir project and some minor irrigation schemes 
are located. The largest area coverage in this sub basin is by the lower Bhavani 
reservoir which irrigates around 0.083 million hectares. The irrigation system in 
Amaravathy sub basin of Cauvery consists of old Amaravathy Channels, 
Amaravathy, Palar-Pondalar, Vattamalaikarai-Odai, Kodanganar and Nanganjar 
reservoir projects as well as minor irrigation schemes.  Amaravathy reservoir 
project irrigates around 0.0084 million hectares while Amaravathy channel feeds 
around 0.013 million hectares. Other mentioned reservoir projects in this sub 
basin irrigate between 2500 and 4,000 hectares. Finally, Noyyal sub basin of 
Cauvery has Noyyal river channels irrigating 5990 hectares, Noyyal reservoir 
project irrigating 3885 hectares and Orathupalayam reservoir irrigating 4209 
hectares (CWDT-VOL IV, 2007).  
The average run off at Krishna Raja sagar reservoir is estimated (using historical 
flow data by CWDT) to be 6.213 BCM or 219.4 Thousand Million Cubic feet 
(TMC) at 50 percent dependability. At the same time the yield at Mettur reservoir 
is calculated at 14.280 BCM or 507.8 TMC at 50 percent dependability. The 
government of Tamil Nadu estimated the contribution of the Karnataka or Mysore 
part of the river basin to be 11.7 BCM or 413 TMC while the Mysore assesses the 
contribution of their catchment to be 11.55 BCM or 408 TMC. The following 
graph (figure 2.4) shows historical flows in the Cauvery River at lower Coleroon 
anicut which is considered as the downstream measurement point of the Cauvery 
River basin. Data sets on gross water yield at this point of the river provided to 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
13 
Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal (CWDT-VOL III, 2007) by Karnataka (KN) for 
the time period between 1901 and 1972 and Tamil Nadu (TN) for the time period 
between 1935 and 1972 are shown separately. Average yield of KN series is 
22.43 BCM (792.3 TMC) while TN series is 21.7 BCM (766.98 TMC). The 
average yield of Cauvery River, assessed by the CWDT, is 20.9 BCM or 740 
TMC at 50 percent dependability. Considering this estimate, it can also be stated 
that 42 per cent of total flows can be stored in various storage structures, built in 
the river.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Historical flows in Cauvery River at lower Coleroon anicut   
Source: CWDT-VOL III (2007) 
2.1.2.2 Tank irrigation  
The minor irrigation systems (Predominantly tank irrigation) in Cauvery basin of 
Karnataka covers an area of 133,546 hectares; while in Tamil Nadu part of the 
basin, the area under minor irrigation is 139,414 hectares. Irrigation tanks are one 
of the main minor irrigation sources in both states. Palanisami (2006) defines an 
irrigation tank as a small reservoir constructed across the slope of a valley to 
catch and store water during the rainy season so it can be used for irrigation 
during the dry season. In the tank irrigated tracts of the Cauvery basin, farmers 
raise a single paddy crop depending on the filling of the tank each year. Irrigation 
systems in Mysore state, at the onset of the century, were mainly the system of 
tank irrigation and the diversion canals (anicuts) from the Cauvery River. Tanks 
in erstwhile Mysore state irrigated 81,000 hectares while diversion channels 
managed to cover only half the area. It reminds us the importance of tanks in the 
irrigation system of that time. Tank irrigation was a widespread practice in Tamil 
Nadu also where north-east monsoon was the main source of water for tanks 
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(Palanisami, 2006). Area irrigated by tanks declined all over the country from 4.1 
million hectare (13.1 % of the total irrigated area) in 1970-71 to 3.1 million 
hectare (5.7 % of the total irrigated area) in 1997-98.  The decline of tank 
irrigation is due to a multitude of factors including 1) widespread groundwater 
pumping facilities catering individual farmers in a tank area, 2) increase in 
operation and maintenance cost of tanks and 3) inability of tanks to serve the 
command area due to siltation resulting from destruction of forest and vegetation 
in catchment etc. The increase in operating costs in Tamil Nadu is around 135 
INR (26 INR to 161 INR) per hectare at current prices, though the increase is not 
substantial in constant prices (Only 10 INR at 1980-81 prices) (Palanisami, 2006). 
The decline in tank irrigation is evident from the decline in its share of total 
irrigated area in Tamil Nadu as given below (Figure 2.5). Apart from the reasons 
quoted above, the historical reason for the decline of tank irrigation in Tamil 
Nadu (cited by Mosse, 1999) is the shift in management of village level resources 
during colonial period. In early British period, the government operated through 
the village elites who invested fairly steadily in community resource management 
system for honours and local position. Later the centralised public work 
department, put in place by the British Government which was directly involved 
in resource management, made the local chiefs and big men to shun from 
investing in water resource management in villages.  This shortage in investment 
was never made up by the public works machinery, which leaded to decline in 
tank irrigation.   
 
Figure 2.5: Tank irrigated area in Tamil Nadu in percentage terms over decades 
Source: Palanisami, 2006 
 
2.1.2.3 Ground water availability  
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All over India, the well irrigated area increased from 11.9 million hectares 
(38.3%) to 30.9 million hectares (56.6%) during the time between 1970 and 1997. 
Unlike the surface irrigation systems, the investment on ground water irrigation is 
from private agencies; i.e. farmer’s own money is invested to establish dug or 
bore wells. The use of public funds for this purpose is limited.  Currently, farmers 
in India have invested around US $12 billion in ground water irrigation which is 
comparable with the public sector investment on surface irrigation in India which 
is around US $ 20 billion (Shah et.al, 2003).  The total ground water extraction in 
the country is currently around 150 cubic kilometers annually. This ground water 
extraction is taking place mainly through 13.14 million energized pumps in the 
country (Shah et.al, 2003).  .  
Replenishable ground water, available in whole Cauvery basin, is estimated at 
12.30 billion cubic meters out of which 10.45 billion is available for irrigation. 
The current groundwater draft is estimated at 5.78 billion cubic meters, notably at 
the current level of ground water development of 55.3% of the total capacity 
(CGWB, 2005). In Karnataka, underground hard rock formation and 
discontinuous nature of aquifers make well digging a risky affair. But in Tamil 
Nadu, the use of dug and bore wells for ground water development is common 
and, importantly, most parts of the state are experiencing lowering of ground 
water levels due to over exploitation (CGWB, 1995). The dependence of 
Karnataka on ground water for irrigation is 35 % while it is 47.2 % in case of 
Tamil Nadu (measured for the year 1994-1995). Total ground water abstraction 
from Cauvery delta area during 1971 to 1983 is represented in figure 2.5  
 
Figure 2.6: Water abstraction from Cauvery delta region   
Source: CWDT-VOL III (2007) 
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In 1989, it was estimated that the groundwater extraction from Cauvery delta 
region had been 1.01 BCM in the old delta area [0.80 BCM at Cauvery sub basin 
and 0.21 BCM in Vennar sub basin] and 0.32 BCM in the new delta area (grand 
anicut area) through 41,800 energized pumps, 15000 diesel pumps and 100,000 
non energized irrigation facilities and domestic wells. The number of energized 
pumps in Tamil Nadu currently is 13.14 million, though exact figures on Cauvery 
delta or basin are not available. There are different estimates on replenishable 
ground water availability in Cauvery delta region. The available estimates show a 
range from 0.815 to 1.1BCM (28.8 to 39.2 TMC) for the old delta region and 0.64 
to 0.92 BCM (22.77 to 32.6 TMC) for the new delta region. It can be speculated 
that the ground draft in Cauvery delta was nearing its potential in 1989. Due to 
over exploitation, many of the wells require deepening in frequent intervals or 
have to be abandoned in short periods of time leading to lose of capital invested.  
In costal areas like Nagapattanam in Tamil Nadu, excessive ground water 
development has led to sea water intrusion and has rendered the water unfit for 
irrigation purposes (CWDT-VOL III, 2007). 
Extraction of ground water is directly connected with energy use. Various 
governments in the Cauvery basin have taken a generous policy towards energy 
supplies for groundwater irrigation. Zero tariff schemes in Tamil Nadu and 
subsidized tariffs of Karnataka are prominent examples. Usually a flat rate is 
charged for every irrigation pump depending on its maximum pumping capacity 
rather than the measured energy use. Due to energy subsidies, Tamil Nadu 
farmers pay less than 1500 INR for irrigating one hectare of land while a similar 
farmer in Bangladesh pays 4800 INR (6000 takka) (Shah, 2004). This created the 
situation of a ground water irrigation boom hurting the energy economy. It is 
estimated that the pumping of 150 cubic kilometer of ground water in the whole 
India uses subsidized energy worth US $ 4.5-5 billion every year (Shah et al., 
2003).  In Tamil Nadu, electric power is available for farmers 14 hours a day for 
365 days a year. Electricity consumption per tube-well increased from 2583 
KWh/year in 1980s to 4546 KWh/year in 1997-98 indicating the increase in 
wasteful pumping and falling ground water levels (Shah et al., 2007). Agriculture 
in Tamil Nadu consumed 6,910 million units of electricity in 1996-97 which has 
increased to 10,358 million units by 1.8 million pumps in 2005-06 according to 
available statistics (Hindu, 2007).  In Karnataka, the state allocated 18000 million 
INR from its budget as subsidy for the power consumed by agricultural pumps 
(Government of Karnataka, 2007). Nevertheless, it is to be noted that some part of 
inefficiency in power distribution systems is attributed to agricultural 
consumption of electric power in India; it keeps up the inefficiency figure at 33 
percent. This gives way to siphon out the agricultural subsidies to unintended 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
17 
benefactors (Monari, 2002). Another important point is the cross subsidization of 
agricultural power by higher power tariffs to commercial and industrial sectors; 
they cross subsidize the agricultural and domestic sectors. This cross 
subsidization is to the tune of 50.2 % all over India in 1998-99 (Gulati and 
Narayanan, 2000).  
Recharging ground water in the Cauvery delta has a conspicuous connection with 
the surface irrigation from Mettur reservoir. It is stated that a shallow acquifer of 
Cauvery delta will be filled after two months after commencing the flow of water 
through canals originating from Mettur reservoir (CWDT-VOL III, 2007). This 
causes the water obtained during peak monsoon season (north-east) in October 
and November flow directly to the sea without getting stored in underground 
aquifers (CWDT-VOL III, 2007). The pattern of rainfall characterized by intense 
showers for short period of time, causes less groundwater recharge from north-
east monsoon In addition, research conducted in Srilanka indicates that a 
catchment area of 34 acres is needed for 1 acre of ground water irrigated area to 
replenish the used groundwater. As the groundwater irrigation spreads spatially, 
the availability of catchment of recharge is becoming lesser every year (Shah 
et.al, 2003).    
2.1.3 Agriculture in Cauvery Basin  
The occupation of around 60% rural dwellers is agriculture in the Cauvery basin. 
Gross cultivable area in the basin is 5.8 million hectares which is around 3 per 
cent of the country’s cultivable area. Major crops grown are paddy (Oryza sativa), 
finger millet (Eleusine coracana) and sugar cane (Saccharum officinarum). Major 
paddy producing areas are Tanjore, Thirvavrur and Nagapattanam districts in 
Tamil Nadu where more than 0.15 million hectares of land area are allocated to 
paddy. Mysore and Mandya districts in Karnataka have 0.06 and 0.09 million 
hectares of cultivated area under paddy (Kharif season). The Tanjore district 
produced 0.4 million tones of rice (not raw paddy) while Nagapattanam produced 
0.25 million tones in 2005-06. In Mandya, yield differences between irrigated and 
unirrigated paddy were of 0.6 tonnes on average while the mean yield was 3.1 
tons under irrigated condition. Productivity of paddy is low in India compared to 
China or Egypt. The mean productivity of paddy in India is 3 tonnes per hectare 
while China produces almost double the tonnage per hectare (6.2 tonnes). In case 
of finger millet, Tumkur (0.2 million hectares), Mandya (0.07 million hectares), 
Mysore (0.08 million hectares) and Hassan (0.08 million hectare) in Karnataka 
are major producing districts. All figures refer to Kharif season of 2005-06.  
Salem and Dharmapuri districts (0.01 and 0.02 million hectares) in Tamil Nadu 
also have large areas under finger millet cultivation. The Mandya district 
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produced 0.15 million tones of finger millet in 2005-06 (2 tonnes/ hectare) where 
the average yield difference between irrigated and unirrigated finger millet was 
0.2 tonnes.  Coming to sugarcane cultivation, Mandya and Mysore districts in 
Karnataka are prominent cultivators with 0.013 and 0.008 million hectares 
respectively. In Tamil Nadu, Trichy district has a sugarcane cultivation area of 
0.0026 million hectares. Mandya district produced 1.3 million tones of sugarcane 
in the agricultural year 2005-06 with a mean productivity of 111 tonnes per 
hectare. (Directorate of Economics and Statistics (Karnataka), 2007 and 
Department of Economics and Statistics (Tamil Nadu), 2006).  
2.1.3.1 Rice cultivation 
In the Mysore state (later Karnataka), paddy cultivation before 1928 was limited 
to the areas where irrigation via anicuts and tanks were available. After the 
construction of Krishna Raja Sagar reservoir, large-scale irrigation facilities were 
made available making paddy the major crop, especially under its command area. 
In addition, farmers started sugarcane crop cultivation in some of the irrigated 
tracts. Nevertheless, irrigation authorities tries to discourage paddy in new 
irrigation projects in Karnataka and growing of finger millet, groundnut or other 
light irrigated crops are encouraged (CWDT-VOL III, 2007). The same is done in 
old project areas, evidently, when there is inadequate rainfall. A single paddy 
growing season (i.e. Kharif from middle of June until the middle of November : 
145-150 days) is followed in most of the basin areas in Karnataka.   
In Tamil Nadu, paddy cultivation was mainly in the Cauvery delta region fed by 
grand anicut canal and other anicuts before 1928. Due the construction of Mettur 
dam and copious flows from Cauvery River due to favourable clauses in 1928 
agreement, paddy cultivation became the dominant activity in the Cauvery basin 
area in Tamil Nadu.  There are three rice growing seasons in these areas below 
Mettur reservoir. They are named: Kuruvai, Thalady and Samba. In Kuruvai, a 
short duration paddy crop (105 days) is cultivated while in Thalady medium a 
duration paddy crop (135 days) is taken up. Kuruvai and Thalady are as 
subsequent crops in the same field while Samba is a single long duration paddy 
crop (150 days), which will not be followed by another rice crop. Kuruvai is 
starting normally in June utilizing the south-west monsoon and flows in Cauvery 
and harvesting is in August-September before the onset of north-east monsoon. 
The second crop of medium duration, planted after Kuruvai, known as Thalady 
utilizes the north-east monsoon and is harvested in January-February. In other 
areas a long duration crop (‘Samba’) as single crop is grown which starts in July-
August and is harvested in December-January (CWDT-VOL I, 2007). In all over 
Tamil Nadu, rice productivity is quite high as compared to the rest of India. A 
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status paper on rice cultivation in India places 27 out of 28 rice growing districts 
in Tamil Nadu state as areas of high productivity while only 14 out of 27 rice 
growing districts of Karnataka state are classified under the same category ( DRD, 
2002).  
2.1.3.2 Rice crop and water use   
All over Cauvery basin, the method of transplanting of rice crop is popular over 
the method of direct seeding. Transplanting needs the preparation of a nursery of 
rice seedlings and is more labour intensive than direct seeding. For the nursery, 
the land is ploughed two or three times in dry conditions and puddled by 
ploughing in standing water of 2-3 cm. Then the land is levelled and raised beds 
of 1-1½ meter breadth and convenient length is formed. In the raised beds 
germinated seeds are broadcasted. In the initial stages water is kept at saturation 
levels and water level is increased gradually to 2-3 cm and maintained over the 
nursery period. The 2- 3 weeks old seedlings are transplanted to puddled and 
levelled main field.  Conventionally, rice is planted with 3-4 seedlings per hill 
creating a dense vegetation of 50-100 plants per square meter. Water management 
is an important activity in rice farming. Land preparation by pudding requires 
large quantity of water i.e. approximately 15 percent of total water requirement). 
During the crop growth period, continuous flooding of the fields is practiced 
conventionally, using 1000-2000 hectare millimeters of water (10000 -20000 
cubic meters per hectare) in Cauvery basin. This figure can be compared with 
finger millet which requires 2000-2500 cubic meters per hectare and sugarcane 
which demands 20000-25000 cubic meters under conventional farming in the 
Cauvery basin area (Shankar et.al, 2003). It should also be noted that the 
efficiency of flood irrigation can be as low as 20 per cent. Another objective of 
continuous flooding is weed control in paddy fields which is conventionally 
supplemented with labour intensive hand weeding (Bindraban, 2001, Uphoff, 
2003).  
As the monsoon rainfall in Cauvery basin can be erratic, especially at the starting 
of the season, there is a need of supplemental irrigation for land preparation of 
paddy fields (CWDT-VOL I, 2007). In addition, supplemental irrigation is 
required at various stages of rice crop. The critical stages of rice crop are the 
seedling stage, tillering phase, panicle initiation to flowering, milk dough stage, 
reduction division stage and primordial initiation. Exposure of paddy crop to 
water stress at these stages may cause reduced root formation, reduced tillering, 
reduced number of fertile grains, reduced number of filled grains, steep yield 
decline (-70%) and reduced numbers of grains respectively (Palanisami et al., 
2003). The recommended practice of water management for paddy crop in 
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Cauvery basin is to irrigate at 5 cm level, one day after the disappearance of 
ponded water in the field. But many farmers keep their farm under flooded 
conditions (10-20 cm) during the entire cropping period, which is a wasteful 
practice (Vijayakumar et al., 2006). The water saving by the recommended 
practice is estimated to be 31 percent in Kharif and 48 percent in summer 
(Palanisami et al., 2003). 
2.1.3.3 Rice as a staple food crop 
Rice is the main part of the local diet. Rice primarily contains carbohydrate in the 
form of starch (70-75 %) and contains a minimum of protein (7%). The energy 
value of 100 gram rice is 345 kilo calories. Tamil Nadu accounts for 7.4 percent 
of India’s rice production while Karnataka has a share of 3.4 percent. The 
productivity of rice in Tamil Nadu is 3.48 tonnes per hectare while Karnataka 
stands at 2.56 tonnes per hectare (see above) (Agmarknet, 2007).  
 
2.1.4 Agricultural water requirement 
The affidavit submitted to CTWD by Tamil Nadu in 2004 shows that the net 
irrigation water, required for supporting present cropping pattern at current 
technology, is 12.57 BCM (444.15 TMC) for 1.04 million hectares under canal 
irrigation, 1.95 BCM (68.9 TMC) for minor irrigation in 0.137 million hectares 
and 0.283 BCM (10 TMC) to cover reservoir evaporation losses. In case of 
Karnataka, the affidavit submitted in 2003 puts the net irrigation water required to 
be 10.80 BCM (381.71 TMC) for 1.02 million hectares and demanded 0.79 BCM 
(28.158 TMC) for proposed projects irrigating 0.08 million hectares. The 
cumulative demand of both states alone is 26.42 BCM (933 TMC) where the total 
flow in Cauvery River is 20.95 BCM (740 TMC) at 50 percent dependability. A 
breakup of the net irrigation water requirement in respective command areas of 
each irrigation project in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka is available. The sub- basin-
wise claims of Tamil Nadu and project wise claims of Karnataka are given in the 
pie charts below (CWDT-VOL V, 2007). 
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Figure 2.7 Sub basin wise breakup of Tamil Nadu’s claim on water requirement in billion 
cubic meters 
Source: CWDT-VOL V, 2007 
   
Figure 2.8: Sub basin wise breakup of Karnataka’s claim on water requirement in billion 
cubic meters 
Source: CWDT-VOL V, 2007 
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In addition, Kerala state is claiming 2.38 BCM (100 TMC) and the union territory 
of Pondicherry is claiming 0.254 BCM (9 TMC) from the available flow of 
Cauvery River.  
2.1.5 Domestic and industrial demand for water  
2.1.5.1 Urban and rural domestic demand 
According to a 1981 census, 31.2 % of population was urban dwellers in the 
whole basin area, which has been substantially increased during the last decade. 
This pattern is also evident from the trend of population density in Bangalore city 
which has increased from 882 persons / square kilometer in 1981 to around 3000 
persons/ square kilometer now. This rapid urbanization is exerting additional 
pressure on already stretched water resources in the basin. In 1991, the drinking 
water supply requirement for the Bangalore city was 0.41 BCM (14.51TMC) 
including the ongoing drinking water supply projects at that time. It is estimated 
that 0.85 BCM (30 TMC) of water will be the ultimate water requirement for the 
city. As there is no data available on water requirements for human and livestock 
in both, the rural and urban areas, of the Cauvery basin, CWDT estimates very 
rough figures of 0.49 BCM (17.22 TMC) for Karnataka and 0.62 BCM (21.98 
TMC) for Tamil Nadu. It should be noted that 50 percent of this requirement is 
assumed to be met with ground water and 80 percent of the water used for 
domestic purposes returns to the river or its tributaries and hence the consumptive 
use on this category is 0.05 BCM (1.75 TMC) for Karnataka. The CWDT 
considers only 1/3rd of the Bangalore city on its estimation as 2/3rd of city is lying 
outside the basin. Similarly for Tamil Nadu, the consumptive domestic use of 
water is estimated at 0.062 BCM (2.2 TMC) (CWDT-VOL V, 2007).  
2.1.5.2 Industrial demand 
There are various projections on industrial water requirements of Tamil Nadu 
from Cauvery River. According to the information furnished by Tamil Nadu to 
CTWD in January 1993, the industrial water requirement from the River was 
reported to be at 0.062 BCM (2.2 TMC). From this as a trend forecast, the water 
requirement is estimated to be 0.21 BCM (7.43 TMC) in 2001 and 0.38 BCM 
(13.63 TMC) in 2025. But in the supplementary information, provided in March 
same year, it is put at 0.14 BCM (4.98 TMC) in 1993, 0.40 BCM (14 TMC) in 
2000 and 1.048 BCM (37 TMC) for 2025. CTWD estimates the industrial water 
demand of TN to be 0.28 BCM (9.96 TMC) by 2011. It is assumed that 97.5 per 
cent of water used in Industries flows back to the river and hence the consumptive 
use is put at 2.5 percent. In addition, the thermal power station at Mettur is 
utilizing 54.34 cusecs (1.54 cubic meters per second) of water and returning 
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45.282 cusecs (1.28 cubic meters per second)  leading to a consumptive use of 
0.008 BCM (0.28 TMC) annually.  
The industrial water use Karnataka in 1990 stood at 0.91 BCM (3.20 TMC) and is 
projected at that time to be 0.16 BCM (5.71 TMC) in the year 2000 and 0.227 
BCM (8.02 TMC) in 2025. The CTWD puts it at 0.18 BCM (6.40 TMC) in which 
0.073 BCM (2.58 TMC) will be met from ground water. Using the same 
assumption applied to Tamil Nadu case, the consumptive use from the river is 
estimated at 0.003 BCM (0.10 TMC). To summarise, the total domestic and 
industrial consumptive use requirement to be met from Cauvery river water 
estimated by CTWD is 0.052 BCM (1.85 TMC) for Karnataka and 0.077 BCM 
(2.73 TMC) for Tamil Nadu. It is evident from the these figures that industrial 
water demand in Cauvery Basin area is still a fraction of irrigation water demand, 
which in quantitative terms, account less than 3 percent of the latter.  
2.2 Research design and data collection  
Apart from data available from secondary sources, collection of primary data was 
organized through a stratified random sampling procedure. 240 farmers, 
belonging to 24 villages from 24 blocks of 8 Cauvery River basin districts in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, were interviewed. The primary survey was under-
taken during the time period between July 2005 and September 2005. The 
surveyed districts, blocks (or Taluks) and villages are given in the table below. 
The selected districts in Karanataka are Tumkur, Hassan, Mysore and Mandya 
while the selected districts in Tamil Nadu are Trichy, Tiruvarur, Tanjore and 
Nagapattanam. The canal irrigated areas in the districts selected Karnataka are 49, 
286, 971 and 882 square kilometers respectively. In the case of selected districts 
in Tamil Nadu, the canal irrigated areas are 450, 1389, 1564, 1278 square 
kilometers respectively.     
Table 2.1: Names of villages, blocks and districts sampled in Karanataka 
State Karnataka 
District Tumkur  Hassan Myore Mandya 
Moorkanahally 
(Gubbi) 
Kachenahalli 
(C.R.Patna) 
KG Koppalu 
(Piriyapattana) 
Murukanahalli 
(K.R. Pete) 
Nonavinakere  
(Tiptur) 
Huchina 
Koppalu (Hole 
Narasipura) 
Nellurupala 
(Hunsur) 
Kadathnalu 
(S.R.Patna) 
Village 
(Block) 
Madehalli  
(Turuvekere) 
Vaddarahalli 
(Arkalgud) 
Kastur Gate 
(K.R. Nagar) 
Mavina 
Koppalu 
(Mandya) 
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Table 2.2: Names of villages, blocks and districts sampled in Tamil Nadu 
State Tamil Nadu 
Districts Trichy Tiruvarur Tanjore Nagapattanam 
Paachur 
(Mannachanallur) 
Alangudi 
(Valangaiman) 
PasupathiKovil 
(Papanasam) 
Palakurichi  
(Keelaiyur) 
Pallividai 
(Lalgudi) 
Peraiyur 
(Needa 
mangalam) 
Enathi 
(Pattukottai) 
Thetenpettai  
(Kilvelur) 
Village 
(Block) 
N.Santhanur 
(Ananthanallur) 
Meelavasal 
(Mannargudi) 
Pulavankadu 
(Orathnadu) 
SembianMadhavi 
(Nagapattanam) 
 
The geographical positions of the sampled locations are documented in the table 
below. The latitude, longitude and distance of each sampling location from the tail 
end sampling location ‘Sembian Madhavi’ village in Nagapatttanam district are 
also given in the table.  
Table 2.3: Geographical information of study locations  
Village District Longitude Latitude 
Distance in 
Kilometers 
Alangudi Tiruvarur 79.37 10.88 53.2 
Peraiyur Tiruvarur 79.41 10.76 39.3 
Meelavasal Tiruvarur 79.43 10.66 28.0 
Paachur Trichy 78.4 10.53 116.8 
Pallividai Trichy 78.43 10.54 113.7 
N.Santhanur Trichy 78.38 10.5 118.7 
Palakurichi Nagapattanam 79.46 10.4 1.1 
Thetenpettai Nagapattanam 79.46 10.47 6.7 
Sembian Madhavi Nagapattanam 79.46 10.41 0.0 
Pasupathi Kovil Tanjore 79.28 10.93 61.1 
Enathi Tanjore 79.31 10.43 16.6 
Pulavankadu Tanjore 79.26 10.61 31.2 
Mookanahalli Tumkur 76.59 13.2 440.8 
Nonavinakere Tumkur 76.33 13.09 453.2 
Madehalli Tumkur 76.42 13.09 445.9 
Kachenahalli Hassan 76.19 12.51 426.5 
Huchina Koppalu Hassan 76.13 12.46 429.1 
Vaddarahalli Hassan 76.03 12.48 439.5 
KG Koppalu Mysore 76.12 12.29 420.4 
Nellurupala Mysore 76.16 12.14 408.5 
Kastur gate Mysore 76.18 12.29 414.7 
Murukanahalli Mandya 76.18 12.29 414.7 
Kadathnalu Mandya 76.39 12.27 393.9 
Mayannana Koppalu Mandya 76.49 12.3 386.5 
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2.3 Overview of the farmer sample  
A pre-tested interview schedule was used for the survey which covered various 
aspects of socio-economic, geographic, cultivation, water use and environment 
related information. In the whole sample of 240 farmers, small farmers (<2 
hectares) accounted 72 percent, and 28 percent were large farmers (>5 hectares). 
Among all farmers, 34 percent farmers held less than 1 hectare.  
2.3.1 Age structure  
It is interesting to look at the age structure of the farmers which gives the picture 
of an aging farmer population. The median age of the sample is 45 while the 
median age of the total population in India is 24.9 (Wikipedia, 2008). The age 
profile of the sampled farmers is given belowin figure 2.8. The median age of 
sampled framers in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are strikingly similar i.e. 45 and 
46 respectively.  
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Figure 2.9: Age profile of sampled farmers 
2.3.2 Education and family size  
At the education front, the average education level of the sample farmers is 8 
years of schooling, showing their relative inability to take up other enterprises. 
There are 24 farmers with college education and only 1 farmer with a master 
degree in the sample. The average farm size of the college educated farmers tends 
to be higher at 12.6 acres or 5 hectares.  On the other extreme, there are 25 
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farmers without any formal education in the sample and the average size of their 
farm holdings is 1.4 hectares. The farmers had relatively larger family size and 
the average stood at 5.4 persons per family. Average family size of large farmers 
tended to be a little larger than of small farmers i.e. 5.45 and 5.31 respectively. 
The biggest family was of the size 16 and the smallest was of 2 members.  
2.3.3 Land characteristics and land prices 
As mentioned earlier the Cauvery basin farmers predominantly fall in the 
category of small farmers which is reflected in the median size of the sample 
farmers at 1.6 hectares. The mean of the sampled farmer holdings is 2.3 hectares. 
Distribution of the sample farm sizes in the dataset is representative of fragmented 
farmlands in a developing country with an average size of 2.3 ha and a standard 
deviation of 3.1 ha. Distribution of farm sizes is depicted in figure 2.9The holding 
sizes tempted to be higher in sampled farmers in Tamil Nadu as compared to 
Karnataka. Coming to the relative position of the land holdings with respect to 
water channels, 34 percent of the sample farmers are located in head reaches, 27 
percent in the middle reaches and 39 per cent in tail end with respect to nearest 
irrigation canal. It can also be seen that 71 percent of the sample farmers are 
located in plain lands, while 29 percent are located in valley slopes. Coming to the 
soils, farmers reported predominantly red sandy loam soil in Karnataka and black 
clayey loam soil in Tamil Nadu. A majority of the farmers, participated in the 
survey, opinioned that the soil quality of their farms is good to moderate quality 
(92%), though they expressed more confidence in soil quality in Tamil Nadu than 
in Karnataka.  
 
Figure 2.10: Farm size distribution of sampled farmers  
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Reasonable market approachability for the farmers in both states is evident from 
the average distance to road and average distance to nearest local market. From 
the sampled farms, the average distance to the nearest road is 1.3 kilometers and 
the average distance to nearest market is 8 kilometers. The agricultural land 
market is well developed with land prices ranged from 0.05 million to 2.5 million 
Indian rupees per hectare. Different kinds of land leasing arrangements were 
observed. The leasing price in terms of money ranges from 2500 to 10000 INR 
per hectare in the study area, though higher figures are reported for sugarcane. In 
some of the sampled villages, the leasing price is fixed as 50 percent share of the 
paddy output or as a fixed portion of output i.e. 6-9 bags of rice per acre (15-22 
bags per hectare). In some other areas, fixed quantities of paddy (800-1300 
kilograms per hectare) are used as the rent. It is to be noted that the agricultural 
land market in the sampled villages of Nagapattanam district is reported to be 
dysfunctional due to sea water intrusion in groundwater making it unfit for 
irrigation.  
2.3.4 Crops 
Major crops grown by the sampled farmers in Karnataka are paddy, sugarcane, 
pulses and finger millet while paddy, sugar cane, banana are found to be the major 
crops in Tamil Nadu. Paddy was the major crop of sampled farmers in both states. 
It is observed that some farmers go for crop rotations such as paddy-pulse (Eg: 
paddy-groundnut), paddy-banana, paddy-sesame in Tamil Nadu while paddy-
finger millet, paddy-sorghum, paddy-pulse, sugarcane-paddy rotations are 
recorded in Karnataka. Some farmers (14%) allowed their farming land to be 
fallow in the first season.  
2.3.5 Comparative picture 
A comparative picture of farmers surveyed from Karnataka and Tamil Nadu can 
be obtained from the table 2.4. Farmers differ in education though the age 
structure and family size are comparable. Tamil Nadu farmers have better 
accessibility to local markets while Karnataka farmers have better access to roads. 
Land prices are comparatively higher in Karnataka in comparison than in Tamil 
Nadu. The average figures on selected characteristics of farmers and farms of 
each state from the sample survey are given in the table along with the t-statistic 
that checks whether the differences in average figures are statistically significant.  
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Table 2.4: Comparative statistics of sample farmers in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu  
Variables Tamil Nadu Karnataka t- value 
Age 47 years 45 years 1.19 
Education 9 years* 7.5 years 2.77 
Family Size 5.3 members 5.5 members -0.67 
Slope of farm 2.65 (index) 2.62 (index) 0.37 
Distance (Market) 6.8 kilometers* 9.2 kilometers -2.15 
Distance (Road) 1.74 kilometers* 0.85 4.04 
Soil (Quality) 1.46 (index)*  1.67 (index) -2.27 
Farm area  3.08 hectares* 1.52 hectares 4.08 
Land Price / ha 320792 INR  453707 INR -4.11 
 
2.3.6 Water use 
Surface irrigation is available in all sample locations; though farmers have 
increased the dependence on groundwater sources over the years. The sampled 
farmers follow the system of flood irrigation in Paddy except three farmers who 
switched over to a system of rice intensification (SRI) mode of cultivation where 
intermittent irrigation is practiced. In case of sugarcane, furrow and ridge 
irrigation systems were practiced.  The 124 farmers, sampled in Tamil Nadu, had 
87 bore wells, of which 7 wells were dysfunctional; while in Karnataka 45 wells 
were owned by 120 farmers out of which 13 were dysfunctional. The chapter 6 
presents the investment cost of well irrigation in detail.  
Farmers of the Cauvery delta region plan the farming operations according to the 
release of water from Mettur dam which is opened normally on 12th of June every 
year. This date coincides with the first cropping season. Delays in release of water 
in the canals may lead to loss of crop as water availability is critical in the initial 
stages of rice crop. The uncertainty of farmers over canal water availability can be 
represented by comparing the actual opening date of Mettur dam with the normal 
opening date of 12th June. The deviation in days from 1993-94 to 2002-03 is given 
in the chart (Figure 2.9) below.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
29 
 
Figure 2.11 Deviation of date of water releases from Mettur dam from normal date of 12th 
June 
Source: Chief Engineer, Water resources organisation, Chennai   
Though the the normal date of release of water from dam is fixed at 12th of June,  
the schedule is strictly followed only 5 times in 10 years between 1993 and 2003. 
The delay in 2002-03 has gone upto 86 days. It should be noted that the duration 
of first crop (Kuruvai) is only 105 days. Due to uncertainty of water delivery in 
Cauvery canals, many of the farmers switched over to ground water sources by 
drilling bore wells or digging open wells so that they can substitute ground water 
for surface water.  
2.3.7 Credit availability 
Farmers in the sample availed credit from both, formal and informal sources. It 
has to be noted that 131 out of 136 farmers availed credit in the sample borrowed 
less than 100,000 INR. The scatter plot (figure 2.9) on interest rate and credit size, 
depicted below, shows that most of the borrowers pay a nominal interest rate 
between 7 and 15 per cent per annum. The chart excludes the largest 5 borrowers.  
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Figure 2.12: Credit size and interest rate of sampled farmers 
  
It can also be noted that many farmers had taken loans for drilling a bore well; 
and another plot on total credit availed and number of bores is depicted in figure 
2.10.  
  
Figure 2.13: Credit size and number of bore wells 
 
2.3.8 Additional information  
The schedule also included a willingness to pay exercise and included relevant 
questions for a hedonic price estimation of water availability in Cauvery basin. 
The collected information will be presented in detail in relevant chapters.
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW ON ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
ALLOCATION 
Water sharing conflicts arise when political and hydrological boundaries do not 
match each other and when a clear dichotomy of cost and benefits of cooperation 
is perceived (Fishhendler and Feitelson, 2003). Transboundary water conflicts are 
common as 148 rivers of the world and are crossing geographic boundaries of two 
countries; while 52 of them flow over more than two countries (Ambec and 
Sprumont, 2002).  In the case of rivers in the developing world, many upstream 
countries try to divert water from the river basin that they share with downstream 
countries, notably, for increasing biomass production in agriculture or forestry in 
order to overcome food insufficiency and poverty. This in turn affects the welfare 
of downstream countries as it reduces quantity and quality of water available to 
them (Toset et al., 2000). The same behaviour can be noticed in the states of 
federal countries like India which share a common river. Interstate water conflicts 
are also common in United States of America. In the Indian context, numerous 
interstate conflicts arose after independence as designing of efficient and 
equitable water sharing mechanisms is still a legal and constitutional challenge 
(Richards and Singh, 2002).  In ameliorating the water sharing issues at national 
and international level, various streams of thought can be found in the existing 
literature, (see Beach et.al, 2000 for detailed review) that can be classified into 
legal, geographic and economic approach. The following subsection details the 
approaches relevant to the river water conflict in question.   
3.1 Laws and conventions 
3.1.1 International scenario  
Till 1950, there were not many laws on transboundary water sharing with the 
exception of the existence of the bilateral agreements. The doctrine of absolute 
territorial sovereignty, which is one of the earliest legal attempts in this direction, 
advocates absolute sovereignty of a country on the rivers and natural resources, 
falling in its geographical boundaries. This principle was first used by U.S 
attorney general Harmon to justify the position of United States of America in 
relation to a water dispute with Mexico in 1895; and hence it is known as Harmon 
doctrine. On the contrary, the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity prohibit 
the right of a country to change the natural course of a water body if it is 
detrimental to a lower riparian state (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Subedi, 2006). 
As these doctrines are contradictory by nature, principal of reasonable and 
equitable utilisation emerged as a major guideline in sharing the transboundary 
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water bodies. This principle is central tenet of Helsinki rules of International Law 
Association (1966) and the UN convention on the non navigational use of 
international water courses law of 1997 and is the one which enjoys worldwide 
acceptance (Gosain and Singh, 2004). The international law making on 
transboundary water sharing reached its zenith at an UN convention on the law of 
non navigational use of international water courses (Subedi, 2006). General 
principles guiding the 1997 convention are equitable and reasonable utilization 
and participation, obligation not to cause significant harm, general obligation to 
cooperate, regular exchange of data and information and relationship between 
different kinds of uses (UN, 2005). In addition to those mentioned above, a 
number of principles and doctrines can be found in the literature. The principle of 
prior appropriation advocates the protection of existing uses or in other words, it 
supports the maintenance of the status quo in water utilisation. Principle of no 
significant harm says that any riparian state is entitled to develop the water 
courses, provided that it does not cause significant harm to other co-riparian 
states. This principle is criticized as a mere extension of the principle of prior 
appropriation (Gosain and Singh, 2004). The Doctrine of correlated rights keeps 
more the focus on efficient utilisation of joint water resources than gaining 
ownership rights (Kilot and Shmueli, 2001). In addition, the principle of mutual 
use which states that a riparian can object the use of water by another riparian 
unless it is directly compensated and the linkage principle where a riparian state 
may demand compensation in a non related area, are also proposed aiming at 
water dispute resolution (Kilgour and Dinar, 1995). The doctrine of correlated 
rights keeps the focus more on efficient utilisation of joint water resources than 
gaining ownership rights (Kilot and Shmueli, 2001). Currently an additional 
principle viz. principle of sustainable development and utilisation of waters in 
international water courses is also in use (Subedi, 2006).  
3.1.2 Indian scenario  
The Constitution of India allocates the subject of water into the domain of state 
legislative subjects (entry number 17 of state subjects in the 7th schedule of 
constitution of India); but with a clause on interstate rivers (entry number 56 of 
union subjects in the 7th schedule of constitution of India). The constitution gives 
power to the central government to enact laws on interstate rivers to adjudicate 
interstate water disputes. The Interstate Water Dispute Act in 1956 permits any 
Indian state, which is in dispute with another state in the matter of water use in an 
interstate river, to request the central government to setup a tribunal for 
adjudication.  The decision of the tribunal is final and binding (Gosain and Singh, 
2004). However, in some occasions, states refused to accept the decisions of the 
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tribunals and in reality, the decision is not binding enough (Richards and Singh, 
2002). In addition, River Boards Act in 1956 provides the provision of 
establishing river boards to regulate and develop the interstate rivers in request of 
the riparian states (Gosain and Singh, 2004).  But ironically, this legal provision is 
not utilised in India and no river boards have been formed so far (Richards and 
Singh, 2002). A Cauvery valley authority was in proposition by ministry of 
Irrigation in 1974 but it was never ratified (Wikipedia, 2007).   
Interestingly, In the British period, under the Government of India Act in 1919, 
irrigation became a provincial but reserved subject, and provincial governments 
had to get prior approval of Secretary of State for any river water project that may 
affect the interest of more than one province. Later, the Government act of 1935 
placed irrigation as a pure provincial subject but included clauses to refer inter 
provincial disputes on water projects to Governor General who may appoint a 
commission to investigate the issue and the decision of Governor General based 
on the report of the commission was binding for the provinces (Bakshi, 2007).   
3.2 Transboundary institutions 
In absence of institutions like water sharing treaties defining clear water rights 
and cite dispute resolution mechanisms, unilateral alterations in water use (by a 
party, a nation, a state or a province) at basin level can lead to water conflicts. It is 
observed that co-riparian relationships are more cooperative in the presence of 
treaties (Giordano and Wolf, 2003). In addition, many researchers and 
international agencies advocate on basin wide management of water by 
establishing transboundary institutions. Internationally there are a number of 
efforts in building up such institutions like the Mekong commission and Rhine 
river commission.  
3.2.1 Transboundary water agreements in India  
A number of interstate river water disputes are adjudicated in India under the 
Interstate Water Dispute Act in 1956. In case of Narmada River which is shared 
by Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra states, a tribunal was set up in 1969 
to allocate equitable shares among the states involved. In case of this river, 
97.59% of the drainage area and 98.75% of the flow contribution belongs to the 
state of Madhya Pradesh while 0.56% of the drainage area and 0.26% of the flow 
contribution belongs to the state of Gujarat. 1.5% of the river length was in 
Maharashtra and 11.5% in Gujarat. The final decision of the Narmada tribunal 
came into effect in December 1979. In the final award, 67 percent of the water 
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flow was allocated to Madhyapradesh while 33 percent was allocated to Gujarat 
(Bakshi, 2007).  
The Krishna river basin, which is shared by the states of Karnataka, 
Madhyapradesh and Andhra Pradesh, was also referred to a tribunal for sharing its 
water among competing states. The Krishna tribunal gave its award in 1973 which 
was published in 1976. The tribunal used the principle of equitable apportionment 
and allocated 27 percent of the river water to Maharashtra, 34 percent to 
Karnataka and 38 percent to Andhra Pradesh out of 58.3 BCM water available in 
the river at 75 percent dependability.  In addition, from the estimated regenerated 
flows of 1.9 BCM in Krishna River, 0.70 BCM was allocated to Maharashtra, 
0.34 BCM to Karnataka and 0.11 BCM to Andhra Pradesh. The tribunal gave 
preference river projects that are in operation or conceived by the year 1960.  In 
the case of Godavari River, the tribunal started functioning in 1974 though 
constituted in 1969 as Krishna river allocation was under consideration by the 
same tribunal. In the Godavari water dispute, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa were the concerned states. The award of 
the Godavari tribunal was a mere formal consolidation of agreements made by 
multilateral discussions by the party states. No quantitative allocation of water in 
the river was made. Instead the river was divided into sub basins and flows from 
these sub basins were allocated to individual states. It was similar to Indus treaty 
made by India with Pakistan (Richards and Singh, 2002). In Indus water treaty, 3 
east flowing tributaries of Indus (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) was allocated to India 
while 3 west flowing rivers (Indus. Jhelum and Chenub) to Pakistan. A system of 
canals was envisaged to share the surplus in the western rivers. A third party, 
World Bank was involved in the treaty through Indus basin development fund 
which financed the construction costs of canals and storage dams to fulfil the 
conditions of the treaty (Schiff and Winters, 2002).  
3.2.2 Negotiation of Cauvery water allocation  
A pure conflict situation is existing in the case of the Cauvery River, sharing i.e. 
allocation of more water to one state eventually means less for the other. As the 
historical development of irrigation pattern lead to full utilisation of river flows, 
conflict is unavoidable.  Nevertheless, settling the initial allocation of property 
rights may facilitate a better cooperation among parties. The current conflict can 
be viewed as an attempt to secure a bigger pie in the initial allocation of property 
rights on water in the River. The historical developments that lead to the 
formation of Cauvery tribunal in 1990 have been explained in chapter 1. It can be 
seen that the importance of tribunal decision is in the settling of the initial 
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property rights allocation (Richards and Singh, 2002). The tribunal gave the final 
award on February 5, 2007. According to its verdict, Tamil Nadu will be allocated 
with 11.86 BCM (419 TMC) of Cauvery water while Karnataka gets 7.65 BCM 
(270 TMC). The actual annual release of water by Karnataka to Tamil Nadu has 
to be 5.44 BCM (192 TMC). Further the Cauvery River tribunal allocated 0.84 
BCM (30 TMC) water to Kerala and 0.2 BCM (7 TMC) to union territory of 
Pondicherry (CWDT-VOL V, 2007). Karnataka filed a revision petition to the 
tribunal as the state viewed the decision of the tribunal be unsatisfactory. Such 
moves originates from the fact that the initial allocation of property right become 
the final allocation of the rights as the property rights are not flexible in the 
absence of institutional mechanisms like water exchange or water trading systems 
between the states or with in the states.  
3.3 Spatial adjustments  
Political fragmentation of river basin boundaries which causes spatial discrepancy 
on benefits and cost distribution among states is one of the main reasons of 
transboundary conflicts (Fischhendler and Feitelson, 2003).  Mechanisms to 
improve reciprocity of benefits include maintaining hydro-solidarity of basin 
states despite the costs (Falkenmark, 2001). This approach is limited by the fact 
that the regions that benefits and regions that incur costs are scattered over the 
river basin, forming discontinuous mosaic pattern preventing formation of 
effective water solidarity (Prigram, 1999 in Fischhendler and Feitelson, 2003).  
Establishment of river water commissions to manage transboundary water 
allocation is one of the solutions to tackle this issue; though many of the 
transboundary organisations formed had limited success in managing the water, 
mainly due to the restrictions imposed by states that incur costs due to 
cooperation. 
 Another mechanism for spatial adjustment is the third party involvement by 
providing financial incentives to the group which may incur cost of cooperation 
and hence solving the spatial discrepancy (Fischhendler and Feitelson, 2003). Yet 
another tool of interest is that of linking unrelated issues to the water dispute in 
order to create a cooperative climate among the groups by balancing the trade 
offs. Apart from these solutions, it can also be suggested that widening the spatial 
scale of negotiations can be fruitful. Cooperation of United States of America and 
Mexico over Colorado and Rio Grande where the allocation issues in Colorado is 
offset by the transfer of water from Rio Grande is an example of the advantages 
of advancing the spatial scales (Fischhendler and Feitelson, 2003).  
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In case of Cauvery River, ambitious plans like linking it to Ganga River got 
public attention in 1970s though rejected in financial and technical grounds. In 
1980, national perspective plan of Government of India proposed linking the 
Cauvery River to Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna and Pennar rivers to balance the 
water deficit and surplus in the rivers of peninsular India. Indian water resources 
society appraised the scheme to be economically viable and technically feasible in 
1996 (Jain et.al, 2005). An attempt to simulate a multi reservoir system in 
Cauvery, Godavari, Krishna and Pennar, in order to analyze the advantages of 
linking these river basins, was carried out by Jain et al. (2005). This study 
estimates the water deficit in Cauvery delta to be 7.5 BCM and 1.008 BCM in sub 
basins of Kabini, Arkavathi, Suvarnavathi, Bhavani and Amaravathi. Even if the 
current ground water draft is included, deficits are huge. This study proposes 
diverting Godavari river water from Ichampalli dam to Nagarjuna Sagar dam in 
Krishna River and then to Somasila dam in Pennar River and to Grand Anicut in 
Cauvery basin so that deficit in Cauvery delta can be managed. The projects are 
simulated in an engineering perspective while social and environmental impacts 
of such transfers are not undertaken.  
3.4 Economic principles of water allocation 
Water sharing mechanisms presented in economic literature concentrates on 
efficient water allocation; while legal and geographic approaches are based on 
equitable allocation. Nevertheless, principles that guide the allocation can be 
economic efficiency or equity, or eventually both. Notice, the instruments in the 
economic basket include marginal cost pricing, public sector allocation, water 
markets and user based allocation (Dinar et al, 2007).  As economists tend to 
make everyone better off, facilitating competitive market behaviour by 
establishing enabling property rights and eliminating distortions is often a 
preferred policy (Just and Netanyahu, 1998). Among them, market allocation 
mechanisms invite special attention.  
3.4.1 Water markets in water dispute resolution 
In an Indian context, Richards and Singh (2002) mentions the social contract 
approach .i.e. deciding on initial allocation of water rights and creating a 
mechanism to trade these rights and manage externalities. This shall serve to 
solve existing interstate water disputes. Explicit proposals to form water markets 
and to solve water disputes can be found in Dinar and Wolf (1994) and Fisher 
(1995). In the former one, they argue on treating water as a tradable commodity 
and detail the advantages when countries trade water against technology. By the 
application of the model to water allocation in middles east, Dinar and Wolf 
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argues on how Egypt can sell excess water to Israel and Gaza if Israel could sell 
water saving technology to Egypt.    
Many of the water conflicts that are arising from the dispute among states over 
ownership of water from shared river streams, lakes, aquifers etc. Fisher (1995), 
address this issue and proves that the water rights and its usage are analytically 
independent. This approach keeps the focus on economic value of water rather 
than quantity allocation and hence it does not matter who holds the right but 
rather who gets the money that the water represents. A country with water 
entitlements faces the opportunity cost of selling the water to a demanding 
country and hence will sell water when the actual benefit of using water is lower 
than that of the gain from trade. In the case of a country that purchases water will 
do it only if the cost justifies the trade. Hence the dispute on ownership can be 
translated into a dispute over monitory compensation on water reallocation 
(Fisher, 1995). Similarly, Ambec and Sprumont (2000) suggest use of side 
payments in addition to water allocation to distribute welfare among the coalitions 
or individuals sharing the water resource.  
3.4.2 Limitation of existing water market models in developing country 
context  
Though the development of water right markets is advised for a long time as a 
solution for water allocation issues (Saleth et al, 1991), it was criticised on a set 
of limitations or weaknesses in its usage in developing countries. The major 
criticisms of establishment of a water market in a developing country can be 
summarised from the studies of Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) as well as 
Gunatilake and Krishnan (2002). Firstly, the bottleneck, pointed out, is the 
presence of high transaction costs for water allocation and regulation due to small 
sized farm holdings in irrigation systems in these countries. Secondly the huge 
investment requirements for conveying water to the locations of demand matter. 
A third critique is that water trade may cause externalities on third parties, and the 
fourth one is on probable reduction in agricultural production and income that 
may result if water reallocation to non agricultural uses is excessive. In their argu-
ments Gunatilake and Krishnan (2002) concentrate on detailing the first criticism 
while Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) take on all these arguments and 
substantiate the possible benefits of water trade within the irrigation sector and for 
the other sectors in developing countries.  
The main arguments that Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) have put forward on 
supporting water trade in comparison to other modes of water allocation are (1) 
the rapidly increasing scarcity of water (2) its high value on reallocation, (3) 
sizable transaction costs of alternatives like administrative and community 
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management, (4) political constraints of opportunity cost pricing, (5) possibility of 
reductions in externalities by the water trading and (6) possibility of investment 
mobilisation by water users. The same paper downplays the questions of widening 
disparity between rich and poor due to the water market options and the issue of 
variability of water supply constraining the usefulness of water markets. One of 
the suggestions already in this research work is to reduce the transaction costs by 
assigning property rights of water to user communities instead of farmers, and 
precisely this argument is pointing towards the potentials of water markets when 
the characteristic of community management is blended to it. A similar argument 
is presented by Msangi et. al (2006) as well.  
3.5. Characteristics of irrigation systems of developing countries: 
An over view  
3.5.1 Technical features  
Most of the irrigation systems in developing world are large-scale gravity flow 
schemes serving small farmers. This includes those in Cauvery Basin. The Water 
is conveyed from large dams to locations of demand by main canals which later 
feed the smaller branch canals serving the farmers. Another feature of Asian 
irrigation systems is that many farmers are not supplied directly from a branch 
canal but through a neighbouring field (Repetto, 1986).  
3.5.2 Institutional setting 
Predominantly, irrigation infrastructure is built and operated by public agencies in 
developing countries. In the last two or three decades, there is drift towards a 
decentralised and market oriented management of water resources deviating from 
‘command and control’ type of administration though many of the developing 
countries lag behind (Bjornlund, 2003). One of the driving factors for this change 
is a shift in lending policies of the World Bank to irrigation projects in developing 
countries, Earlier the bank supported the infrastructure development through 
financing large irrigation projects while now a substantial part of the financing is 
for establishing institutional components for decentralised water management like 
of creating and strengthening water user associations. The World Bank also 
promotes establishment of water rights and water market (Plusquellec, 1998).  
3.5.2.1 Water pricing  
In large scale irrigation systems in developing world serving small farmers, 
volumetric pricing is an exception rather than the rule. The main bottleneck is the 
exorbitant transaction costs on constructing channel systems to supply water to 
individual farms, installing flow measurement devises like weirs and flumes, loss 
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of irrigation efficiency as measuring devises interrupts water flow, cost of 
monitoring the water use and huge costs of individual settlement of disputes on 
water use (Moore, 1989). In addition, one has to look at social and political costs 
of price reforms. A mathematical simulation model on farmers of Haryana in 
India shows that a water tariff of 0.2 INR/ cubic meter will force the rice farmer’s 
(<1 hectare) income to the bare minimum for the survival i.e. 5000 INR/year 
(approximately 100 Euros). As the small farmers are dominating in the Indian 
agricultural structure, the social and political cost of water price hike can be 
substantial (Alary and Deybe, 2005). But also the alternative, irrigation fee per 
unit area, creates no incentive to save water. It is primarily due to the fact that the 
farmer faces the same water price independent of his/her water use or his 
marginal cost of using water falls to zero. When the water use is not metered, the 
water actually used by individual farmer is private information which is not 
available for the regulating authority. This information asymmetry is a factor that 
makes the flat rate per unit area water pricing inefficient compared to volumetric 
pricing (Tsur, 2000).  
3.5.2.2 Water price and cost recovery of irrigation services   
The current average cost recovery of operating expenses from irrigation systems 
in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is less than 5 % (Thakkar, 1999 and Mithra, 1997), 
far from 94.65 % in Karnataka and 22.5 % in Tamil Nadu during 1974-75. In 
converse, the national average investment cost to irrigate a hectare of area 
increased from 1200 INR in first five year plan period (1951-56) to 35081 INR in 
seventh annual plan period (1985-90) in nominal terms.  But serious practical and 
political problems are driving Governments away from charging the water at its 
opportunity costs. Further, agricultural land prices embodies the water rights and 
if the water is charged at opportunity costs,  the price of irrigated land may fall to 
the price of unirrigated lands which may seriously expropriate farmer’s assets. 
The magnitude of such asset devaluations and social disruptions and unrest it 
causes makes the use of opportunity cost pricing far from pragmatic (Thobani, 
1997).  Nevertheless, the existing water charges which charged on a per hectare 
basis are not meeting the operation and maintenance of the large surface irrigation 
systems. Namoodiri et.al (2006) reports that the existing water prices ranges 
between 2.77 to 61.73 INR per hectare in Tamil Nadu and 37.05 to 988.45 INR in 
Karnataka. Tamil Nadu has not revised its water rates since 1962 while Karnataka 
has revised the water rates in 2000.  
When considering the fact that the revenue collected through water charges 
contributes less than 5 per cent of the total operation and maintenance costs of 
irrigation projects in the study area, one has to deduce more reasons than the 
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prevailing low water charges. Various channels of moral hazard in the existing 
irrigation and revenue collection institutions can be another reason for lower 
revenue recovery. In the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, 
the water charges are collected along with land tax i.e. through a higher 
assessment of land tax on irrigated lands. This creates a situation of Irrigation 
Department delivering water services and the Revenue Department collecting 
water fee (Saleth, 1996 in Mithra, 1997). The incomplete information of the 
Revenue Department on irrigated land area and the crop cultivated each year 
forms ways to opportunistic behaviour of local revenue collection officers. Many 
a time, local revenue officials report considerably less area under irrigation than 
the actual irrigated area and reroute the tax revenue to personal accounts but the 
information asymmetry protects the local officers from being responsible for 
revenue collection shortfalls (Huppert, 2005 and Samal and Kolanu, 2004).  
Another feature of the irrigation system is that they are not demand scheduled, 
which means the supplies are less reliable from a farmer perspective. Also supply 
schedules are not made in consultation with farmers or farmer organisations in 
most of the irrigation systems though exceptions exist. Moore (1989) puts the 
reason of absence of demand scheduling to be the interaction between uncertain 
supplies from irrigation sources and inefficient information gathering and system 
management of the water managers. The information asymmetry on supply 
schedules gives way to opportunistic behaviour by irrigation managers, such as 
allocating more water to influential farmers or farmer groups in return of 
monitory and non-monitory benefits (Huppert, 2005). Many a time, deliberate 
uncertainty of supply schedules are introduced in order to elicit bribes i.e. the 
exhibition of rent seeking behaviour is observed (Repetto, 1986). Frequently 
farmers protest to the lack of quality of service by non payment of water fee but 
due to dichotomy of delivery of services (through irrigation department) and 
water fee collection (through revenue department) such protests are not effective. 
The financial allocation to irrigation department and incentives to irrigation 
officials are not linked with the system performance or revenue recovery, which 
further gives way to low quality service and opportunistic behaviour (Huppert, 
2005). A vicious cycle of poor performance of Indian irrigation system is given 
below (adapted from Selvarajan, 2001).  
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Figure 3.1: vicious cycle of poor performance of Indian irrigation system 
Source: Selvarajan, 2001 
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962 INR while the existing water fees in the area ranged from 37.5 to 100 INR. 
This means a ten to fifteen fold increase in water charges. The Karnataka 
government agreed to progressively increase the irrigation rates from the existing 
to the suggested rate.  
When farmers came to know about the hefty water fees, political movements by 
farmer organisations thwarted the move to increase the water fee and were 
successful to retain the older rates due to their political lobbying power. This 
resulted in cost recovery figures that are far from actual operation and 
maintenance expenses. The main innovative feature of KGBNL is the wholesaling 
of water to farmer societies (WUAs) at a volumetric basis.  Farmer’s societies are 
responsible for collecting water charges from the members. It is also visualised 
that any reduction in water use by farmers may result in lower costs to farmer 
society and hence encourage water saving. This could not be realised in the 
absence of volumetric measurement of water to individual farmers (Raju et al., 
2003).  
The world Bank summarised the factors that leads to low cost recovery in 
irrigation projects in Asia as: 1) absence of linkage between funds allocated for 
irrigation and revenue collected by it, 2) lack of participation by farmers in 
management of the irrigation system, 3) lack of communication between 
irrigation management and farmers, 4) low quality of service (in quantity, 
duration and timing of irrigation water delivery), 5) absence of performance 
linked incentives/disincentives in the irrigation management, 6) absence of 
penalties to users faltering in payment, 7) low priority given to operation and 
maintenance, fee collection and efficient water use, 8) small size and low income 
of irrigated farms and 9) corruption among irrigation officials (Easter and Liu, 
2005). Nevertheless, there are justifications for partial payment of irrigation cost 
in India from public tax revenue. Study by Bhattarai et al. (2006) reveals that the 
irrigation multiplier operating in India is in the order of 3 to 4.5 which means 
around 30 percent of annual benefit from Irrigation falls into farmer’s hand while 
70 percent spills over to the rest of economy. Even then, the question of efficient 
utilisation of available resources and financial sustainability of irrigation 
institutions remain.  
3.5.2.3 Water rights allocation in Indian irrigation systems  
The existing practices on surface water allocation among users in India can be 
grouped into five viz. 1)Warabandi, 2)Shejpali, 3)Land class, 4)Satta and 5)Phad 
systems. In the Warabandi system, users are entitled to a fraction of total water 
flow available in proportion to land area while in the Shejpali system, delivery of 
a specific quantity of water under a given schedule to facilitate the crop to 
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maturity is practiced.  In the Land class system, the class of the land i.e. single 
cropped, double cropped etc are considered along with the land area to decide 
water allocation. In the Satta system, the government agencies are responsible to 
provide an assured irrigation till the crop maturity. The Warabandi system is 
practiced mainly in North-Western India while the Shejpali system is 
predominantly used in western India, and the Land class system dominates in 
southern India. Finally, the Satta system is confined to north-eastern parts of 
India. In all the four systems mentioned, government agencies are responsible for 
the water allocation while in the Phad system practiced in small scale irrigation 
facilities in Maharashtra, local communities are responsible in water distribution 
(Namboodiri et al., 2006).  
3.6 Previous study in Cauvery Basin on water allocation 
Vedula (1985) attempted an optimization model for a determination of optimum 
cropping pattern that will result in maximum net benefit for the farmers in the 
basin. This work also attempts to find a cropping pattern that can create maximum 
irrigated areas in the basin. He has verified the effect of upstream developments, 
i.e. construction of Yagachi, Harangi, Voteholes, Lakshmanathirtha, Chicklihole 
reservoir projects that would reduce annual inflow to Krishna Raja Sagar and 
Hemavathi reservoirs by 19.7% and 5.7% respectively. It is a twelve months 
irrigation model for the reservoir systems in the upper Cauvery basin. The inputs 
for the deterministic model consist of mean monthly flows into reservoirs, 
estimated monthly evaporation rate and mean monthly diversion requirements for 
irrigation. A maximization of net benefit by optimizing cropping patterns, given 
the constraints on land area, reservoir storage continuity, storage capacity and 
downstream release requirements, is carried out. Interestingly, inflows to Mettur 
reservoir are taken into account and downstream releases of water in each month 
are specified as minimum releases to ensure adequate water supply for existing 
irrigation in the delta and non delta region below Mettur. Alternatively optimum 
cropping pattern on maximum diversions or maximum irrigated area in the upper 
basin, given the same constraints are also worked out. The results show that 
proposed upstream developments may not affect the net benefits of the existing 
irrigation system, given the optimized cropping pattern. The author states the 
caution that the optimum cropping pattern, realized by the model, may not be 
acceptable for farmers. As it is a planning model and the operation plan to achieve 
the suggested area coverage of crops has to be conducted separately if results has 
to match with reality.  
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3.7 Environmental externalities in absence of water allocation 
agreements   
Water logging and salinisation are common problems of over irrigation in 
upstream (head end) areas which are known as twin menace of irrigated 
agriculture. This problem can be due to factors such as inadequate lining of 
canals, inadequate drainage and excessive irrigation. In India, primary cause of 
water logging and salinisation is the lack of economic incentives to conserve 
water and restrict over irrigation (Wichelns, 1999). This problem in turn arises 
from ill defined property rights and institutional structures facilitating optimal 
water use (Oster and Wichelns, 2003). Volumetric water pricing and water 
markets are the economic instruments widely recommended to tackle the 
externalities. The unit area water pricing system practiced in India does not 
provide any incentive for individual farmer to restrain from over irrigation while 
volumetric pricing in developed countries provide economic rationality to restrict 
use. Coming to water trading, allowing farmers to trade the water entitlements 
among them, negative externalities such as water logging and salinity can be 
managed. In presence of a trading opportunity, farm level efforts to convert deep 
percolation and surface run off to marketable surplus may reduce the burden on 
local water tables (Wichelns, 1999).  Saleth describes an ‘incentive gap’ that 
exists in India between value generated by current water use and the scarcity 
value of water and advocates policy reforms to close the gap. According to him, 
the incentive gap is resulting in practices that lead to water logging, salinisation 
and aquifer depletion in various parts of canal regions (Wichelns, 1999). Shankar 
et.al (2003) show that the cost of cultivation of Paddy in water logged areas of 
Kabini command in Cauvery basin is 7 percent higher than the normal farming 
areas in the basin while output was 34 percent lower than normal, resulting in a 
net loss of 12466 INR per hectare.  In a similar study in Haryana shows that 10-12 
percent reduction in yield in water logged areas that leads to 20-30 per cent loss in 
monitory terms when cost escalation in affected areas is accounted. In whole of 
Haryana, the estimated loss from these externalities is 1640 million Indian rupees 
(Datta and Jong, 2002).     
Next, it can be seen that the access and management of surface water resources is 
intertwined with groundwater resource as the irregularities in the former often 
lead to over extraction and hence depletion of latter (Winter et al.,2005). In the 
absence of well defined property rights, some farmers may use water quite 
inefficiently while other farmers are prone to frequent dry spells (Flatters and 
Horbulyk, 1995). In Cauvery basin, the competition between states on using 
available water has created water scarcity for agriculture (Tuong and Bouman, 
2003).  In order to save their crops, farmers in the basin switch over to the 
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extraction of ground water as an alternative. This is prominent in Cauvery basin 
as the main crop, paddy, is sensitive to water scarcity. As there are no incentives 
for long term optimisation of ground water use for individual farmer, excessive 
pumping from aquifers exceeding the recharge rate may occur. The resulting 
depletion, often expressed by falling ground water levels causes an increase in the 
extraction costs, deterioration in land quality and diminishing of land rents 
(Konikow and Kendy, 2005). The absence of legal and institutional mechanisms 
in managing ground water pumping and practical difficulties in monitoring 
individual ground water use leads to over-exploitation of ground water resource 
(Rosegrant and Biswanger, 1994). It is estimated that average fall in ground water 
level is 05- 0.7 meter per year in Karnataka and 1 meter per year in Tamil Nadu 
(Bouman and Tuong, 2003). The Centre for water policy (CWP, 2005) has 
reported that the districts in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu register a fall in ground 
water level more than 4 meters  in every 20 years or 2 meter fall in ground water 
level in every 10 years. This includes Hassan, Mandya, Mysore and Tumkur 
districts in Karnataka and Tanjore, Tiruvarur and Trichy districts in Tamil Nadu 
that are in the Cauvery basin area. Tamil Nadu has 103 administrative blocks 
classified under over exploited category out of 384 blocks in 1998 (CWP, 2005). 
In Karnataka, the 56 per cent (1109 out of 1895) of observation wells by the 
department of mines and geology showed a decline in 2002 (ENVIS, 2007).    
A fall in ground water levels due to over exploitation causes increasing cost of 
pumping, land subsidence and in some regions it results in sea water intrusion. 
Shah et al. (2003) identifies four distinct stages in groundwater based irrigation 
regimes in South Asia. The first stage is characterised by the traditional water 
lifting devises and concentrated rural poverty while the second stage is of 
groundwater based agrarian boom. In the second stage tube-well based irrigation 
creates rapid increases in rural income and employment. In the third stage, early 
symptoms of ground water over draft are visible as local water tables sink but the 
agrarian economy continues booming. In the fourth stage, the ground water 
bubble bursts and serious problems of ground water quality and quantity sets in. 
Shah et al. classifies central Tamil Nadu in third stage and coastal Tamil Nadu in 
fourth stage of ground water socio-ecology.   
In summary, the literature reveals the pressing need for devising mechanisms that 
will result in efficient and equitable water allocation and reduction of externalities 
with in the legal, institutional, geographic and social conditions existing in the 
research area.   
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4. POLITICS AND ECONOMY OF NON-
COOPERATION IN CAUVERY WATER SHARING 
This introductory chapter (Chapter 1) discussed several details of the historical 
development of Cauvery river water sharing problem. In the current chapter we 
will discuss an important research question raised in Chapter 1 i.e. why the major 
riparian states did not cooperate in settling their initial water rights, even after 
elected governments replaced the kingdoms of asymmetric power.  
4.1 Water and politics in Cauvery basin  
The provision of irrigation water to farms ensures higher productivity of crops 
apart from reducing uncertainty in depending stochastic rainfall as the primary 
source of water for crops. In other words, irrigation provision insures farmers 
from potential crop failures due to uncertain weather conditions and enhances 
their incomes and living standards.  This is evident from the Figure 4.1 which 
depicts the gap between mean irrigated and rainfed crop productivity in 
Karnataka. The gap ranges from approximately 1 tonne per hectare, in case of 
paddy and sorghum, to 0.75 tonne in case of finger millet, and 0.5 tonnes in case 
of groundnut.  
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Figure 4.1: Mean productivity of important crops in irrigated and rainfed tracts of 
Karnataka  
Source: Compiled from Directorate of Economics and Statistics (Karnataka), 2007 
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Being a key resource for millions of farmers in the Cauvery basin, water played 
and still plays a deciding role in the political landscape of the Cauvery basin. 
During the period Chola dynasty of 1st and 2nd century AD, provision of irrigation 
in Cauvery delta area by the construction of a water diversion structure, lead to a 
surge in agricultural revenue and ensured the dominance of the dynasty (Weber, 
2005). Later during British colonial periods, enhancement of irrigation in Cauvery 
delta by constructing diversion structures and canals substantially increased the 
tax revenues for the Government. The economic benefit even made the Madras 
presidency to guard its water rights by including provisions in water sharing 
agreements with Mysore (detailed in chapter 1). The water - economy - politics 
linkage continues in Cauvery river basin and can be used to explain the non-
cooperative stand point of democratically elected governments in the basin.  
4.1.1 Karnataka scenario 
Anand (2004) discusses the importance of the Cauvery River water sharing issue 
in winning electoral constituencies in Cauvery basin (ECCB) and in gaining 
majority in state legislative assemblies and in the formation of governments in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. He links this strategic importance of ECCB to 
regional political parties’ stand points in Cauvery water sharing. He stresses that 
the higher representation of ECCB in Governments of 1996 and 2001 (see figure 
4.2) as well as the fact that 1/4th of members (56 out of 224) in state legislative 
assembly represented the ECCB indicate the importance of a populist political 
stand on Cauvery water sharing. The figures on local assembly results (Anand, 
2004) indicate that, given the strong competition between parties in winning the 
electoral constituencies in Cauvery basin, policy on Cauvery water sharing can be 
a crucial factor in deciding the assembly election verdict in these constituencies.  
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Figure 4.2: Representation of Cauvery basin constituencies in Assembly and Government 
of Karnataka      Source: Compiled from Anand (2004) 
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Even though the electoral trends indicate the importance of ECCB in winning a 
majority in the state assembly and in the formation of government, there is a need 
of further evidence for proving the relation between voting pattern and political 
stand point of parties on Cauvery water sharing issues. To accomplish this 
objective, a question on voting behavior has been included the primary survey 
which covered four of seven basin districts in Karnataka.  The farmers 
interviewed in the survey were confronted with the question of whether they will 
vote for a political party (Party A) which agrees to share water with Tamil Nadu 
irrespective of their current political affiliation. The results show that voting to 
opposition party (Party B) is a quite likely outcome. The graphical representation 
of the hypothetical voting scenario is given in the figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Share of voters in the sampled districts in Karnataka that may vote to Party A 
if it decides to compromise on sharing Cauvery water 
4.1.2 Tamil Nadu scenario  
The strong relationship of Cauvery water issues and politics is visible in Tamil 
Nadu as well. The importance of ECCB for assembly and Government formation 
is evident from available data (Anand, 2004). The figure 4.4 represents the share 
of ECCB in assembly and government formation.  It can be seen that the share of 
ECCB in the government has increased to 32 percent in 2001 compared to 28 
percent in 1996.  
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Figure 4.4: Representation of Cauvery basin constituencies in Assembly and Government 
of Tamil Nadu 
Source: Compiled from Anand (2004) 
As these electoral trends are not conclusive evidence for association between 
voting behaviour and political stand points of parties on Cauvery water sharing, 
we have included the question on voting behavior in the primary survey in 
selected districts of Tamil Nadu, also. The question confronted by the sampled 
farmers is whether they will vote to a party C, who compromises on water share 
with Karnataka, irrespective of their current party affiliation?  Results show that 
Party C will be voted out as 70 per cent of the voters may decide against them 
(See figure 4.5).  
                         
Figure 4.5: Share of voters that may vote to Party C, if it decides to compromise on 
sharing Cauvery water 
The observed shifts in voting pattern in both states calls for further explanation on 
the voting behaviour in case of water issues and its role in the formation of 
political stand points; and it is dealt in the subsequent section.   
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4.2 A theoretical explanation of non-cooperative behaviour of basin 
states 
Let us assume that the political positions of parties can be expressed as points in 
an ‘n’ dimensional Euclidean policy space. This follows Ansolabehere and 
Snyder (2000). The ideal position of a voter (farmer in our case) can also be 
expressed as a point in this policy space. The difference in distances from ideal 
position to party policy stand points (which is a difference in utility) determines 
voter’s choice; i.e. she will vote for the party closest to her ideal position in the 
policy space. The graphical depiction of this policy space is given in figure 4.6 
with economic, environmental and social policy dimensions as examples. Let use 
denote the policy position of a party by the point, X  i.e. XA is the policy stand 
point of Party A and XB is the policy position of Party B. Z is the ideal position a 
voter in the policy space.  
 
                     
                              
Figure 4.6 : Depiction of position of Party A, Party B and voter in n- dimensional 
Euclidean policy space.  
Let || XA - Z ||2 be a distance, which is the absolute value of distance from the 
party A’s policy position (XA) to voter’s ideal policy position (Z). It represents the 
utility of the voter by voting to the party A i.e. U(XA, Z). Similarly, let || XB - Z ||2 
represent the utility of the voter by voting to the party B i.e. U(XB, Z).   The 
Outcome of the electoral competition, between Party A and B in this case, is 
determined by the difference in U(XA, Z) and U(XB, Z).  Let us take our real life 
electoral competition in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. They are usually a two party 
or two coalitions competition. The major parties in Tamil Nadu are DMK and 
AIDMK while Janatha Dal (JD) and Congress are leading parties in Karnataka. 
Though the last election witnessed Bharathiya Janatha Party (BJP) coalescing 
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with JD to form the government. For theoretical examination, we can consider 
them as Party A and B in Karnataka and Party C and D in Tamil Nadu. So the 
electoral outcome is decided by the difference between the distance between 
policy stand points XA and XB in the case of Karnataka (∆U(XA, XB,Z) and is 
formalized by the equation (Following Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000),  
∆U(XA, XB,Z) =  ||  XA -Z  ||2 - || XB -Z  ||2 ............................................ (1)  
If ∆U(XA, XB,Z) which represents the utility difference between Party A and B in 
the equation is less than zero, it means that the distance from voter’s ideal 
position to the party A is less than corresponding distance to the party B. In other 
words, party A is closer to the voter’s ideal position. This ensures the Part A 
being the winner.  If ∆U(XA, XB,Z) is greater than zero, Party B will be the 
winner. If it is zero there is tie.  
In our simplistic representation of elections, we can incorporate issues of very 
high influence on voting pattern as decisive variables. Ansolabehere and Snyder 
(2000) call such issues as valance issues. It is incorporated as a score Y with a 
weighting factor λ. The Y depends on the party stand on the valance issue and the 
weighting factor λ, which represents the power of the valance issue in deciding 
the electoral outcome. The higher Y denotes, the more acceptable is the stand on 
the valance issue by a party; while a high λ shows it ability to influence voting 
decisions.  In presence of such important issues, utility gained by voting to party 
A can be represented (Following Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000) as  
U( XA, YA;Z) = λYA – || XA-Z ||2 ...................................................... ..(2) 
Here the score on party policy on the valance issue for the party A is YA.  
Similarly, utility gained by the voter voting to party B is  
U( XB,Y;Z) = λYB – || XB-Z ||2..............................................................(3) 
The electoral outcome in equation 1 can be reframed as   
∆U(XA,YA, XB, YB;Z) = [λYA -  || XA -Z ||2 ] – [λYB - || XB -Z ||2 ] ......(4) 
By rearranging (4),  
∆U(XA,YA, XB, YB;Z) = λ(YA –YB) + || XB -Z ||2 -  || XA -Z ||2..............(5) 
This equation points out that the electoral outcome will be depending on the 
difference in distance between the policy stand points of Party A and B as well as 
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their stand point in valance issue. If ∆U(XA,YA, XB, YB;Z) in the equation 5 is 
greater than zero, voter gets more utility by voting to party A. This ensures the 
Part A being the winner. This can happen if the party A is closer to the voter’s 
ideal policy stand point and if its stand point in critical issue (valance issue) is a 
popular one.  If ∆U(XA ∆U(XA,YA, XB, YB;Z)  is less than zero, Party B will be 
the winner. This means the party B is the closest to the voter’s ideal policy stand 
point and if its stand point in critical issue (valance issue) is the popular one. If it 
is zero there is tie. The same case is applicable for the parties C and D in Tamil 
Nadu. Let us denote the outcomes i.e. Party A being winner, Party B being winner 
and both parties tie to be 1, -1 and 0.  
Let us consider the Cauvery water issue as a valance issue. The swing voting 
patterns are evident from in the primary survey conducted in Karnataka and Tamil 
Nadu. They show the high power (λ) of this valance issue in deciding the voting 
behaviour and hence deciding the electoral outcome of Cauvery Basin districts. 
The data presented in section 4.1 shows that wining in these electoral 
constituencies in Cauvery Basin is decisive in government formation. In this 
scenario, let us examine the combinations of strategies that parties can take in 
Karnataka (A or B) and Party in Tamil Nadu (C or D) on Cauvery water sharing. 
The prisoner’s dilemma on strategy choice is presented in table 1.  
Table 4.1: Prisoner’s dilemma in water sharing 
Party B  
 
Strategy Cooperate in sharing water Noncooperate in sharing water 
Cooperate 
to sharing 
water 
||  XA -Z ||2 - || XB -Z ||2 
(Outcome can be 1, 0 or  -1) 
λ(YA –YB) +||XB -Z||2 - ||XA -Z||2 
(Outcome is -1 or party B 
wins) 
Pa
rt
y 
A
 
Non-
cooperate 
to sharing 
water 
λ(YA –YB)+||XB -Z||2-||XA -Z||2 
(Outcome is 1 or party A 
wins) 
|| XA -Z ||2 - || XB -Z||2  
(Outcome can be 1, 0 or   -1 )  
In the scenario of high ability of the valance issue (Cauvery water sharing) in 
swinging votes, taking the populist stand on the valance issue can make sure that 
the election outcomes depend only on the policy positions of Party A and B (XA 
and XB). If a party A takes the populist point on the valance issue i.e. 
noncooperation in sharing water, it makes sure that it has a fair chance to win the 
election independent of the Party B stand on the valance issue (see table 4.1). It 
means that the Party A strategy to take the populist stand point of noncooperation 
(YA=1) leaves two options for party B i.e. to assume the same stand point (YB =1) 
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or to cooperate in water sharing (YB=0). If the party B takes the latter position in 
the valance issue, Party A will be the winner irrespective of Party B policy 
position and if the Party B takes the same position as of A i.e. to non-cooperate, 
Party A gets a fair chance to win electoral competition depending on its distance 
from the ideal policy point of the voter.  It is the same case with Party B. This 
condition forces the parties to take the same strategy on the valance issue which is 
the noncooperation in water sharing.  
In the presence of the prisoner’s dilemma, an optimal strategy of the Party A and 
B as well as the governments formed by them is to non-cooperate on Cauvery 
water sharing as that this strategy gives best possible outcome irrespective of the 
other party stand. If we superimpose the same strategy options for Party C and D 
in Tamil Nadu, the same outcome, i.e. refusal to make compromises on Cauvery 
water sharing, will occur from both sides. This is precisely so as the sets of parties 
contesting in both states are mutually exclusive. In conclusion, irrespective of the 
fact that Party A or B is in power in Karnataka, Party C or D is power in Tamil 
Nadu, compromises may not occur at bilateral level unless the Cauvery water 
share tones down in its political importance (λ→0).  
4.3 Political importance (λ) and the underlying economic motives  
The current conflict is based on the physical sharing of initial river water rights 
and not on sharing the net benefits that the water represents. Nevertheless, the 
farmers’ (voters of the party) political reaction is based on economic 
considerations. As the water in the Cauvery River is fully allocated with out any 
surplus (see chapter 1 and 2), any reallocation will cause water allocation to be 
less than benchmark water receipts in both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. The 
benchmark in Karnataka is the current level of utilization of Cauvery waters and 
in the case of Tamil Nadu, it is the historical water receipts stipulated in 1824 
agreement. Assuming farmers’ income is a linear function of water received, any 
reallocation will reduce the economic welfare of farmers compared to the 
benchmarks. In addition, in the absence of flexibility in water allocation 
mechanisms, the initial water rights allocations represent the maximum income 
that farmers can gain from cultivating the irrigated crops at current technology. 
This economic consideration is expressed in voting behaviour as evident from the 
surveys conducted in sampled districts.  
For a comparison, the primary survey also included a question on voting 
behaviour with respect to a party offer of providing electricity free of cost for 
pumping ground water for irrigation. This policy already exists in Tamil Nadu 
though number of free connections is limited. When posed the question in the 
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primary survey in Karnataka i.e. whether the respondents will vote for a political 
party offering free electricity to farmers (irrespective of their current party 
affiliation) showed a 50 percent swing in votes. The major reason for not shifting 
the voting (for the other half of respondents) is that the respondents viewed it as 
an election gimmick and expressed doubt on the credibility of such an offer. 
Nevertheless this exercise shows how economic considerations in irrigation water 
access get expressed into voting behaviour in the research area.  
From the political prisoners’ dilemma depicted in table 4.1, it is clear that the 
political importance (λ) should fall considerably for evoking a cooperative 
behaviour. This can happen in presence of a mutually beneficial sharing scheme 
or in other words, an arrangement where net gain from cooperation is positive for 
both states. In the coming chapters, a water trading mechanism i.e. an exchange  
of water for money among the water user groups is examined for its potential to 
reduce the welfare loss due to cooperation and hence its political importance.  
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5. WATER RIGHTS MARKET AS A MECHANISM TO 
RECONCILIATE THE WATER SHARING DISPUTE 
As stated in the previous chapter, the Cauvery water sharing dispute is currently a 
dispute over quantity of initial river water rights and not of the net benefits that 
the water represents. Nevertheless, the political importance is footed on the 
farmers’ economic benefit from the water allocated to each of them. As the water 
rights and its usage can become independent in presence of a water rights trading 
mechanism (Fisher, 1995), defining water rights and establishing a system of 
trading these water rights is required to address the water sharing as an issue of 
sharing the economic benefits. This approach keeps the focus on economic value 
of water rather than quantity allocation and hence it does not matter who holds the 
right but rather who gets the money that the water represents.  
5.1 Water rights market in a developing country: challenges and 
opportunities 
Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) suggested a set of advantages of allowing a 
functional market to decide the allocation of water among competing users and 
sectors. They compared the water market with other instruments. The main 
arguments that they have put forward on supporting water trade in comparison to 
other modes of water allocation are (1) the rapidly increasing scarcity of water, 
(2) its high value on reallocation, (3) sizable transaction costs of alternatives like 
administrative and community management, (4) political constraints of 
opportunity cost pricing, (5) possibility of reductions in externalities by the water 
trading, and finally (6) the possibility of investment mobilization by water users. 
The major bottleneck in applying a market based approach in developing 
countries, according to them, is the presence of (1) the high transaction cost of 
establishing the prerequisites of a functional water market i.e. assignment of the 
initial water rights and the provision to physically regulate the water flow to 
individual fields, (2) the high transaction costs of finding a suitable and willing 
buyer for the individual water rights and (3) the associated administrative costs of 
reassigning the water entitlements. Considering the small size of individual farm 
holdings (less than 2 hectares) in most irrigation systems of developing countries, 
these costs make the market based instruments in water allocation an unviable 
proposition. Hence the reduction of establishment and transaction costs is the 
greatest challenge in front of the policy researchers who are designing better 
market based water allocation instruments in developing countries (Msangi et al., 
2006). Otherwise, the existing mode of centralised water allocation becomes the 
economically viable alternative, though it is far less efficient in water 
management. 
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Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) mentioned that a possible way to reduce the 
establishment and transaction costs in the water rights markets of developing 
countries is assigning property rights to water to user communities instead of 
individual farmers. This argument is pointing towards downsizing the number of 
players in the water market and hence substantially reducing the stated costs. A 
similar argument is presented by Msangi et. al (2006).  But the major question to 
be answered is how a group of farmers can be coordinated to act as a single player 
in a water rights market so that rights can be traded among water user 
communities instead of individual small sized farmers?  The authors did not try to 
elaborate on this aspect. The current chapter attempts to portray a coordination 
mechanism that can act as a visible hand by synchronising the individual farmer 
actions in water user communities and hence facilitating the invisible hand of 
water market in water reallocation among the communities.   
5.1.1 Property rights: community and individual  
In the case of a resource like water, its allocation when property rights are ill 
defined is obviously challenging (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002). Property rights 
over any asset, in general, encompass the right to use the resource, realise income, 
sell, or exclude others. An associated concept is the transaction cost which is 
defined as the cost of protecting and exchanging property rights (Holden and 
Thobani, 1996). It is self-evident that allocating water rights to each miniscule 
farm holdings in a large river basin can be quite high, as it means quantitative 
allocation and monitoring of water use of each individual farmer plots. In addition 
to metering of water, monitoring the proper functioning of water meters against 
tampering and malicious practices can make it even more expensive in practice. 
Considering this fact, it can be argued that limiting the allocation of water rights 
and its quantitative physical allocation to water user association level (WUA) can 
substantially reduce the implementation and transaction costs. The initial 
allocation of rights can be based on historical water use of the WUA so that the 
political friction in assigning initial water rights can be minimized. However, the 
question is what will be the roles of individual farmers and the WUA, if they want 
to participate in the water market, this has to be clarified.  
As stated in Chapter 3, some of the financially autonomous irrigation institutions 
in India, like the Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Limited (KGBNL) of Karnataka, are 
practicing the quantitative wholesaling of water to farmer societies.  The KGBNL 
charges water prices according to the quantity used by the farmer societies and 
they are responsible for collecting the water charges from the individual members. 
It is also visualised that any reduction in water use by farmers may result in lower 
costs to a farmer society and hence may encourage water saving. Nevertheless, 
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this could not be realised in the absence of volumetric measurement of water at 
individual farmer levels (Raju et al., 2003). It is evident from this case that, in the 
absence of volumetric measurement of individual water use, water user groups 
require a coordination mechanism that links the individual efforts to incentives. 
Such a mechanism can invoke a coordinated response to water prices.  
5.1.2 Water trade and water saving  
An individual farmer, holding a right to consume a specific amount of water and 
facing a water market, may employ water saving techniques in his/her field and 
sell the saved water to realise additional income (Dinar and Letey, 1991). Water 
saving practices can range from simple management methods to modern capital 
intensive techniques. The options in front of the farmer can even be changing over 
to rainfed cultivation so that the whole water right can be sold. This is 
economically rational only if the cost of transition to a water saving mode of 
cultivation is lower than the gain from selling the saved water. It is hereby argued 
that if water rights are allocated to the water user group, selling of a part of water 
right in exchange of money may not automatically result in the use of water 
saving techniques in the fields of the WUA members, as there is no explicit 
linkage between individual efforts to save water and individual gains. It means 
that the price signal given by the water market may not be able to guide actions at 
individual farmer level. In other words, the invisible hand of water market 
mechanism needs to be assisted by a visible hand or a coordination system at 
WUA level to make sure that the water market result in the desired outcome. A 
mechanism of coordination at WUA level to induce water saving at individual 
farmer fields is discussed in the following sections.  
5.1.3 Water trade and agricultural production  
Another important criticism of the use of market based approaches in developing 
countries is that the water trading may cause excessive reallocation of water to 
industrial purposes and domestic use and hence can cause significant reduction in 
agricultural production. Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) argue that there is 
scope of efficiency gains in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors if the 
buyers face full opportunity cost of tradable water but see chances of modest 
levels of water transfers from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. 
Nevertheless, it may be desirable to restrict the access to the water market to those 
farmers who do not abandon cultivation. This explicit arrangement is required to 
make sure that the agricultural production is sustained in cultivable areas of 
developing countries, even in the presence of the water market. This condition 
may be important as food shortages and associated price raises are becoming 
common in these countries. We handle this issue by limiting water rights that can 
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be traded in the water rights market to aggregate water use reductions (or savings) 
achieved by employing water saving irrigation techniques or crop raising which 
are practiced by members of the water user community. This condition also 
means that crop cultivation becomes a prerequisite for participating in the water 
market and hence maximising the revenue from water trade becomes independent 
of crop cultivation per se.  
5.2 The water market setting 
We start the description of the water market by specifying the actors and their 
roles. Water user associations, water authorities and farmers are the main actors at 
both supply side and demand side of the water market. Non-agricultural users of 
water also can be a part of the demand side.  We see a Water User Association 
(WUA) as a cooperative body which is responsible for irrigation water 
management in the area under its command and the Water Authority is an agency 
that manages water allocation over a large area (Eg: Irrigation departments in 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu) which quantitatively allocates water to WUAs. Every 
farmer is assumed to be a member of the WUA. As the user associations hold 
water right according to the historical abstractions of surface water, quite a 
number of WUAs will have at least sufficient amounts of water for agriculture at 
current level of irrigation technology. We term them as WUA-(seller). These 
WUAs are at the supply side of the market while the remaining water user 
associations, facing deficit in surface water rights, are at the demand side along 
with non agricultural users. Let us call them WUA (buyer). We present a skeletal 
view of such a water market for the research area in the figure 5.1.  
5.2.1 Conceptual frame of the interstate water market 
Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual frame of an interstate water market in the 
Cauvery River Basin. Here the initial rights are allocated to Karnataka and Tamil 
Nadu by the Cauvery tribunal and the rights are further distributed by the water 
authorities among WUAs according to their historical water use. Both intra state 
and interstate water trade is allowed. The possibilities of the trade are 1) WUA in 
Karnataka sells the water right to a WUA in Tamil Nadu, 2) WUA in Karnataka 
sells the water right to another WUA in Karnataka, 3) WUA in Tamil Nadu sells 
the water right to another WUA in Tamil Nadu 4) WUA in Tamil Nadu sells the 
water right to another WUA in Karnataka. The arrows in the figure 5.1 indicate 
these possibilities. All the water trade is organized by the water authority in this 
conceptual framework.  It also acts as a hub for exchanging the rights. The water 
trade is beneficial if the reallocation leads to a Pareto optimal increase in benefits 
compared to the status quo allocation in the river basin.  
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Figure 5.1: Water rights transaction possibilities in a water market set up in the research 
area.  
 
5.2.2: The supply side of the water market  
A detailed conceptual diagram of the supply side in this water market setting is 
furnished in figure 5.2. The water and money transfers in the proposed water 
market are indicated. As previously stated, a WUA at the supply side holds 
adequate water rights. These water user communities with sufficient rights can 
reduce the water demand by organising the water saving cultivation practices in 
farmlands under their command by coordinating the required actions of the 
member farmers.  The surplus rights generated can be sold to a WUA at the 
demand side. The WUA (buyers) have to purchase water rights from the pool of 
rights offered by the supply side through the Water Authority. This setting of 
allowing purchases from common pool of water rights makes sure that transaction 
cost of searching and finding a buyer for the seller and a seller for the buyer can 
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be minimized and will make sure that prices will lead to efficient redistribution of 
water rights. As trade of water rights are closed before the physical transfer, cost 
of water reallocation can be reduced substantially. Water price formation takes 
place according to demand and supply conditions like in a normal market (similar 
to a commodity bourse) and it decides the money flow in the whole market 
system. Electronic markets like in the Westlands Irrigation District in California, 
are also perceivable (Landry and Anderson, 1999). The differences between a 
normal water right market and the proposed water market concept can be deduced 
form the conceptual diagram. The differences are that the buyers and sellers are 
water user communities instead of individuals and water rights are sold before the 
physical allocation of water. The remaining portion of the chapter is concentrating 
on the coordination of the individual farmer members in a water user association 
at supply side so that the group can act as an individual seller.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Skeletal view of the water market concept with the visible and invisible hands.   
5.3 The visible hand  
As a discussed already, a visible hand should coordinate actions of the individual 
farmer members to assist the invisible hand of market price of water in guiding 
farmer’s decisions in water saving and trading activities in each WUA. A revenue 
sharing contract between WUA and an individual farmer is the coordination 
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device proposed here. This contract is a mechanism to coordinate the water saving 
activities among its members by regulating the sharing of the revenue realised by 
water trading. We are adapting a principal-agent (P-A) model to derive the 
contract conditions so that WUA can maximize the surplus rights and hence the 
revenue for all of its members. The surplus rights are generated by the use of 
water saving techniques and the use of appropriate cultivation practices in 
individual farmer’s fields. The cooperative nature of the WUA is given its due 
importance while framing the P-A model.  
5.3.1 A principal-agent model of the contract scheme  
Let us discuss the contractual relationship between WUA and the farmers. It has 
been already assumed that the water user association has sufficient water rights 
for crop cultivation at the current irrigation technology. The aim of the WUA is to 
maximize the water surplus that can be traded at a given price. In a normal water 
market where individuals hold the water rights, each of them can engage in water 
saving agricultural practices and sell the surplus water rights. As previously 
stated, only a clear specification of individual effort and individual gain 
relationship can bring the right level of individual activities when water rights are 
allocated to user groups. In order to frame such a relationship, the WUA is 
assumed to be a principal of a cooperative nature who is engaging in revenue 
sharing contracts with farmers in return of water saving practices in their 
individual fields.  Farmers are agents working for the principal’s goals in this 
setting.  
The principal, WUA, is interested in maximizing the farming area under ‘revenue 
sharing for water saving’ contracts so that it can maximize the water surplus that 
can be traded and hence its revenue. As there are a number of WUAs who are at 
the supply side, we index them with a superscript ‘i.’ Recall that WUAi  holds the 
right to use certain amount of water ( ix ) for irrigation which is sufficient enough 
under current cultivation and irrigation technology. WUAi consists of ni 
(1….s…ni) number of farmers and the WUA management. As the contract 
scheme for a single WUA at the supply side is derived here, the superscript ‘i’ can 
be dropped for reducing notational complexity.  
Let us discuss the principal-agent (P-A) relationship from the perspective of the 
agent or the farmer who is engaged in a crop raising enterprise. It is assumed that 
the use of water saving techniques or cultivation methods will not affect the 
agricultural output but will inflict a cost depending upon the area of its use by the 
farmer. This means that more the land area allocated to the water saving mode of 
cultivation, more is the cost inflicted and more is the water saved.  
WATER RIGHTS MARKET AS A MECHANISM TO RECONCILIATE THE WATER SHARING 
DISPUTE 
 
62 
5.3.1.1 The cost of employing the water saving technique 
The transition from traditional to water saving modes of irrigation is costly to 
farmer, for instance, in terms of additional labour or capital.  A disproportional 
increase in costs for each additional unit of area under water saving practice can 
be visualised. For this we assume a linear marginal cost curve, which implies a 
quadratic cost function, )( slC   
(1) 
ssssss llllC Ψ′+= 5.0.)( ϕ  
Where sϕ  and sΨ  are the parameters of the cost function and ls denotes the 
farming area under water saving irrigation / cultivation technique for the 
farmer,‘s’. Note that land area allocation can be easily monitored unlike water use 
of each farm which substantially reduces the transaction costs of the WUA.  
5.3.1.2 The ‘revenue sharing for water saving’ contract 
In order to facilitate the transition to the water saving irrigation/cultivation from 
the traditional irrigation/cultivation in agent’s fields, the principal (WUA) offers 
an revenue sharing scheme that has two components i.e. a fixed component to 
convince the risk averse farmers to employ the water saving practices and a 
variable component to ensure the effort of the agent farmer. Following Furubotn 
and Richter (2005), the incentive scheme is  
(2) 
sswsss lhPrlW α+=)(  
where 
sr  denotes the fixed component of the linear incentive scheme in WUA 
which may be paid in advance. sα  stands for share of the sth farmer from ssw lhP  
which is the revenue realised by the WUA from his/her effort. Here Pw is the unit 
price of water in the water market and hs is the conversion factor that converts the 
land area under water saving irrigation/ cultivation ( sl ) to water saved in 
quantitative terms (eg: cubic meter). hs is assumed to be fixed for the water saving 
technique employed by the farmer  ‘s’.  The total water right sold by the WUA is 
equal to s
s
slh∑  which is equivalent to ′− xx  where ′x is the water required in the 
whole WUA after the employment of water saving measures in farmers’ fields 
and ”x” is the quantity of water for which it holds the right.  
5.3.3 Incentive constraint 
The agent’s (farmer’s) gain depends upon the linear incentive that the WUA 
offers and the cost of transition to the new mode of irrigation or cultivation. The 
gain of the farmer can be represented as the surplus that he/she derives when 
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additional cost of water saving is deducted from the principal’s incentives 
(equation (2) – equation (1)).    
(3) =− )()( ss lClW  ssssssswss llllhPr Ψ−−+ /5.0.ϕα  
So, the agent farmer’s aim is to maximise his gain, )()( ss lClW − . If we take the 
first derivative with respect to the variable ‘land area’ (ls), 
(4) 0=Ψ−− ssssws lhp ϕα
 
Rearranging (4), we receive a linear response function 
(5) sssswss hpl ϕα 11 −− Ψ−Ψ=  
Equation (5) represents the agent’s response function for the principal’s payment 
scheme. It also can be called an incentive constraint as the principal can induce 
optimum level of farmers’ land area by certain income share
sα .  
5.3.1.3 Participation constraint  
Participation of farmers is ensured when the additional benefit realized by 
engaging in a contract is at least equal to farmer’s reservation utility ( R ) 
(Furubotn and Richter, 2005).  So, the additional income from the contractual 
arrangement has to be greater than or equal to his/her reservation utility.  
(6) =− )()( ss lClW  RllllhPr ssssssswss ≥Ψ−−+ /5.0.ϕα  
Taking R as slκ , which means a minimum gain per unit area (κ ) is required to 
ensure participation,  
(7) sssssssswss lllllhPr κϕα =Ψ−−+ /5.0.
 
Rearranging (7), the participation constraint is  
(8) ssswsssssss llhPlllr καϕ +−Ψ+= /5.0.  
5.3.1.4 Principal’s objective function 
The principal or the WUA is interested in maximising its income. Each WUA is 
assumed to be a price taker as the water price is determined by the market demand 
and supply conditions. Hence the total revenue of WUA ( ∑ ssw lhP ), depends on 
the total land area allocated to water saving mode of cultivation (∑ sl ) as sh is a 
constant for a given water saving technology. So the WUA has to maximize the 
total land allocation to water saving mode of cultivation in order to realize 
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maximum revenue. The principal takes effort to convince the farmers to join the 
contract and its reward (PI) is modeled as  
(9) PI   = [ ] ∑∑∑ −−−=−−
s
ss
s
ssws
s
sssws rlhPrlhP )1()1())(1( ααα  
The share of net revenue (after paying the fixed component of the linear incentive 
scheme ( sr  ) that the principal gets from each agent is )1( sα− . The objective is to 
maximize PI, given the incentive and participation constraints, 
sssswss hpl ϕα 11 −− Ψ−Ψ= (IC) 
ssswsssssss llhPlllr καϕ +−Ψ+= /5.0.  (PC)  
Nevertheless, in this setting, the principal tries to maximize rewards and lacks the 
character of a cooperative. Here the principal acts like a profit oriented private 
firm. In order to incorporate the characteristics of a cooperative, a bonus scheme 
is introduced.   
5.3.1.5 The bonus scheme  
Recall that the principal i.e. the WUA is a cooperative body. Hence the profit left 
after payment of a decent remuneration to the WUA members is shared among 
the agents (WUA members) as a bonus. The bonus can be represented as a share 
( β ) of the profit from the water trade, (following Zusman, 1989) and the total 
bonus to the WUA members (B) can be represented as   
(10)  B = 





−−− ∑∑
s
ss
s
ssws rlhP )1()1()( ααβ  
Note that 





−−−− ∑∑
s
ss
s
ssws rlhP )1()1()1( ααβ  goes to the principal and B 
represents the bonus amount that has to be distributed among the members. The β  
can take values from 1 to zero.   The condition, 0=β means that all the profit rests 
with the principal and no bonus is given to agents and 1=β indicates that the 
whole profit of the principal is distributed among the agents. The desirable 
scenario is a value in between 1 and 0.   
We can visualize two kinds of bonus sharing schemes i.e. equitable and equal 
types. Equitable bonuses are distributed according to the land area that each agent 
put under the water saving contract while equal bonuses are distributed according 
to head count of agents. If we resort to the equitable type of bonus, which gives 
more reason for large farmers to join the contract, the bonus to individual farmer 
will be 
WATER RIGHTS MARKET AS A MECHANISM TO RECONCILIATE THE WATER SHARING 
DISPUTE 
 
65 
(11) Bs = 





−−− ∑∑
∑ s
ss
s
ssws
s
s
s
rlhP
l
l )1()1()( ααβ  
It is to be noted that Bs is an individual bonus received by the farmer ‘s’ and the 
sum of Bs over all farmers is B i.e. ∑=
s
sBB .  
We can use the bonus scheme as a team incentive (Romstad, 2003) as well. A 
team incentive here is an incentive which stimulates farmers, engaged in the 
contract, to lobby other farmers to join the team at no cost to the principal (Collins 
and Maille, 2008). To make the bonus a team incentive, we add a correction 
factor (c.f) to the individual bonus function,  
c.f = 2
2
)(
)(
A
l
s
s∑
  
The new individual bonus function after incorporating the correction factor is  
(12)  Bs = 





−−− ∑∑
∑
s
ss
s
ssws
s
ss
rlhP
A
ll
)1()1()( 2 αα
β
 
Here “A” is the total farm area under the water user association. The correction 
factor becomes unity when whole area comes under the contract ( Al
s
s =∑ ), which 
means a full bonus will only be realised when all farmers join the contract and 
bring all their land area under the ‘revenue sharing for water saving’ contract. As 
the correction factor is a squared term, an increase area under the contact scheme 
will result in more than proportional gain of bonus to all farmer members. For 
example: If whole farm area (A) is under the contract ∑ =
s
s Al )( , the farmers can 
realise 4 times the bonus compared to a scenario where the 50 percent of farm 
area ∑ =
s
s Al )( 21  is under the scheme.  
This incentive may force farmer (members) to lobby other members to join the 
contract at no cost to the principal. In addition, it may also encourage farmers to 
allocate their whole farm area to the contract and to lobby others to do the same 
5.3.1.6 Updated incentive constraint  
When bonus scheme is (added) included to the gain function of the farmer agent,  
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(13) 
=− )()( ss lClW sssss
s
ss
s
ssws
s
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sswss lllrlhPA
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lhPr Ψ−−





−−−++ ∑∑
∑
/
2 5.0.)1()1( ϕαα
β
α  
As each agent is trying to maximise her gain, first derivative of (14) with respect 
to sl  is equated to zero  
(14) 





−−−+Ψ−− ∑∑
∑
s
ss
s
ssws
s
s
ssssws rlhPA
l
lhP )1()1(. 2 αα
β
ϕα = 0 
It is to be noted that we treat ∑
s
sl as a variable which can not be influenced by the 
decision of a single farmer alone as each of them holds only a small fraction of 
the total area. He/she has to lobby other farmers to join the scheme in order to 
influence∑
s
sl . 
By rearranging equation (15), the new incentive constraint is  
(15) 





−−−
Ψ
+Ψ−Ψ= ∑∑
∑ −
−−
s
ss
s
ssws
s
s
s
ssswsss rlhPA
l
hPl )1()1(. 2
1
11 αα
β
ϕα
 
Equation 15 is the updated response function of the agent and hence acts as the 
incentive constraint to the principal. As the response function directly depends on 
the ratio of the area under the contract scheme and total farming area, the contract 
scheme can persuade farmers to lobby each other in joining the contract at no cost 
to principal.  
5.3.1.7 Updated participation constraint  
We have already assumed that the reservation utility of farmer is slκ  i.e. the 
minimum gain that farmers bargain for,   
(16) s
s
ss
s
ssws
s
ss
ssssssswss lrlhPA
ll
llllhPr καα
β
ϕα =





−−−+Ψ−−+ ∑∑
∑
)1()1(5.0. 2/  
Rearranging equation (16), the participation constraint is 
(17) s
s
ss
s
ssws
s
ss
sswssssss klrlhPA
ll
lhPlllr +





−−−−−Ψ+= ∑∑
∑
)1()1(5.0. 2/ αα
β
αϕ  
5.3.1.8 Honorarium to the principal  
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





−−−− ∑∑
s
ss
s
ssws rlhP )1()1()1( ααβ  is the final reward of the principal as stated in 
5.3.6.  
As we already explained, WUA is a benevolent principal who shares the profit 
among the members. But in order to ensure that the principal gets a minimum 
honorarium after distributing the bonus, an upper limit to β  can be introduced. 
Similarly, a lower limit of β  can ensure that farmers receive a minimum amount 
of bonus. These conditions can be specified as  
UL βββ ≤≤   
Where ‘ Lβ ’ is the lower limit of β  to fix the upper limit of reward for the 
principal while Uβ  specify the upper limit of β  to ensure a lower limit of the 
reward of the principal. This lower and upper limit of β  has to be set by a 
negotiation between the WUA and farmers but the actual (optimized) level will be 
one that maximizes the objective function, given the constraints including the 
constraint on β  (Honorarium constraint). Whitford et al. (2005) argues that 
including the option of negotiation in principal-agent contracts results in a larger 
share of the surplus generated by the agent’s actions is realised by the agent than 
in standard principal-agency theory.  Hence the negotiation allows the subjects to 
attain Pareto optimal gains rather than trading off incentives for efficient risk 
sharing (Whitford et al., 2005). This is realized here by allowing the agents to 
limit the principal’s gain from their efforts by negotiation on upper and lower 
levels of β .  
5.3.2 Summary of the P-A model  
Let us hereby summarize the principal’s objective function including incentive 
(IC) and participation (PC), bonus (BC) and honorarium (HC) constraints. 
Maximize PI = maximize ∑∑ −−−
s
ss
s
ssws rlhP )1()1( αα
 
Subjected to  
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∑
−−−
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Bs = 
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Here the parameter η  is added to retain the mathematical equality of IC and PC 
when the market water price is higher than the price required for a full area 
allocation. As β  is constrained with in the lower and upper limits, η makes sure 
that the principal is not demanding an allocation more than the full area under the 
WUA. The excess money gets distributed as bonus but does not affect the already 
optimized coefficients of  sl  and sr .  
This revenue sharing contract links the individual effort to individual reward, 
which is a function of the water price. This condition is equivalent of having 
individual allocation of water rights to each farmer but the transaction cost of 
establishing, protecting and exchanging water rights can be a fraction of the latter.  
5.4 Benefit of the market based water allocation in the Cauvery 
basin 
Water trade in the Cauvery basin can lead to Pareto optimal increase in benefits 
compared to the status quo allocation in the river basin, only when the cost of 
purchasing the additional water rights is lower than cost of the using the 
alternative source of water by the WUAs of the demand side i.e. groundwater. In 
order to do it, it has to be proved that a price differential exist between the water 
right purchases and ground water extraction. The demand price of water can be 
estimated from the cost of ground water extraction while the numerical simulation 
of the P-A contract can be used to estimate the supply price of water rights. The 
following chapters are dealing these aspects.  
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6. GROUND WATER EXTRACTION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS 
AQUISITION: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND THE 
BENEFITS 
It is evident that the demand for additional supplies of surface water for 
agriculture arises from WUAs holding less than sufficient surface water rights. 
Recall that all WUAs hold water rights according to their past water receipts in 
the conceptual frame described in Chapter 5.  A typical strategy of farmers facing 
surface water shortage in the research area is to compensate the surface water 
deficit by the use of ground water. Costs of extracting water from this alternative 
source can be considered for estimating the price at which surface water purchase 
will be a viable option. If the farmer decides to use ground water as the alternative 
for additional surface water rights, he faces three sets of costs i.e. 1) investment 
costs 2) extraction costs and 3) externality costs. As extraction costs are heavily 
subsidised by both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka governments through highly 
subsidised electric power (see the section 2.1.2.3), this chapter look at the other 
two costs for determining the price of ground water. The price of groundwater is 
indirectly measured by considering the amortised investment costs and the 
external costs as a component of land prices at different locations with different 
ground water levels. The results are used in the next chapter to examine whether a 
price differential exists between the unit price of surface water rights and the 
estimated ground water price.  
6.1 Investment costs in groundwater extraction 
Ground water pumping requires substantial investment on constructing wells and 
installing pumping equipments in addition to energy cost of lifting the water out 
of the aquifer. In order to calculate cost of ground water extraction, we amortise 
the lumpsum investments to annuities (M). 
(1) [ ] [ ]1)1(/)1( −++= LL iiiVM  
Where ‘V’ is the compounded investment cost in Indian rupees at 2006 level. The 
rate at which we compounded the investment is 4 per cent and the same rate (i) is 
considered for amortisation as well. The average life of the bore well (L) is taken 
as 10 years.  The present amortised cost of investment/ha include all the cost 
required to produce a successful well. It is to be noted that all bore wells drilled 
by farmer may not be successful in yielding water and a failed well may 
substantially increase the costs of ground water use. A sub-sample of 58 farmers, 
after removing outliers, is used in calculating the amortised values of investment 
(per ha) on bore wells. The amortised mean investment/ha is 5827 INR with high 
standard deviation of INR 4651 where the median investment is 4593 INR. The 
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amortised investment/ha for all farmers in the sample are presented in the figure 
6.1 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Amortised value / ha (INR) of borewells of the sampled farmers  
6.2 Externality cost of pumping ground water 
The simultaneous pumping of ground water by many farmers sharing the same 
aquifer can lead to over-drafting of groundwater. This in turn causes the sinking 
of ground water table over years which can be considered as an externality of 
inefficient surface water distribution in our case. In the following section, 
quantification of the externality using a hedonic regression on agricultural land 
prices is carried out.  Such an approach is possible because the price of the 
bundled good, i.e. irrigated farm land, can be segregated with respect to different 
characteristics of the land parcel (Faux and Perry, 1999) which include the status 
of ground water availability for irrigation (represented by ground water level 
here). In addition, the short term benefit of ground water extraction for 
agricultural production exceeds the operational costs of extraction as electricity is 
subsidized in the research area (see chapter 2) and hence the effect of fall in 
ground water levels are not visible in output of profit figures.  These reasons 
justify the use of hedonic pricing model to unravel the hidden costs of over 
extraction of ground water for irrigation.  
6.2.1 Ground water levels in the Cauvery Basin  
Before specifying the hedonic regression model, an overview of the ground water 
situation along the Cauvery River is presented in the figure 6.2. The average 
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water levels of surveyed agricultural land parcels in Cauvery Basin, aggregated 
over administrative districts of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu states (See chapter 2 
for details of the primary survey) are depicted here.  
 
Figure 6.2: Average depth to the water tables from the surface in surveyed agricultural 
land parcels along Cauvery Basin 
The average ground water table ranges from 24 meters to 54 meters below surface 
level in the river basin. The KRS (Krishnarajasagara Reservoir Project) and 
Mettur (Stanley Reservoir Project) dams, which are the main water reservoirs in 
the Cauvery River, are located roughly in the middle of the command area (See 
Chapter 2) and it can be noticed that groundwater level shows a decreasing trend 
(means depth to the water table from the ground surface is increasing) towards 
both ends from the centre except in the Nagapattanam district. Albeit ground 
water availability at 6 meters from the surface, it is unfit for irrigation purposes in 
this district due to sea water intrusion of the aquifer due to over extraction. It is to 
be notified that the agricultural land market in sampled villages of Nagapattanam 
district is reported to be dysfunctional due to this problem. Agricultural land 
transactions are seldom reported in this district.  
6.2.2 Hedonic regression  
Hedonic regression is widely used to estimate the value of attributes of land 
parcels especially residential properties (see Boyle and Kiel, 2001 for an 
extensive review)  but applications in agriculture are not rare [For e.g. Palmquist 
and Danielson (1989), Xu et al. (1993),  Faux and Perry (1999) ].  
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6.2.2.1 Hedonic regression specification 
The covariates of farm land prices are hypothesised to be 1) the soil quality, 2) the 
groundwater availability, 3) the road and the market access and 4) the bargaining 
power of the farmer. Soil quality is measured using an index based on farmer’s 
own assessment of the farmland (from the survey). It should be noted that this is 
hidden information in the perspective of a prospective buyer. The groundwater 
availability is specified as the depth at which groundwater was available during 
the last cropping period. The depth of the ground water table also indicates the 
chances of having a successful cropping season if the surface water flow is 
inadequate. It is evident that groundwater availability is viewed as an insurance 
against crop failures in the research area due to irregular surface water availability 
(see the section 2.3.6). The road and the market access are measured using the 
distances to nearest road and market from each land parcel. As the size of the 
farm determines the ability of the farmer to successfully bargain, it is specified as 
a proxy of farmer’s bargaining power.  
As the observations are taken along the river stream, there is a physical 
connection among the sampled blocks and villages viz. the surface water flow. It 
is to be noted that water diversions in a village or block can influence the surface 
water availability and the ground water levels of neighbouring village or blocks. 
In addition, farm land price in one village or block influences the land prices in 
surrounding villages or blocks. So there is a social connection as well. But the 
both physical and social influence diminishes as distance from the village or block 
to the location of interest increases. Considering these peculiarities, the 
underlying spatial dependence in land prices is modelled as an isotropic spatial 
process i.e. the dependence between the land prices of two locations are specified 
as a function of Euclidean distance between them. This can be specified as the 
interaction of residuals in spatial regression. This type of specification of spatial 
processes is traditionally used in ecological and epidemiological studies (Raso et 
al., 2006). Hence the land price becomes a function of neighbourhood 
characteristics along with its own features. There is an increasing interest in such 
spatial hedonic models but the applications in farming lands are limited in number 
[Eg: Geoghegan et. al. (1997), Ready and Abdalla (2005)]. 
Let land price of ith land parcel of jth block be (Lij), its covariates be Xij , the block 
specific random effect be θj and the natural log of ijL  follow a normal distribution.  
(2) ,ˆ jijij LnXLLn θβ +=  
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This double log version of hedonic regression is equivalent to a Box-Cox 
transformation (λ =0) which is common in hedonic regression literature.  Here βˆ  
is a vector of regression coefficients. The spatial heterogeneity is modelled as 
location specific random effects, which specify a latent spatial process. The 
spatial random effect ( )...,,...(ˆ 1 Nj θθθθ = ) is assumed to follow a multivariate 
normal distribution with zero mean effect and the variance covariance matrix, ω  
i.e. )MVN(0,~ ωθ j . The ω  can be expressed as a product of the standard 
deviations (σ ) and the spatial correlation matrix, Σ  i.e. Σ= 2σω  . As already 
stated, this spatial correlation matrix is parameterised as a function of distance 
between the spatial locations. This means that the isotropic spatial process 
underlying spatial dependence among land prices is specified as a function of the 
distances between the spatial locations. The functional form is taken as an 
exponential one following conventions (Raso et al., 2006), that is  
)exp( mnmn dφ−=Σ  
where 
mnd  is the Euclidean distance between two blocks (m and n) while φ  is the 
spatial correlation factor which controls the decay in correlation with increasing 
distance. The distances are calculated using the UTM coordinates of the block 
centre (xm,ym) and (xn,yn). Some spatial modellers use a power exponential 
function to characterise the spatial correlation by assigning a power to the 
exponential form [ κφ )( mndxp − ]. The power κ is unity in the current specification 
(Raso et al., 2006).  
A summary of the variables used in the hedonic regression model and their 
description is given in the table 6.1.  
Table 6.1: List of variables in the hedonic regression 
Variables Explanation Unit 
Lij Expected selling price per ha of ith land parcel Indian Rupees (INR) 
Attributes of land parcel 
1X  Distance to road from the ith land parcel Meters 
2X  water level in the ith  land parcel Meters 
3X  Level of soil quality in farmer’s opinion  Index 
Determinant of Bargaining Power 
4X  Size of ith land parcel  Hectares 
Spatial random effect 
mnd  Euclidean distance between of m and n block 
centres  
Distance between 
UTM coordinates of  
(xm,ym) and (xn,yn) 
 
GROUND WATER EXTRACTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS 
AQUISITION: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND THE BENEFITS 
 
 
74 
6.2.2.2 Hedonic regression estimation 
Following a Bayesian model specification, prior distributions are adopted for the 
model parameters. Hereby the principle of conjugacy is used in selecting most of 
the prior distributions of the parameters. Vague normal distribution is chosen for 
all βˆ  parameters, inverse gamma prior is used for 2σ . The ‘ϕ ’ , the spatial 
correlation factor is allowed to vary between 0 to 0.94 at a distance of 10 
kilometers and 0 to 0.085 at 400 Kilometers by the parameters by specifying the 
uniform distribution [uniform(-12, -5.3)] . All prior distributions used in the 
estimation are given in table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 Prior Distribution of parameters 
Parameters Details Priors 
βˆ   Regression coefficients normal (0, 0.00001) 
ϕ  Spatial correlation parameter lnϕ ~ uniform(-12, -5.3) 
σ  Spatial  variance 1−σ ~ gamma(0.001, 0.001) 
The software used for the spatial hedonic regression is ‘Winbugs- version 1.4.1’ 
and the code for the model is given in Appendix 1. Two sets of initial values are 
assigned to check the convergence of the parameter values. The initial values are 
generated by the software ‘R’ according to their assumed initial distributions.  
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation is employed in estimating the parameters. 
A burn-in of 5000 iterations is also set. 
6.2.2.3 Hedonic regression results 
All the estimated parameters of the hedonic regression except for the soil quality 
index and the road access variable are statistically significant. The value loss by 
the falling ground water levels in Cauvery Basin is quite apparent in the estimated 
parameter of that variable.  The results assert the significant negative relation 
between ground water levels and land prices, which account for a loss of around 
INR 80,000 per hectare corresponding to a water level drop from 4 meters to 40 
meters. The results also show significant neighbourhood effects in the land prices. 
Road access represented by the distance to road from each land parcel is found to 
have not exerting any significant effect on land prices, probably due to the fact 
that there is a low level of farm mechanisation and the land parcels are not usually 
sold for non-agricultural purposes. The soil quality index also appears to have 
little influence in the expected land values.  This may be due to the fact that it is 
hidden information for the prospective land buyer. The farm size turns up to be a 
positive significant variable since it represents the bargaining power of a farmer 
with the prospective buyer. It can be seen from the results that all the spatially 
GROUND WATER EXTRACTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR SURFACE WATER RIGHTS 
AQUISITION: WEIGHING THE COSTS AND THE BENEFITS 
 
 
75 
assigned random effects are significant except the θ [7] representing the block 
Papanasam in Tamil Nadu.  In summary, the agricultural land value in Cauvery 
basin is predominantly determined by the ground water availability, bargaining 
power of the farmer and neighbourhood conditions (captured in spatial random 
effects). The results are presented in the table 6.3 and the table 6.4.  
Table 6.3: Hedonic regression results – coefficients of variables 
Parameters value   Standard deviation t-statistic MC error  
α  12.08 0.5193 23.26 0.01674 
distroadβ  0.05167 0.04338 1.191 3.33E-04 
farmsizeβ  0.104 0.04901 2.122 3.66E-04 
levelwatβ  -0.1989 0.08016 -2.48 8.12E-04 
[ ]2soilqualβ         -0.01252 0.08857 -0.141 6.63E-04 
[ ]3soilqualβ  0.2789 0.1993 1.399 0.001595 
[ ]4soilqualβ  0.03864 0.281 0.1375 0.002097 
Table 6.4: Hedonic regression results – spatial random effects 
Θ value Standard 
deviation 
t-statistic MC 
error 
Block District 
θ [1] 0.7046 0.3731 1.89 0.01701 Valangaiman Thiruvarur 
θ [2] 0.8285 0.3571 2.32 0.01704 Needamangalam Thiruvarur 
θ [3] 0.9674 0.366 2.64 0.01706 Mannargudi Thiruvarur 
θ [4] 0.9184 0.3551 2.59 0.01632 Mannachanallur Trichy 
θ [5] 1.052 0.3709 2.84 0.01696 Lalgudi Trichy 
θ [6] 0.8996 0.3658 2.46 0.01634 Ananthanallur Trichy 
θ [7] 0.278 0.3608 0.77 0.01632 Papanasam Tanjore 
θ [8] 1.154 0.3656 3.16 0.0171 Pattukkottai Tanjore 
θ [9] 1.172 0.377 3.11 0.01757 Orathanadu Tanjore 
θ [10] 0.9939 0.361 2.75 0.01672 Gubbi Tumkur 
θ [11] 1.308 0.3619 3.61 0.01708 Tiptur Tumkur 
θ [12] 1.263 0.3605 3.50 0.01712 Turuvekere Tumkur 
θ [13] 1.12 0.3508 3.19 0.01661 C.R. Patna Hasan 
θ [14] 1.262 0.3572 3.53 0.01674 Hole Narasipura Hasan 
θ [15] 1.68 0.3866 4.35 0.01802 Arkalgud Hasan 
θ [16] 1.025 0.3497 2.93 0.01659 Piriyapattana Mysore 
θ [17] 0.6586 0.3443 1.91 0.01599 Hunsur Mysore 
θ [18] 1.373 0.3644 3.77 0.01739 K.R. Nagar Mysore 
θ [19] 1.05 0.3539 2.97 0.01655 K.R.Pete mandya 
θ [20] 1.544 0.3561 4.34 0.01682 S.R. Patna mandya 
θ [21] 1.653 0.364 4.54 0.01727 Mandya mandya 
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Effects of neighbourhood characteristics on land prices represented by θj can be 
better understood when these effects are translated into value terms. Values vary 
from INR 0.05 million to INR 0.7 million per hectare of agricultural land.  In 
order to understand their magnitude, these figures can be compared with the mean 
land price in the sample (INR 0.4 million per ha) and maximum land price 
observed (INR 2.4 million per ha). Figure 6.3 shows the value of θj , arranged 
according to their distance from the tail end (from the same reference point) of the 
Cauvery River. This shows the spatial variability in land prices in Karnataka 
(Tiptur to S.R Patna) and Tamil Nadu (Ananthanallur to Pattukottai) in the 
geographical order. 
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Figure 6.3: Estimated effects of spatial location on Land Prices in its geographical order 
6.2.2.3 Fit of the hedonic regression  
We used the coefficients of spatial hedonic regression and spatial random effects 
to predict the means of observed land values which show a good fit representing 
the predictive capability of the model (see the figure 6.4). In addition, we can 
verify the convergence by assigning two sets of initial values for all coefficients 
and all exhibited convergence. 
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Figure 6.4: Observed and Predicted Land Prices for 189 sample farms 
 
6.2.2.4 External cost of using ground water 
To quantify the external effect, let us examine the relationship of the variables of 
our interest i.e. the ground water levels and the land prices which then is the basis 
for the water price evaluation. This relationship is portrayed in figure 6.5. It can 
be seen that the agricultural land prices are falling along with the ground water 
levels, notably, at a diminishing rate. The value loss decelerates substantially 
when water level crosses 40 m (≈130 feet) below ground level or in other words, 
the major portion of value loss happens before it falls to 40 meter below the 
surface level. A fall around a foot per year (1 foot = 0.3048 meter)  can cause a 
land value deterioration of  INR 947 (from a depth of 9 meters ) to INR 151 / ha 
(from a depth of 43 meters ) per year. A fall of one foot per year aggregates to a 3 
meter fall per decade. The sampled basin districts are classified by the central 
ground water board as areas of water level sinking over 2 meters per decade. 
Hence land value loss per foot decrease in water table can be taken as the external 
cost. It is been found that the land value reaches around the value (per ha) of 
rainfed land when the water table sinks 40 meters below the ground level.  
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Figure 6.5: Falling ground water levels and land value reduction in Cauvery basin 
6.3 Demand price of surface water right 
As the amortised mean investment per hectare is 5827 INR and the external cost 
ranges between INR 947 (from a depth of 9 meters) to INR 151 per hectare, it can 
be seen that the average cost of using ground water per hectare by the WUAs at 
the demand side is approximately 6000 INR to 7000 INR per hectare per year.  
For an average farmer who meets 50 percent water shortage by ground water 
pumping for two season paddy crop (10000 cubic meters/ ha), this account to 0.6 
INR to 0.7 INR per cubic meter. This figure can be taken as the demand price of 
surface water rights as the surface water right price exceeding this level makes the 
ground water extraction to be the cheaper alternative. It is to be noted that the 
operating costs of pumps are not considered in this calculation as electricity is 
heavily subsidised in these regions for political gains. If we add the real operating 
costs also to the costs of using ground water, there will be a considerable increase 
in the demand price of surface water. The next chapter examines whether the 
existing demand price can generate sufficient water rights reallocation.  
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7. ESTIMATING THE SUPPLY PRICE OF WATER 
RIGHTS: A NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 
7.1 The principal-agent specification 
The principal-agent scheme outlined in the chapter 5 is the following: The 
principal (WUA) has an objective function,  
Maximize PI = maximize ∑∑ −−−
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As the principal would like to maximize its gains, he offers the specified incentive 
scheme and shares the profit as a team incentive for joining the contract. The 
principal’s instruments, to invoke the optimal response from farmer members, are: 
1) an amount paid in advance for joining the contract to farmer ‘s’, i.e. 
sr ; 2)  the 
revenue share offered to farmer  ‘s ‘ , i.e. sα  ; and 3) the profit share to farmer ‘s’, 
Bs. Farmer ‘s’ respond to the incentives by allocating a part or the whole of 
his/her farming area, sl  to water saving mode of cultivation and lobbying other 
famers to join the contract.  
7. 2. Data for the empirical simulation   
For an empirical simulation, a hypothetical water user association is generated 
using  land holding data which has been collected during the primary survey so 
that it can be a representative one. In this Water User Association (WUA), there is 
a total farm area of 565.08 ha (See Chapter 2 for details) held by 241 member 
farmers. For simplicity, we assume that all farmers of this hypothetical water user 
association cultivate paddy which is the predominant crop of the Cauvery Basin. 
For the purpose of estimating the parameters and specifying the variables for the 
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numerical simulation of the envisaged principal-agent specification, secondary 
data is used along with primary data. Let us examine the parameters and variables 
in the above stated P-A model one by one.  
7.2.1 Calibration of exogenous parameters 
A. Rate of water saving
 
per hectare (hs): This rate is associated with the water 
saving technique that can be employed in the farmer’s field. A set of techniques 
that can be used for water saving in the research area is given in table 7.1 
(Palanisami et al., 2003). The main feature of the listed techniques is that they 
cost labor but require less or no capital investment. These techniques are suitable 
for small farmers in developing countries (India) who are generally short of 
capital. It is to be admitted that this list is not exhaustive but the intention is to 
demonstrate a few of them. After inspecting the efficiency of available techniques 
(10-48 %) and farmer’s average efficiency levels, it is decided on a figure of 20 
per cent as the value of hs. In quantitative terms, this is equivalent to 2000 cubic 
meter of water (hs =2000 m3) as average water consumption for raising paddy is 
10000 cubic meters per hectare per crop. This is considered reasonable in 
comparison with other studies (Belder et al., 2004, Kongchum, 2005, Yang et.al, 
2007)  
Table 7.1: Water saving practices and their potential in rice farming 
Water saving Practices  Water saving potential 
Replacing continuous irrigation systems 
with irrigation to a depth of 5 cm when soil 
reached saturation level 
  30-48 % water saving 
Constructing earthen hand bunds inside 
existing field bunds 
  20-25 % water saving 
Direct seeding    10 % water saving 
System of rice intensification (including 
 intermittent wetting and drying)  
 30 -40 % water saving 
 
Source : Compiled from Palanisami et al. (2003) 
B. Price of water (Pw): Another parameter of interest is price of water (Pw) which 
is equivalent to the unit price of water right sold in the water market. As each 
water user association is assumed to be a price taker, the price is an exogenous 
variable determined by demand and supply factors. We accomplish sensitivity 
analysis of the price parameter by analyzing the size of the gains for farmers and 
the principal at a range of water right prices.  
C. Reservation utility (κ )  
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Farmer’s reservation utility per unit area is taken to be a moderate additional gain 
of 250 to 500 Indian rupees per ha. This is equivalent to producing an additional 
0.75 to a 1.5 quintal or rice per ha respectively. The figures are calculated based 
on the support price offered by the Govt. in the region (Rs. 5 / Kilogram) and the 
cost benefit ratio of rice in the research area (1.5), notably, during the time period 
of the research work. 
D. Cost function parameters ( .ϕ and Ψ ) 
As it is previously stated, all water saving techniques demands additional labour. 
Since many of the farmers can manage the additional labor requirement of the 
water saving mode of production by family labour, ideally, a willingness to accept 
exercise could be used to determine an average payment at which they may start 
switching over to water saving mode of cultivation. But, due to the fact that 
willingness to accept exercises quite often result in exaggerated figures (Horowitz 
and McConnell 2002), the willingness to pay (WTP), a penalty for avoiding a 
switching over to water saving mode of cultivation, is estimated. In the WTP 
exercise, farmers were presented with two choices, either they could pay an 
additional charge per hectare or adopt a water saving mode of cultivation. The 
details of the WTP exercise are given in the next section. We used the average 
willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the switch over (equivalent to average payment 
at which the switch over to water saving mode of cultivation) as the 
parameter sϕ i.e. the intercept of the cost function. Regarding the slope parameter 
of the cost function ( Ψ ), a moderate slope is assumed. 
7.2.2 Contingent Valuation Exercise 
As already stated, the hypothetical scenario presented to the farmer is a 
dichotomous choice between paying an additional water charge (penalty) and 
adoption of water saving mode of production. A waiver of the existing water 
charge is also offered to the farmer, if he/she adopts the water saving mode of 
cultivation.  A double bounded form of contingent valuation is employed. 
(Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen,1991) In this format, the farmer is presented 
with a random penalty bid, and depending on farmer’s response to the initial bid, 
a higher or lower subsequent penalty bid is presented. The follow up penalty bid 
is halved if the farmer is willing to switch over to water saving mode of 
cultivation instead of paying the initial penalty. The follow up penalty is doubled 
if the farmer is ready to pay the initial penalty.  There are four possibilities of 
responses viz. pay-pay (PP), pay-adopt (PA), adopt-pay (AP) and adopt-adopt 
(AA).  Here the pay-pay response means that the farmer is ready to pay the 
penalty at both level of bids (initial and higher follow up bid) as well as he will 
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not adopt any water saving measures in his field. Pay-adopt response means that 
farmer decides to pay at the initial bid level, but ready to shift to a water saving 
mode of cultivation when faced with a doubling of the additional water charge. 
These four outcomes of the bidding procedure viz. AA, AP, PA, PP place the true 
willingness to pay the penalty (WTP) in intervals of (-∞,ViL), (ViL, Vi), (Vi, VH), 
(VH, +∞) respectively and are coded as 1, 2, 3 and 4. Vi represents the value of the 
initial bid presented to ith farmer while ViH represents a bid higher than the initial 
bid while ViL represents the bid lower then the initial bid. The bid structure is 
designed a-priori and the initial bid ranged from INR 100 to INR 600 per hectare, 
the higher bids varied from INR 200 to INR 1200 and the lower bids varied from 
INR 50 to INR 300 per hectare. The empirical bid structure and the response 
categories are given in the        Table 7.2. It can be seen that there is a tendency to 
adopt water saving modes if cultivation conditions increase as the bid increased. 
In the experiment, only 9 farmers out of 240 were willing to pay the penalty at 
both penalty bids presented to them. The number of farmers, who were willing to 
adopt the water saving modes in their production at both bids, is 168 (70 %).  
Table 7.2: Responses to different penalty bids categories  
Responses Bid category (First bid- Higher 
bid -Lower bid) in Indian 
Rupees (INR) 
Adopt-
Adopt 
Adopt-
Pay 
Pay-
Adopt Pay-Pay 
600-1200-300 32 5 1 1 
500-1000-250 25 2 6 3 
400-800-200 39 2 2 0 
300-600-150 31 11 0 0 
200-400-100 30 6 1 1 
100-200-50 11 19 8 4 
Total 168 45 18 9 
Grand total  240 
7.1.2.1 Econometrics of doubled bound contingent valuation  
Following Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen (1991) the probability (Π) of getting 
a ‘pay’ response to the first bid followed by a ‘pay’ response to second bid (PP) is  
(1) )1/(1 )( HiVPPi e βα +−+=∏  
Where PPi∏ follows a logistic function. Similarly, probability for AA, PA and AP 
responses by ith respondent are 
(2) )1/(11 )( LiVAAi e βα +−+−=∏  
(3) )1/(1)1/(1 )()( iHi VVPAi ee βαβα +−+− +−+=∏  
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(4) )1/1)1/(1 )()( Lii VVAPi ee βαβα +−+− +−+=∏  
Mathematically, the log-likelihood function of double bounded model is  
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Where LDB is the natural log of the double bounded log likelihood and riPP, 
ri
AA
,ri
PA
 and riAP are binary variables corresponding to the response category of ith 
respondent.  
7.2.2.2 Calculation of the mean willing to pay  
The coefficients, α and β of the double bounded dichotomous choice CVM and 
the mean willingness to pay and its confidence intervals are estimated using the 
referendum CVM programme written by Cooper, J.C (1999). Following 
Hanemann, Loomis and Kanninen (1991), the mean willingness to pay is 
calculated using the equation, E (WTP) = β/1−
 
 
7.2.2.3 Double bounded logit estimation results  
As a fisrt result, the bid variable is significant (see Table 7.3) and its sign is 
negative as expected. The mean willingness to pay estimated from the double 
bounded logit equation is INR 105.5 per hectare with a 95 per cent confidence 
interval of 86.3 to 129.5. The Krinsky and Robb procedure (Park et al., 1991) is 
used for calculating the confidence intervals. It is to be noted that the CVM 
question included a waiver in existing water charge, INR 100/hectare. It means 
that the willingness to pay of the farmers to avoid a transition to a water saving 
technique is INR 205.5. In this scenario a farmer with an average area of 3 
hectares has to pay around INR 617 per farm, if the water saving measure is not 
adopted. This is equivalent to the wage of 10-15 labour days according to 
prevailing wage rates. It may justify the construction of earthen hand bunds inside 
existing fields or adopting intermittent irrigation. Also it is possible that a farmer 
is estimating the opportunity costs of labour less than the prevailing wages as he 
offers his own labour for the water management activities. 
Table 7.3: Double bounded logit regression results 
Variable  Coefficients  Standard error  t-Statistic  
Constant  0.19241 0.2165 0.8889 
Bid  -0.007527 0.0009464 -7.953 
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7.2.3 Endogenous variables  
The endogenous variables are principal’s instruments and the farmer response. 
The principal’s set of instruments for invoking an optimal response from farmer 
members are: 1) sr , the initial payment to convince the risk averse farmers; 2) sα , 
the revenue share offered to farmer  ‘s‘;, and 3) Bs, the bonus or the profit share to 
farmer ‘s’.  Farmer ‘s’ respond to the incentives offered by the principal by 
allocating part or the whole of his/her farming area,  sl  to water saving mode of 
cultivation. The farmland area of each farmer is taken as their maximum possible 
contribution to the pool of area under water saving mode of irrigation in each 
WUA.  
Descriptions of endogenous and exogenous parameters and variables in the P-A 
model are given in table 7. 4. The program code for the simulation of agent’s 
behaviour according to principal’s instruments is written in GAMS software. The 
GAMS code for the P-A model is given in the appendix 2.  
Table 7.4: Description of parameters and variables of the contract scheme 
 Description Value Unit Remarks 
Parameters 
sh   Conversion coefficient for 
converting land area under 
water saving technology 
employed by farmer ‘s’ to 
its water saving 
equivalents  
2000 Cubic 
meter 
Only technologies 
which can save at least 
20 percent of water is 
considered 
wP  Price of water 0.2-0.4 Indian 
Rupees/ 
cubic 
meter 
Determined by demand 
and supply conditions  
κ  Reservation utility of the 
farmer per ha 
250-500 Indian 
Rupees 
 
sϕ  The intercept of cost 
function  
205 Indian 
Rupees 
Estimated from a 
contingent valuation 
exercise 
sΨ  Slope of cost function 20 Indian 
Rupees 
Means a cost 
escalation of 500 INR 
for a farmer holding 5 
hectares 
Variables and restrictions 
sr  Amount paid in advance 
for joining the contract 
Endogenous Indian 
Rupees 
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sα  the revenue share offered 
to farmer ‘s ‘ 
Endogenous   
β  the profit share offered to 
the all WUA members 
Endogenous   
Lβ  The minimum profit share 
offered to members 
0.8 Indian 
Rupees 
Limits the maximum 
profit share (20%) of 
the principal 
Uβ
 
The maximum profit share 
offered to members 
0.9 Indian 
Rupees 
protects the minimum 
profit share (10%) of 
the principal 
Bs Bonus to individual farmer Endogenous Bs Bonus to individual 
farmer 
sl  Land area under the 
contract scheme for the 
farmer ‘s’ 
Endogenous Ha 
sl  is less than or equal 
to total farm area of the 
farmer ‘s’ 
 
7.3 Results of the numerical simulation 
Numerical simulations of the contract scheme presented in 7.1 are carried out to 
estimate the optimised values of principal’s instruments (
sr , sα and Bs) and the 
farmer’s response, sl . Various scenarios of water right prices and reservation 
prices are simulated.  
7.3.1 Optimised values of endogenous variables  
For the initial run of the principal-agent model, we have taken the reservation 
utility (κ ) to be 250 Indian rupees (INR) and simulations at the water prices ( wP ) 
of 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 Indian rupees per cubic meter are conducted. All other 
parameters are kept as specified in table 7.4 (a ceteris paribus assumption).  In this 
simulation, a water price of INR 0.2 ( wP  = 0.2) results in an aggregate area 
allocation (∑
s
sl  ) of 496.2 hectares (88% of the total area) to a water saving mode 
of cultivation. This corresponds to water saving of 0.9 million cubic meters. The 
principal gives the INR 229.5/ha as average initial payment ( sr ).  The average 
revenue share ( sα ) is 0.48, corresponding to an average payment of INR 111/ha 
for the farmers joined in the scheme. In addition, the cooperative principal shares 
a bonus of INR 26692 ( β = 0.9) among the farmers. Nevertheless, the principal’s 
net income is limited to INR 3845.  Figure 7.1 displays the optimised values of 
sα in each farm at the water price of INR 0.2.  
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Figure 7.1: Values of the principal’s instruments sα and β  at the water price of INR 0.2  
The principal offers increasing bonus (Bs) and initial payment per farm (rs) as the 
farm size increases. But the initial payment (rs/ha) for each additional hectare 
offered by the farmer shows a diminishing trend. It means that the principal 
should offer a higher initial payment per hectare for small farmers who are risk 
averse. These relations at a water price of INR 0.2 ( wP  = 0.2) is displayed in 
figure 7.2. In case of bonus per farm, the principal offers it according to the total 
farm area allocated to the water saving practices in the whole WUA so that it 
invokes a team incentive to lobby other farmers.  
 
Figure 7.2: Relation of sr per ha, sr per farm and bonus (Bs) per farm to the farm size at 
water price of 0.2 INR  
When the water price is increased to 0.3, the aggregate area under the revenue 
sharing for water saving contract (∑
s
sl ) increased to 556.05 ha. It is the whole 
ESTIMATING THE SUPPLY PRICE OF WATER RIGHTS: A NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF 
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 
 
87 
area under the WUA.  The net principal income increased here to INR 35544. The 
principal distributes INR 137947 (INR 247/ ha) among the members as bonus. At 
a higher price of INR 0.4, the cooperative principal distributes INR 229257 as 
bonus    ( β =0.8).  
The numerical simulation proves that the WUA, as principal, is able to ensure 
participation of farmers in the water saving contact scheme by offering an initial 
payment (
sr ), revenue share ( sα ) and the bonus share (Bs) and thus it achieves a 
maximum allocation of land to the suggested water saving mode of cultivation or 
irrigation by farmers. It also proves that a water price of INR 0.3 induce all 
farmers to switch over to water saving cultivation in response to the principal’s 
instrument. The principal also can realise a decent remuneration for its effort.  
7.3.2 Impact of the bonus specification 
To prove the relative advantage of the bonus scheme, each set of results in the 
previous simulations are compared with results of the contract scheme with out 
the bonus specification. When the bonus scheme is dropped, the cooperative 
nature of the principal is lost and it becomes a normal profit making principal. Let 
us term the contract scheme presented in the section 7.1 as the cooperative 
contract and the other with out bonus as profit oriented contract. 
At the water price of INR 0.2, ( wP  = 0.2), the aggregate area allocated to water 
saving practices under the cooperative contract is 496.2 hectares (88% of total 
area) while it is only 456.6 hectares (81% of total area) when the principal is a 
profit oriented one. An additional 40 hectares show the significance of the bonus 
scheme. Nevertheless, the principal’s net income is limited to INR 3845 while 
INR 26985 is the income of profit making principal. The cooperative principal 
gives the INR 229.5/ha as initial payment ( sr ) and an average revenue share ( sα ) 
of 0.48, corresponding to an average payment of INR 111/ha for the farmers 
joined in the scheme while profit oriented principal gives INR 219/ha as initial 
payment and a revenue share of 0.6 corresponding to an average payment of INR 
121/ ha. In addition, the cooperative principal shares a bonus of INR 26692 
( β =0.9) among the farmers but profit orient principal does not offer any bonus. 
At a water price of INR 0.3, the aggregated area under the cooperative contract is 
556.58 ha while the profit oriented one manages 522.84 ha, where there is a 
difference around 35 hectares.  The net principal income increased here to INR 
35544 in the former case while the latter achieved INR 102235. The initial 
payments are comparable in both cases but profit oriented principal offers higher 
revenue shares, an additional INR145/ha. In converse, the cooperative principal 
distributes INR 137947 (INR 247/ ha) among the members as bonus. In this case 
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we have to be remind the reader that the total revenue of the cooperative principal 
is high as the total area under the contract. At a higher price of 0.4, the difference 
between the both contracts in achievement of aggregate area gets reduced to 10 
hectares. Nevertheless, the members achieve a higher income under the 
cooperative contract as the principal distributes INR 229257 as bonus ( β =0.8). 
The main feature is that the contract with bonus specification achieves the 
maximum area allocation at a price around INR 0.3 per cubic meter, while the 
contract with out the bonus specification achieves it only around INR 0.45 per 
cubic meter. In addition, it can be seen that the cooperative principal is better 
performing especially at lower water prices which is an important feature as the 
higher prices of water may not be realistic in real life situations.  
To highlight the effect of the bonus, notably as a team incentive (use of correction 
factor on bonus distribution), we are looking at the relation between bonus per 
hectare and aggregate area under the contract scheme at a water price of INR 0.4. 
The relationship is depicted in figure 5. It is clear from the figure that lobbying 
other farmers to join the contract can lead to substantial individual gains.  
   
Figure 7.3: team incentive: relationship between bonus per ha on aggregate area under 
the contract  
7.4 Evidence from research area  
It is proved here that water saving and reallocation will respond to water market 
prices if farmers are coordinated by the revenue sharing mechanism. In the 
research area, an exercise to coordinate the water use in Siddhamalli taluk in 
Tanjore district in Cauvery Basin has already been carried out by the district 
authorities through synchronising farming activities and regulating water flows in 
a 2000 hectare farm block cultivating paddy crop.  The practice of draining of 
water from one paddy field to another was also controlled simultaneously. As a 
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result, the water requirement of the block got reduced to half of the normal 
allocation in this experiment (50 percent saving in water). A similar experiment 
was carried out in Krishna River Basin as well and realised similar results 
(CWDT-VOL V, 2007). These experiences indicate that the coordination 
mechanism generating sufficient incentives like the one proposed here can 
institutionalise the aggregate water saving achieved in such experiments in 
presence of an interstate water market.  
7.5 Comparing water rights purchase and ground water use  
It has been already stated that (see chapter 6) the average cost of using 
groundwater by the demand side is around 6000 INR to 7000 INR per hectare per 
year when the cost of externalities is also considered.  Hence it is evident from the 
figures that a surface water right price less than INR 0.6 / cubic meter is 
economically viable for a farmer who meets 50 percent of irrigation requirement 
by ground water pumping for two season paddy crops (10000 cubic meters). 
Purchasing water rights is equivalent to 10000 cubic meters at the price of 0.3 
INR amounts to 3000 INR, which is substantially lower than the cost of ground 
water usage.  It is to be noted that we did not consider the operating cost of pumps 
as electricity is heavily subsidised in these regions for political gains. If we add 
the real operating costs also to the cost of using ground water, considerable gains 
of water trading becomes visible. This proves the potential of surface water 
reallocation by the water rights market to Pareto optimally increase the benefits 
for all stakeholders in Cauvery Basin.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY AND THE POLICY 
RELEVANCE OF THE PROPOSED WATER RIGHTS 
MARKET IN THE CAUVERY BASIN   
8.1 Summary of the main findings 
The current study examines the historical, political, economic and legal aspects of 
the Cauvery River water conflict and develops an economic solution for the water 
sharing issue. In the historical perspective, the study describes the evolution of the 
current scenario of existing demands exceeding the available water supply in the 
River. The historical review of development of irrigation systems in the river 
basin starts from the construction of Cauvery Anicut by an early Chola King, 
Karikala Cholan in 200 A.D to regulate the flood waters in Cauvery River. It also 
mentions various dynasties ruled the Cauvery basin area and their contribution 
towards development of irrigation systems in the River basin. The conflict 
situation in River water sharing arose in the 19th centaury between the Wodayar 
Kings in the Mysore state (upstream) and the British colonial rulers of the Madras 
state (downstream). The treaty that both parties forged in 1892 had conditions 
restricting water diversions by Mysore state and the allowing copious river water 
flows to Madras state which facilitated the evolution of an irrigation system based 
on the rice farming with flood irrigation in the downstream part of the basin. The 
1892 agreement expired after 50 years and the upstream state, Karnataka 
(previously Mysore) developed its irrigation systems to compensate the 
underinvestment in its irrigation systems during the period of the treaty. This 
pattern of development left the upstream and downstream irrigated areas to 
compete for the same resource and eventually exacerbated the conflict on water 
sharing. The body formed to negotiate a treaty on initial water allocation, Cauvery 
Water Dispute Tribunal could not give a final verdict that is acceptable for all 
states involved in the water sharing conflict. In this scenario, the current study 1) 
looks at the reasons for the lack of political interest in cooperating in the 
formation of a water allocation treaty, 2) reviews various legal, economic and 
geographical instruments in water sharing and finally 3) develops a water market 
solution for the water sharing issue so that the focus will be on the economic 
value that can be realised from water rather than its quantity allocation. In 
addition, the study looks at 4) the externalities of using ground water as an 
alternate source of water instead of an efficient surface water allocation system.  
8.1.1 Insights from the field research  
The systematic examination of the data on Cauvery River basin from secondary 
sources gives valuable inputs to the development of water market solution 
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suggested in the study. The pattern revealed from the data on surface and 
groundwater availability and its use suggest the inefficient use of surface water 
and over extraction of ground water sources in the river basin.  It is also evident 
that agriculture is the principal consumer of the river water and domestic and 
industrial demands are comparatively miniscule. In the agricultural sector, rice 
farming is the activity that accounts for a major share of the water use in 
agricultural sector and currently employs the inefficient continuous flooding 
method of irrigation. This throws light on the necessity of building institutions 
facilitating irrigation efficiency gains at farm level and water allocation efficiency 
at the basin level.  
In the farm level data from the primary survey of 240 farmers belonging to 24 
villages from 24 blocks of 8 Cauvery River basin districts in Karnataka and Tamil 
Nadu, reveals how the inefficiency at the system (basin) level affects the farmers 
and how the inefficiency of irrigation practiced by farmers affects the system 
efficiency. The irrigation water demand at current technology exceeds the water 
availability in the river basin and hence to compensate the deficit, farmers use 
ground water as an alternate source. In the absence of a formal treaty in surface 
water sharing, there prevails an uncertainty in timing of water transfers among 
states each year, which gets translated to inefficiencies in water distribution to 
farmers.  This also drives farmers in adopting bore wells for groundwater 
extraction. In a nutshell, both quantity and quality of irrigation water supply steer 
farmers to adoption of groundwater as the preferred source of water. Note that the 
term ‘quality’ of water supply does not address the physical qualities of water 
rather focus of the quality of the distribution system. From the farm level data, it 
is evident that current ground water extraction rates exceed the recharge and 
ground water levels are falling at an alarming rate.  
The primary survey reveals the picture of an agricultural system dominated by 
small farmers (<2 hectares), with median age exceeding the median age of the 
county by 20 years, having an average education level of 8 years of schooling, 
cultivating predominantly paddy, sugarcane or millets, facing uncertainty of 
surface water supplies over quantity and timing, extracting groundwater more 
than its recharge and employing inefficient irrigation practices and supporting a 
family of six members. The farmers avail credit from formal and informal sources 
for investing in ground water extraction even at interest rates far exceeding the 
formal bank rates.  
The survey also revealed that the farmers will not vote to any political party that 
is willing to compromise on surface water quantity allocation to the respective 
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states and a majority of farmers are ready to vote for a party which promises full 
subsidisation of electricity for pumping ground water.  
8.1.2 Political prisoner’s dilemma in water sharing 
Water availability is the factor that decides the social strata of the farmer or in 
other words, the access to water decides whether he belongs to a category of poor 
farmers who are dependent on stochastic rainfall for crop cultivation or the group 
of prosperous farmers having access to surface or ground water sources (or both). 
Hence his/her the political choices depend on the policies of a political party 
regarding surface and ground irrigation water availability.  Political parties 
translate this sentiment to votes by wooing them by policy promises such as 
subsidies for electricity for groundwater pumping. In this scenario it is optimal for 
any party to take a position of noncooperation in water sharing agreement that 
compromises the current or historical water allocation levels in the Cauvery river 
basin. This strategy makes sure that the competing party will not take undue 
advantage in election by proclaiming their non-cooperative stand point. The 
insight from this result is that there is a need to decouple initial water allocation 
and the money that the water represents.  
8.1.3 Water market as a solution for water sharing issue 
In order to decouple water rights (or initial water allocation) from the net benefits 
that the water represents, a water right market can be introduced. In the presence 
of a water rights market, the final allocation of water in the river is decided by 
demand and supply conditions even if the initial allocation is decided through a 
water sharing agreement. Even though this solution is already suggested by many 
researchers, the major bottlenecks in implementation are the high transaction 
costs of (1) establishing the prerequisites of a functional water market i.e. 
assignment of the initial water rights and the provision to physically regulate the 
water flow to individual fields, (2) the high transaction costs of finding a suitable 
and willing buyer for the individual water rights and (3) the associated 
administrative costs of reassigning the water entitlements. In order to reduce the 
establishment and transaction costs of a water rights market, downsizing of 
number of players in the market by allocating rights to farmer communities (water 
user associations) instead of individual farmers is proposed. In this market water 
rights can be bought and sold by water user associations.  
The immediate question to be answered is how the coordination of the water user 
association can be achieved so that the community behaves as a single entity in 
the market. In the presence of the water rights market, each WUA has the 
possibility of employing water saving techniques in its command area and selling 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY AND THE POLICY RELEVANCE OF THE PROPOSED WATER 
RIGHTS MARKET IN THE CAUVERY BASIN   
 
93 
the surplus rights if the water rights prices justify the cost of employing water 
saving techniques. The challenge is how to coordinate the use of water saving 
techniques in individual farms so that aggregate water surplus can be traded. The 
assumption here is that the WUA (seller) holds sufficient water rights for 
irrigation under current technology. The revenue sharing for water saving contract 
between water user association and the farmer offers a solution for this problem. 
The revenue sharing for water saving contract designed using a principal-agent 
model offers three instruments to coordinate action of farmers 1) The fixed 
amount paid to farmer in advance for joining the contract 2) a variable revenue 
share 3) the profit share from the water trade. The profit share is based on the 
aggregate water surplus generated so that it can act as a team incentive. It is to be 
reminded that water trade in the Cauvery basin can lead to Pareto optimal increase 
in benefits compared to the status quo allocation in the river basin, only when the 
cost of purchasing the additional water rights is lower than cost of the using the 
alternative source of water by the WUAs of the demand side i.e. groundwater. So 
to estimate the price below which water rights become a viable alternative, cost of 
ground water extraction has to be calculated.  
8.1.4 Estimation of groundwater extraction costs 
The three components in ground water extraction costs are 1) investment costs on 
bore well and pumping equipments 2) pumping costs i.e. electricity charges 3) the 
externality costs of falling ground water levels. The amortised mean investment 
cost per hectare for establishing bore wells calculated from the sample is 5827 
Indian Rupees. As electricity is heavily subsidized, the pumping costs are not 
considered in the costs at the farmer side. The externality cost is estimated 
through a spatial hedonic regression of water table levels on land prices. A 
Bayesian framework is used in the spatial estimation procedure so that 
neighbourhood effects on land prices can be explicitly modelled. The results of 
the hedonic regression revealed a loss of around INR 80,000 per hectare 
corresponding to a water level drop from 4 meters to 40 meters. It is been found 
that the land value reaches around the value (per ha) of rainfed land when the 
water table sinks 40 meters below the ground level. A fall around a foot per year 
(1 foot = 0.3048 meter)  can cause a land value deterioration of  INR 947 (from a 
depth of 9 meters ) to INR 151 / ha (from a depth of 43 meters ) per year. A fall of 
one foot per year aggregates to a 3 meter fall per decade. The sampled basin 
districts are classified by the central ground water board as areas of water level 
sinking over 2 meters per decade. Hence land value loss due to a fall in ground 
water level by 0.3048 meter is taken as the external cost. Hence it can be seen that 
the average cost of using ground water per hectare by the WUAs at the demand 
side is approximately 6000 INR to 7000 INR per hectare per year.  For an average 
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farmer who meets 50 percent water shortage by ground water pumping for two 
season paddy crop (10000 cubic meters/ ha), this account to 0.6 INR to 0.7 INR 
per cubic meter. This figure can be taken as the demand price of surface water 
rights as the surface water right price exceeding this level makes the ground water 
extraction to be the cheaper alternative. 
8.1.5 Supply price of water rights  
In order to see whether a sufficient price differential exists between supply and 
demand prices of water rights, an empirical simulation of the principal-agent 
model of the revenue sharing for water saving contract is carried out. The 
parameters of the model are estimated from both primary and secondary sources. 
Cost function parameters of the water saving technique are estimated by a 
contingent valuation exercise. Here a willingness to pay exercise is used to 
determine an average payment at which they may start switching over to water 
saving mode of cultivation. The doubled bounded dichotomous contingent 
valuation exercise estimated that the willingness to pay of the farmers to avoid a 
transition to a water saving technique is INR 205.5. In the numerical exercise of 
the principal-agent model, simulations at the water prices of 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 
Indian rupees per cubic meter are conducted. All of these prices are below the 
demand price of 0.6 Indian rupees. At the water price of INR 0.2, an aggregate 
area allocation of 88% of the total area to water saving mode of cultivation is 
achieved. When the water price is increased to 0.3, all farmers in the WUA joined 
the contract and offered their whole farm area to the water saving mode of 
cultivation. The numerical simulation proved that the WUA, as principal, is able 
to ensure participation of farmers in the water saving contract scheme by offering 
a fixed initial payment, a revenue share and the bonus share and thus it achieves a 
maximum allocation of land to the suggested water saving mode of cultivation or 
irrigation by farmers. It also proves that a water price of INR 0.3 induce all 
farmers to switch over to water saving cultivation in response to the principal’s 
instrument. The principal also can realise a decent remuneration for its effort.  
In addition, the implication of using a bonus scheme (profit sharing) is tested by 
comparing its performance to a principal-agent scheme with out the profit sharing 
condition. The analysis shows that the contract with bonus specification achieves 
the maximum area allocation at a price around INR 0.3 per cubic meter, while the 
contract with out the bonus specification achieves it only around INR 0.45 per 
cubic meter and hence proving the advantage of using the bonus condition.  
The numerical simulation proved that a considerable price differential exists 
between supply and demand prices of water. It is to be noted that the operating 
cost of pumps is not considered as electricity is heavily subsidised in these 
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regions for political gains. If we add the real operating costs also to the cost of 
using ground water, considerable gains of water trading becomes apparent. This 
proves the potential of surface water reallocation by the water rights market to 
Pareto optimally increase the benefits for all stakeholders in Cauvery Basin. 
 
8.2 Political, economic and administrative viability of the water 
rights market  
It has been proved in the preceded chapters that setting initial water rights in the 
Cauvery Basin is Pareto beneficial in the presence of a water rights market. In the 
proposed water market structure, transaction costs of defining, protecting and 
exchanging water rights is substantially reduced by distributing rights to water 
user associations (WUAs) instead of individual farmers. WUAs are allowed to 
generate surplus rights by coordinating water saving cultivation practices by their 
members using a revenue sharing contract mechanism instead of monitoring the 
individual water use by metering water use which has substantial transaction 
costs. The contract mechanism is devised to ensure that the benefit from water 
trade is Pareto optimal in WUAs that generates the surplus water rights for water 
trade.  At the demand side, the possibility of buying surface water rights reduces 
externality of sinking groundwater tables in addition to saving high investment 
costs. The price differential between ground water extraction and surface water 
rights indicates the possible Pareto optimal benefit for the demand side.  In 
addition, huge financial burdens of governments providing highly subsidised 
energy to farmers for pumping groundwater can be reduced if farmers switch over 
to buying additional surface water rights instead of groundwater pumping. Recall 
that purchasing surface water rights costs substantially less than supplementing 
the water deficit by groundwater pumping; even if the extraction cost (electricity 
charges) is fully subsidized (see section 7.4). As water buying and selling 
becomes a lucrative activity for farmers (via WUAs) as well as governments, 
settling initial water rights for the functioning of the water right markets will 
become politically viable. Such an arrangement can lead the Cauvery water 
conflict to an acceptable settlement as the final allocation of water is decided by 
the market and is flexible depending on the supply side and demand side 
conditions.  
In 2002, Ballestero et al. suggested that there are multiple criteria or objectives 
for a water distribution agency and the local government; to establish a ‘Market 
by Agencies’ or MBA. Our water rights market is also an MBA, as it is operated 
through the water authority (See the conceptual frame of the water market in the 
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section 5.2.1), and hence we can check whether the proposed water market 
arrangement gives a feasible solution. The objectives listed by Ballestero et al. 
(2002) are: 1) Creating a market for surface water in the area under its command; 
2) Protecting the historical water rights of farmers: 3) Reducing the revenue 
shortfall of the organization; 4) Maintaining the level of water supply; and 5) 
Meeting the agency’s budget constraint. Regarding the first objective, it is the 
stated aim of the proposed water rights market.  By reducing transaction costs 
through minimizing the individual farmer’s roles in the water trade as well as by 
up-scaling the activities to a water user association level, the current water market 
model lay out the stage for effective water trading. The up-scaling is achieved by 
revenue sharing contracts that coordinate farmer’s actions to generate surplus 
water rights. The incentive contract gives transparency in sharing of gains from 
water trade and encourages team effort in each WUA. In addition, huge costs of 
establishing and maintaining water meters for each and every farm are saved by 
limiting the quantitative allocation of water at WUA level. 
Coming to the second objective, water rights allocation to individual WUAs is an 
important pillar of the proposed water market and hence it protects the historical 
water rights of farmers. Regarding the third objective, proposed market stands 
neutral as it neither affects nor concerned with the water fee charged by the 
agency to cover its operating expenses.  It deals only with reallocation of water 
surplus generated by water saving practices. It is more so as irrigation water in the 
research area (also generally in developing countries) is charged at a flat rate per 
unit area and not per unit of water. But it can be seen that there can be substantial 
gains from reducing the subsidized energy provision to farmers using ground 
water if they turn towards buying the water saved in other WUAs. The proposed 
contract mechanism ensures that only the surplus water rights are sold and hence 
meets the fourth objective.  Regarding the fifth objective, it can be expected that 
WUAs may take over the functions of water distribution, storage and maintenance 
of canals in their command area if it leads to additional water surplus and hence 
further gains by the trading. This new role of WUA can potentially reduce the 
financial burden of the distribution agency. The fair chance of WUAs taking over 
these activities is evident from the substantial water saving achieved in the 
experiments carried out by local water authorities in Cauvery Basin (see section 
7.3). In addition to these, the water market in the research area can achieve 
objectives relevant to research area such as reducing the external costs of sinking 
ground water levels and decide the final allocation of the water rights as discussed 
in the preceded sections. In summary, establishment of the water rights market in 
the proposed structure has all potential to be politically, administratively and 
economically viable in the research area.  
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8.3 Efficiency, equity and sustainability in water allocation 
Namboodiri et.al, (2006) described the ultimate goal of managing irrigation water 
is to ensure the efficient, equitable and sustainable water use. Equity is a major 
concern for the Cauvery Water tribunal as it tries to distribute water as fairly as 
possible among the users in each state. But during this maneuver in ensuring 
equitable distribution among basin states, economic efficiency takes a backseat. 
As explained in Chapter 4, economic consideration of water allocation dictates the 
political actions in the research area and hence each state tries to bargain for a 
higher share which often thwarts the efforts of the tribunal to set the initial water 
rights. It is hereby argued that if the equitable water shares allocated by the 
tribunal are redistributed among WUAs and the WUA rights are allowed to be 
traded in the interstate water market, economic efficiency can be achieved. Such a 
condition may lead to a change in political pay off in the water sharing issue and 
hence may lead to the settlement of water disputes. The attractive feature is that 
the final allocation of water rights is determined by market conditions rather than 
administrative decisions.  Coming to the issue of sustainability, Namboodiri et al. 
(2006) argue that the system has to maintain the quality and quantity of water 
resources for the use of future generations in order to be sustainable. The water 
market suggested here may arrest the further deterioration of ground water 
availability and quality if it could generate sufficient surplus water rights to 
compensate the gap between extraction and recharge of ground water in WUAs 
which are facing a water deficit. So the proposed water market can ensure 
equitable and efficient water reallocation and may foster sustainable water use in 
the research area.   
8.4 Establishment of the water rights market 
Bhatia et al. (2006), using a computable general equilibrium model, have shown 
that the practice of flexible water sharing in the river basins can provide 
substantial economic gains in the parts of Tamil Nadu state, where a sizeable part 
of Cauvery river basin is located. The same can be true in Karnataka and other 
basin states. Bhatia et al. specify that a flexible water allocation system may 
provide 20 percent higher income, 24 per cent less water pumped from aquifers 
and 15 percent less overall water used by the year 2020 in Tamil Nadu state. But 
this paper does not answer how the flexible water sharing that reallocates water to 
its competing ends can be organised. The current research work lays out the water 
rights market model that operates at a higher scale than individual farm as a 
solution for this impeding question.   
A suggested roadmap towards establishing such a water market in the research 
can be summarized in the following steps: 1) Allocating the equitable water rights 
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to the Cauvery River basin states. The water rights allocation decision of the 
Cauvery water disputes tribunal can be regarded as the initial water right for the 
basin states. 2) Redistributing the water rights to water user associations in each 
state. River Boards Act in 1956 provides the provision of establishing river boards 
to regulate and develop the interstate rivers in request of the riparian states 
(Gosain and Singh, 2004). Establishment of such a river board can ensure the 
smooth functioning of the interstate water rights market by decoupling the 
regional interests from that of the whole basin. The proposed river board can take 
the role of the ‘water authority’ in the conceptual frame. 3) Allowing WUAs of 
sufficient water rights to engage in water saving contracts with farmers and sell 
the surplus water rights generated through the water market. 4) Allowing WUAs 
facing deficiency to buy water rights from the pool of water rights offered by the 
supply side. 5. Monitoring the results.  
8.5 Possible improvisation of the visible hand  
Though the option of water harvesting to generate surplus water rights in WUAs 
is not considered in the principal-agent scheme for evoking agent’s (farmer’s) 
coordinated effort (See Chapter 5), it can be easily attached to the scheme. Water 
harvesting in large ponds called village tanks was a custom in many of the 
farming areas in Cauvery basin. This tradition can be revived or can be 
reintroduced so that runoff during the rainy season can be collected and stored for 
deferred use, effectively creating surplus rights by reducing the river water 
demand. Traditionally such water storing structures are found in areas of water 
scarcity and not in areas of sufficient surface water availability for irrigation. 
With the presence of a water trading opportunity, one can revive the importance 
of water harvesting structures even in the areas with sufficient canal irrigation as 
they provide an additional business opportunity. If quite a number of WUAs 
engage in water harvesting, it may also reduce flooding of downstream area 
during the monsoon season.  
If we add the option of water harvesting, the principal’s objective will be then 
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can be distributed as profit share for each farmer.  
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8.6 Limitations of the research work  
In the study, the proof for the water rights reallocation being economically 
beneficial for both WUA (buyer) and WUA (seller) in both states is achieved 
through examining the supply and demand prices of water rights. Nevertheless, 
quantifying the total benefit of water reallocation using the water market 
mechanism in the whole Cauvery River basin is not attempted due to data and 
resource limitations. In addition, the current study does not examine whether 
reallocating saved water from agriculture to sectors such as industries and 
domestic use can lead to economic gains. Another issue is the possibility of 
collective investment in water saving technology, for instance, like maintaining 
lined canals, regulating field to field water drainage or purchasing laser land 
levelling equipments which can be added to the toolbox of WUAs in creating 
surplus water rights are not covered.  We leave these to future studies.  
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German Summary (Zusammenfassung) 
Hintergrund und Ziele der Forschung  
Die aktuelle Studie untersucht die historischen, politischen, wirtschaftlichen und 
gesetzlichen Aspekte des Wasserkonfliktes am Fluss Cauvery im indischen 
Subkontinent und entwickelt eine wirtschaftliche Lösung für das 
Wasserverteilungsproblem. Im historischen Kontext beschreibt die Studie die 
Entwicklung des aktuellen Szenarios, in welchem der Bedarf an Wasser das zur 
Verfügung stehende Angebot des Flusses überschreitet. Der historische Rückblick 
der Entwicklung von Bewässerungssystemen im Flussbecken beginnt beim 
Aufbau des Cauvery Anicut (Wasserumleitungssystem) 200 Jahre nach Christus, 
durch einen frühen Chola König, Karikala Cholan, um Hochwasser des Flusses 
Cauvery zu regulieren. Da viele verschiedene Dynastien und Regierungen die 
Beckenregion des Cauvery regierten, werden ihre unterschiedlichen Einflüsse 
bezüglich der Entwicklung von Bewässerungssystemen im Flussbecken erwähnt. 
Wie sich zeigte, förderten die historischen Gegebenheiten, dass sich flussabwärts 
und flussaufwärts des Cauvery Beckens jeweils eigene, wasserintensive 
Bewirtschaftungssysteme in den verschiedenen zeitlichen Perioden entwickelten. 
Dieses Entwicklungsmuster hinterließ einen Konkurrenzkampf der flussaufwärts 
und flussabwärts bewässernden Regionen um dieselbe Ressource und führte 
letztendlich zum Wasserverteilungskonflikt. Die Körperschaft, Cauvery Water 
Dispute Tribunal, die geschaffen wurde, um einen Vertrag zur 
Wasserneuverteilung zu unterzeichnen, konnte kein abschließendes Urteil fällen, 
dass für alle involvierten Staaten des Wasserverteilungskonfliktes annehmbar 
war. Vor diesem Hintergrund betrachtet die vorliegende Studie 1) die Gründe für 
das Fehlen von politischem Interesse an Kooperationen in Form von 
Wasserverteilungsverträgen, 2) bewertet verschiedene gesetzliche, wirtschaftliche 
und geographische Instrumente zur Wasserverteilung und schließlich 3) 
entwickelt sie eine Lösung in Form eines Wassermarktes. Deshalb wird der 
Schwerpunkt mehr auf dem wirtschaftlichen Nutzen liegen, der vom Wasser 
realisiert werden kann, als auf dessen physischer Verteilung. Außerdem 
quantifiziert die Studie 4) die externen Effekte, die bei der Nutzung von 
Grundwasser als alternative Quelle für Wasser entstehen, anstatt der Entwicklung 
eines effizienten Systems, um das Oberflächen Wasser neu zu verteilen.    
Einblicke in die Feldforschung 
Die systematische Auswertung der Daten über das Cauvery Flussbecken aus 
sekundären Quellen ergibt sinnvolle Einsatzwerte für die vorgeschlagene 
Wassermarkt Lösung. Das Modell legt die Daten über Oberflächen- und 
Grundwasserverfügbarkeit offen. Ihr Verbrauch deutet auf einen ineffizienten 
GERMAN SUMMARY (ZUSAMMENFASSUNG) 
 
101 
Gebrauch von Oberflächenwasser und einer zu großen Förderung von 
Grundwasser im Flussbecken hin. Außerdem wird offensichtlich, dass die 
Landwirtschaft der hauptsächliche Nutzer des Flusswassers ist. Der häusliche 
sowie industrielle Bedarf sind damit verglichen sehr gering. Im 
landwirtschaftlichen Sektor,  verbraucht der Reisanbau einen Großteil des 
Wassers. Das liegt an der ineffizienten Bewässerungsmethode der durchgehenden 
Überflutung. Das betont die Notwendigkeit Institutionen aufzubauen, welche die 
Effizienz der Einnahmen auf der Ebene der Landwirte sowie die Effizienz auf der 
Ebene der Wasserverteilung im Becken fördern. 
Die Daten auf Ebene der Landwirte aus der ersten Erhebung umfassen 240 
Landwirte aus 24 Dörfern, 24 Blocks und8 Cauvery Flussbecken Bezirken in 
Karnataka und Tamil Nadu. Die Daten legen offen wie die wirtschaftliche und 
technische Ineffizienz auf der systemischen (Becken) Ebene die Landwirte 
beeinflusst und wie die Ineffizienz der angewandten Bewässerungsmethoden der 
Landwirte das System beeinflusst. Die Landwirte nutzen Grundwasser als 
Ersatzquelle, weil durch die ineffiziente Verteilung des Oberflächenwassers die 
Bewässerung mit der derzeit verwendeten Technologie die Wasserbereitstellung 
des Flussbeckens überschreitet. Aufgrund des Fehlens eines formellen Vertrages 
über die Verteilung des Oberflächenwassers existieren Unsicherheiten in der 
zeitlichen Planung der Wassertransfers zwischen den Staaten , welche auf die 
Ineffizienzen der Wasseraufteilung zwischen den Landwirten zurückgeführt 
werden. Das führt die Landwirte wiederum dazu, Bohrungen zur 
Grundwasserbeförderung durchzuführen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass 
sowohl die Menge, als auch die Qualität des Bewässerungswassers dazu führen, 
dass das Grundwasser die bevorzugte Quelle für Bewässerungswasser der 
Landwirte ist. Der Ausdruck „Qualität“ des Wasserangebots bezieht sich dabei 
nicht auf die physikalische Qualität des Wassers, sondern mehr auf die Qualität 
des Verteilungssystems. Aus den primären und sekundären Datenquellen wird 
ersichtlich, dass die derzeitig beförderten Grundwassermengen die 
Grundwasserneubildung überschreiten und die Grundwasserspiegel auf einen 
alarmierenden Stand fallen. 
Die erste Erhebung zeichnet das Bild eines landwirtschaftlichen Systems, welches 
von kleinen landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben (<2 ha) dominiert wird. Die Landwirte 
in der Studie haben ein durchschnittliches Bildungsniveau von 8 Jahren 
Schulbildung. Außerdem bauen sie vor allem Reis, Zuckerrohr und Hirse an und 
sind stets mit Unsicherheiten bezüglich der zur Vergügung stehenden Menge und 
Qualität des Oberflächenwasserangebots konfrontiert. Sie befördern mehr 
Grundwasser als zurückgebildet werden kann und setzen ineffiziente Methoden 
der Bewässerung ein. Sie versorgen eine Familie mit sechs Mitgliedern. Die 
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Landwirte ziehen Nutzen aus Krediten von formellen oder informellen Quellen, 
um in die Förderung des Grundwassers zu investieren, sogar bei Zinsätzen, 
welche die formalen Banksätze weit übersteigen. 
Die Studie hat ebenso gezeigt, dass die Landwirte keine politische Partei wählen 
würden, welche sich bereit erklärt einen Kompromiss in der Mengenverteilung 
des Oberflächenwassers bezüglich der betroffenen Staaten einzugehen. Die 
Mehrheit der Farmer ist jedoch bereit eine Partei zu wählen, welche volle 
Subventionierung von elektrischen Pumpen zur Beförderung von Grundwasser 
verspricht. 
Das Gefangenen Dilemma in der Wasserverteilung 
Wasserverfügbarkeit ist der Faktor, der über die Zugehörigkeit zur sozialen 
Schicht des Landwirts entscheidet. Mit anderen Worten, der Zugang zu Wasser 
entscheidet, ob er zur Kategorie der armen Landwirte gehört, die im 
Pflanzenanbau abhängig von der zufälligen Regenwahrscheinlichkeit sind, oder 
zur Gruppe der erfolgreichen Landwirte, die einen Zugang zu Oberflächen- 
und/oder Grundwasser haben (oder beides). Daher hängt seine/ihre politische 
Entscheidung von der Strategie einer politischen Partei hinsichtlich des Zugangs 
zu Oberflächen- und Grundwasser zur Bewässerung ab. In diesem Szenario ist es 
für jede Partei am besten, Position für die Nichtkooperation im 
Wasserverteilungsabkommen zu beziehen, als einen Kompromiss zwischen den 
aktuellen oder historischen Verteilungsniveaus im Cauvery Flussbecken 
zuzustimmen. Diese Strategie sichert, dass die konkurrierende Partei keine 
übermäßigen Vorteile bei der Wahl hat, durch das Verkünden ihres 
nichtkooperativen Standpunkts. Die Erkenntnis aus diesem Ergebnis ist die 
Notwendigkeit der Entkopplung der Menge der Wasserverteilung von dem 
ökonomischen Gewinn, den das Wasser repräsentiert. 
Ein Wassermarkt als Lösung des Wasserverteilungsproblems 
Zur Entkopplung der Wasserrechte (oder zur ersten Wasserverteilung) von den 
Nettogewinnen die das Wasser repräsentiert, kann ein Markt für Wasserrechte 
eingeführt werden. Bei Bestehen eines Marktes für Wasserrechte wird die 
endgültige Verteilung des Wassers von Angebot und Nachfrage entschieden, auch 
wenn die anfängliche Verteilung durch ein Wasserverteilungsabkommen geregelt 
wird. Auch wenn die Lösung bereits von mehreren Forschern vorgeschlagen 
wurde, sind die größten Hemmnisse gegenihre Einführung die hohen 
Transaktionskosten des (1) Ermittelns von Erfordernissen eines funktionierenden 
Wassermarktes, dass heißt die Verteilung der anfänglichen Wasserrechte und die 
Gewährleistung, dass das Wassers zu den individuellen Feldern gelangt, (2) die 
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hohen Transaktionskosten einen adäquaten und willigen Käufer für individuelle 
Wasserrechte zu finden und (3) die damit verbundenen administrativen Kosten 
der Neuverteilung der Wasseransprüche.  Um die Kosten der Etablierung und der 
Transaktion des Wassermarktes zu reduzieren, ist beabsichtigt, die Anzahl der 
Akteure auf dem Wassermarkt zu verkleinern, indem die Verteilungsrechte 
anstelle einzelnen Betrieben Gemeinschaften von Landwirten (Wasser Nutzer 
Verbände) zugesprochen werden,. Auf einem solchen Markt können die 
Wasserrechte von den Wasser Nutzer Verbänden gekauft und verkauft werden.   
Die unmittelbare Frage, die beantwortet werden muss, ist, wie die Koordination 
der Wasser Nutzer Verbände erreicht werden kann, so dass die Gemeinschaft als 
eine einzige Person auf dem Markt auftritt. Wenn ein Wassermarkt gegeben ist, 
hat jeder Wasser Nutzer Verband die Möglichkeit, wassersparende Techniken in 
seinem Rechtsbereich einzusetzen und den Überschuss an Rechten zu verkaufen, 
wenn die Preise der Wasserrechte  die Kosten des Einsatzes der wassersparenden 
Technik ausgleichen. Die Herausforderung besteht also darin, die Nutzung von 
wassersparenden Techniken auf den individuellen Höfen so zu koordinieren, dass 
der gesammelte Wasserüberschuss gehandelt werden kann. Es wird dabei 
angenommen, dass die Wasser Nutzer Verbände (Verkäufer) genügend 
Wasserrechte zur Bewässerung ihrer Flächen mit der aktuellen Technologie 
aufweisen. Eine Lösung für das Problem bietet eine Einkommensteilung mittels 
eines Wassersparvertrags zwischen dem Wassernutzer Verband und dem 
einzelnen Landwirt. Die Einkommensteilung im Wassersparvertrag erfolgt über 
drei Instrumente zur Koordination des Verhaltens des Landwirts und nutzt ein 
Hauptvertreter Modell: 1) Es wird ein fester Betrag als Vorauszahlung an den 
Landwirt gezahlt dafür, dass er dem Vertrag beitritt, 2) eine variable 
Einkommensteilung, 3) Teilung des Gewinns aus dem Wasserhandel. Die Teilung 
des Gewinns baut sich aus dem gesamten erwirtschafteten Wasserüberschuss auf. 
Daraus ergibt sich ein Anreiz, als Team zu agieren. Verglichen mit der aktuellen 
Wasserverteilung kann der Wasserhandel im Cauvery Becken nur dann zum 
Pareto optimalen Anstieg der Gewinne führen, , wenn die Kosten des Einkaufs 
zusätzlicher Wasserrechte niedriger sind, als die Kosten, die den Wasser Nutzer 
Verbänden auf der Nachfrageseite entstehen für die Verwendung einer 
alternativen Wasserquelle, wie dem Grundwasser. Um also den Preis 
abzuschätzen unter welchem die Wasserrechte eine realisierbare Alternative sind, 
müssen die Kosten der Förderung von Grundwasser berechnet werden. 
Kostenschätzung der Grundwasserförderung 
Die drei Kostenkomponenten der Grundwasserförderung sind 1) 
Investitionskosten in Bohrbrunnen und Pumpanlagen, 2) Pumpkosten, das heißt 
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Elektrizitätskosten und 3) die durch externe Effekte des fallenden 
Grundwasserspiegels anfallenden Kosten. Die durchschnittlich 
zurückzuzahlenden Investmentkosten pro Hektar für den Aufbau von 
Bohrbrunnen betragen bei diesem Beispiel 5827 indische Rupien (INR). Weil 
Elektrizität stark subventioniert wird, werden die Pumpkosten auf Seiten der 
Landwirte nicht beachtet. Die Kosten der externen Effekte werden durch eine 
räumliche hedonische Regression der Wasserspiegelstände auf Landpreise 
geschätzt. Bei der Durchführung der räumlichen Schätzung wird ein Baye’sches 
Bezugssystem verwendet. Externe Effekte auf Landpreise können so explizit 
modelliert werden. Die Ergebnisse der hedonischen Regression ließen einen 
Verlust von etwa 80000 INR pro Hektar erkennen, bei einem dazugehörigen 
Abfall des Wasserstandes von 4 Metern bis 40 Metern. Es wurde festgestellt, dass 
der Wert eines Ackers an den landpreis eines nichtbewässerten Ackers 
heranreicht, wenn der Wasserspiegel 40 Meter unter die Geländeoberfläche sinkt. 
Ein Abfall von etwa einem Fuß pro Jahr (1 Fuß = 0,3048 Meter) kann den Wert 
eines Ackers um 947 INR (bei einer Tiefe von 9 Metern) bis 151 INR pro Hektar 
(bei einer Tiefe von 43 Metern) und Jahr mindern. Der Abfall von einem Fuß 
(0,3048 Meter) pro Jahr aggregiert sich zu einem Abfall von 3 Metern pro 
Jahrzehnt. Die untersuchten Beckenbezirke werden durch den zentralen 
Grundwasserverband als Gebiete klassifiziert, deren Wasserstand um mehr als 2 
Meter pro Jahrzehnt absinkt. Daher wird die Absenkung des Landwertes, 
beruhend auf einem Abfall des Wasserstandes um 0,3048 Meter, als externe 
Kosten pro Jahr veranschlagt. Deswegen zeigte sich auch, dass die 
durchschnittlichen Kosten der Nutzung des Grundwassers pro Hektar durch die 
Wasser Nutzer Verbände auf der Nachfrageseite etwa 6000 INR bis 7000 INR pro 
Hektar und Jahr betragen. Für einen durchschnittlichen Landwirt, welcher 50 
Prozent seines Wassermangels für zweijährigen Reisanbau (1000 Kubikmeter/ 
Hektar) über Förderung von Grundwasser ausgleicht, beträgt dies 0,6 INR bis 0,7 
INR pro Kubikmeter. Dieser Betrag kann als Nachfragepreis nach 
Oberflächenwasserrechten  gelten. Wenn die Preise der Oberflächenwasserrechte 
dieses Level überschreiten, wird die Förderung von Grundwasser die billigere 
Alternative. 
Angebotspreis von Wasserrechten  
Um zu sehen, ob eine ausreichende Preisdifferenz zwischen Angebots- und 
Nachfragepreisen nach Wasserrechten besteht, wurde eine empirische Simulation 
des Hauptvertreter-Modells zur Einkommensteilung im Wassersparvertrag 
durchgeführt. Die für das Modell benötigten Parameter wurden aus primären und 
sekundären Quellen geschätzt. Die Parameter der Kostenfunktion der 
Wasserspartechnik wurden durch eine Kontingente Bewertung geschätzt.  Dabei 
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wurde eine Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse genutzt, um eine durchschnittliche 
Zahlung zu ermitteln, ab welcher die Landwirte beginnen, zur wassersparenden 
Methode des Anbaus zu wechseln. Die doppelt begrenzte, dichotome 
Anteilsbewertungsanalyse schätzte, dass die Zahlungsbereitschaft der Landwirte 
einen Übergang zur wassersparenden Technik 205.5 INR beträgt. In der 
numerischen Analyse des Hauptvertreter Modells werden Simulationen mit 
Wasserpreisen von 0,2 , 0,3 und 0,4 INR pro Kubikmeter durchgeführt. All diese 
Preise liegen unter dem Nachfragepreis von 0,6 INR. Bei einem Wasserpreis von 
0,2 INR wird eine aggregierte Gebietsverteilung von 88% des gesamten Gebiets 
mit der wassersparenden Anbaumethode erreicht. Wenn der Wasserpreis auf 0,3 
INR stieg, traten alle Landwirte dem Wasser Nutzer Verband bei und boten ihre 
gesamte Anbaufläche für den Anbau nach der wassersparenden Methode an. Die 
numerische Simulation bestätigte, dass die Wasser Nutzer Verbände als Vorsteher 
in der Lage sind, die Teilnahme der Landwirte am Wassersparvertrag Modell zu 
gewährleisten und zwar durch die Bereitstellung einer festen Zahlung zu Beginn 
sowie die Einkommens- und Gewinnteilung. Dadurch wird eine maximale 
Verteilung des Landes zur empfohlenen wassersparenden Methode des Anbaus, 
oder der Bewässerung durch die Landwirte erreicht. Die Studie belegt ebenso, 
dass ein Wasserpreis von 0,3 INR alle Landwirte dazu veranlasst, als Antwort auf 
das Vorsteher Instrument zum wassersparenden Anbau zu wechseln. Außerdem 
kann der Vorsteher eine bescheidene Belohnung für seine Bemühungen erzielen.   
Zusätzlich wurden die Folgen der Nutzung eines Bonus Modells dadurch getestet, 
dass seine Effizienz mit der des Hauptvertreter Modells ohne 
Gewinnteilungsauflage verglichen wurde. Die Analyse zeigte, dass der Vertrag 
mit der Bonus Kondition die maximale Gebietsverteilung bei einem Preis von 0,3 
INR pro Kubikmeter erreicht, während der Vertrag ohne die Bonus Kondition die 
maximale Gebietsverteilung nur bei einem Preis von 0,45 INR pro Kubikmeter 
erreicht und bestätigt damit die Vorteile der Verwendung einer Bonus Kondition.  
Schlussfolgerungen 
Die numerische Simulation belegte, dass eine beachtliche Preisdifferenz zwischen 
dem Angebots- und Nachfragepreis nach Wasser besteht. Es muss bemerkt 
werden, dass die Betriebskosten der Pumpen nicht beachtet werden, weil 
Elektrizität in diesen Gebieten aus politischen Gründen stark subventioniert wird. 
Wenn wir die tatsächlichen Betriebskosten zu den Kosten der 
Grundwassernutzung hinzu addieren, werden beachtliche Kosten des 
Wasserhandels ersichtlich. Dies belegt das Potential der Oberflächenwasser-
Neuverteilung durch einen Markt für Wasserrechte zum Pareto optimalen Anstieg 
der Gewinne für alle Anspruchsberechtigten im Cauvery Becken. 
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Appendix 1: Winbugs code for the Bayesian spatial hedonic regression  
model { 
   for(i in 1:188) { 
      Landprice[i] ~ dnorm(mu1[i], tau) 
     mu1[i] <- alpha + beta.distroad*distroad[i]+ beta.levelwat*levelwat[i] 
+beta.farmsize*farmsize[i]+ beta.soilqual[soilqual[i]]+ theta[Location[i]] 
 } 
# Landprice-Land price per ha 
 
#Attributes of location 
# distroad-distance to road in meters 
# levelwat-level of water in meters 
# Soil quality - 4 levels 
# Distmarkt- Distance to market 
# Determinant of Bargaining Power 
# Farm size in ha 
#Location  
# Spatial location 
# Spatial effects are explicitly modelled as land prices are spatially correlated 
# Spatial area specific random effect 
   theta[1:21] ~ spatial.exp(mu[], x[], y[], vr.inv, phi, kappa) 
    
# Priors for mu 
   for(j in 1:21) { mu[j] <- 0  
# Priors for random effects variance 
   vr.inv ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001) 
   v <- 1/sqrt(vr.inv)             # sd of spatial random effects 
  
# Parameters of spatial exponential covariance function    
   logphi ~ dunif(-12, -5.3)       
 # attributes correlations ranging from 0.000 to 0.940 at distance 10000 m 
 # and correlations ranging from 0.00 to 0.085 at distance 400,000 m 
  phi <- exp(logphi) 
  kappa <- 1 
# prior for variance of land prices 
    tau ~ dgamma(0.01, 0.01) 
 
# vague priors on regression coefficients 
    alpha ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001) 
    beta.distroad~ dnorm(0, 0.00001)      
    beta.levelwat ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001)  
   beta.farmsize ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001) 
   beta.soilqual[1] <- 0          
# set coefficient for baseline soilquality  to zero 
   beta.soilqual[2] ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001)      
   beta.soilqual[3] ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001)      
   beta.soilqual[4] ~ dnorm(0, 0.00001)      
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Appendix 2 :GAMS code for the principal agent model specified in section 7.1  
*………………………………………… 
*DIMENSION DEFINITION 
*………………………………………. 
set J farmers /1*241/ 
    L year /2006/ 
; 
*………………………………………… 
*DATE ENTRY 
*………………………………………… 
Table land(J,L) input data for land area 
 *(not shown)  
; 
*………………………………………… 
*MODEL DEFINITION 
*………………………………………… 
PARAMETERS 
hs conversion coefficient for land to water  /2000/ 
psi slope of cost function /20/ 
phi intercept of the cost function  /205/ 
kappa reservation utility of farmer per ha  /250/ 
Land_data(J,L) data of land area 
member /241/ 
pricewat water price /0.2/ 
A total land area of WUA /565.05/ 
; 
Land_data(J,L)=Land(J,L) 
; 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
alpha(J,L) share of farmer 
beta share as bonus 
ls(J,L)  land area under contract 
eta adjustment factor 
; 
VARIABLES 
PI(J,L) principals obj 
totarea total area under contract scheme 
nprincipinc(J,L) 
bonus(J,L) bonus offered by principal 
agbonus aggreagte bonus 
revenue revenue 
r(J,L) initial payment in water saving contract 
netprincipinc Net principal income 
tPI total income of principal 
totrs total initial incnetive 
totshare total revenue share 
; 
EQUATIONS 
qrevenue revenue of WUA 
qprincipinc(J,L) principals income 
qtotprincipinc gross income of principal 
qincconstr incentive constraint 
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qnetprincipinc(J,L)  principals net income 
qtnetprincipinc toatl net income of principal 
qpartconstr participation constraint 
qlandconstr(J,L) constraint on land under contract scheme 
qbonus(J,L) bonus calculation 
qagbonus aggregate bonus 
qtotarea total area under the contract scheme 
qtotrs total rs 
qtotshare total revenue share 
qbeta restriction on beta 
qbeta2 restriction on bet 
qeta restriction on eta 
qeta2 restriction on eta 
; 
qprincipinc(J,L).. PI(J,L)=E=(1-alpha(J,L))*(pricewat*hs*ls(J,L)-r(J,L)); 
qtotprincipinc.. tPI=E=sum(L,sum(J,(PI(J,L)))); 
qnetprincipinc(J,L).. nprincipinc(J,L)=E=(1-beta)*PI(J,L); 
qtnetprincipinc.. netprincipinc=E=sum(L,sum(J,nprincipinc(J,L))); 
qincconstr(J,l).. ls(J,L)=E=(alpha(J,L)*(1/psi)*pricewat*hs)-
((1/psi)*phi)+eta*(beta*(1/psi)*((totarea)/(A*A))*tPI); 
qtotarea.. totarea=E=sum(L,sum(J,ls(J,L))); 
qrevenue..revenue=E=totarea*hs*pricewat; 
qpartconstr(J,l).. r(J,L)=E=(phi*ls(J,L))+(0.5*psi*ls(J,L)*ls(J,L))-
(alpha(J,L)*pricewat*hs*ls(J,L))-eta*(beta*ls(J,L)*((totarea)/(A*A))*tPI)+(kappa*ls(J,L)); 
qlandconstr(J,L).. ls(J,L)=L=Land_data(J,L); 
qbeta..beta=L=0.9; 
qbeta2..beta=G=0.8; 
qeta..eta=L=1; 
qeta2..eta=G=0; 
qbonus(J,L).. bonus(J,L)=E=beta*((ls(J,L)*totarea)/(A*A))*tPI; 
qagbonus.. agbonus=E=sum(J,sum(L,bonus(J,L))); 
qtotrs.. totrs=E=sum(L,sum(J,r(J,L))); 
qtotshare.. totshare=E=sum(L,sum(J,(alpha(J,L)*(pricewat*hs*ls(J,L)-r(J,L))))); 
*………………………………………… 
*SOLUTION 
*………………………………………… 
Model princagent /all/ 
Solve princagent using DNLP maximizing tPI; 
display 
r.l,alpha.l,tPI.l,ls.l,bonus.l,beta.l,netprincipinc.l,totarea.l,totrs.l,totshare.l,agbonus.l,revenue.l,eta
.l; 
*………………………………………… 
TRANSFER TO EXCEL 
*………………………………………… 
PARAMETERS 
pr paramter for r 
palpha parameter for alpha 
pbeta paramter for beta 
pls paramter for ls 
pbonus paramter for bonus 
; 
pr(J,L)=r.l(J,L); 
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palpha(J,L)=alpha.l(J,L); 
pbeta=beta.l; 
pls(J,L)=ls.l(J,L); 
pbonus(J,L)=bonus.l(J,L); 
$libinclude xldump pr bonuscontract4.xls init 
$libinclude xldump palpha bonuscontract4.xls alph 
$libinclude xldump pbeta bonuscontract4.xls bet 
$libinclude xldump pls bonuscontract4.xls landa 
$libinclude xldump pbonus bonuscontract4.xls bon 
 
 
 
